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Recently, I have been reminded that I have been working on 
pasts and history and time for decades. It makes me wonder to 
what extent my thinking has changed over the past thirty years! 
I think it has; yet such reminders point to repetition and hopes 
for improvement. But above all, it suggests that I have received 
the help of a large number of friends, colleagues, and institu-
tions. These acknowledgments will no doubt overlook many— 
my apologies.
In a sense, this manuscript has three origins. First, my recog-
nition that time is an abstraction, not only something learned but 
something social and historical, came at an everyday moment. 
My then young daughter, who has a diurnal clock, came into our 
room on a weekend, asking if we were getting up. “Not until seven 
o’clock” was the answer. She returned several times in approxi-
mately five minute intervals but then stopped; it was well after 
seven. It turned out that she became preoccupied and missed the 
moment when the minute hand reached twelve. She was waiting, 
now very patiently, for precisely seven o’clock. I learned something 
important that day; this turned my attention to not just pasts and 
history but time as an abstract concept, its connection to history, 
and how it orders our lives.
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I did not realize what I was getting into; it has been an intellec-
tually enjoyable and stimulating yet long and meandering sojourn. 
Like so many historians, I figured I knew something about time. 
After teaching several seminars on time and space (once with Jim 
Fujii), I realized that I needed to concentrate on time. Back then, I 
believed that historians had not written much on time; perhaps that 
is true, but I now realize that there is a considerable literature on 
time throughout the recorded past. I am continuing to read, learn, 
and change my way of thinking. Many people and institutions have 
aided me as I wander through the thicket of writings. In particular, 
I have been guided by mentors and friends: Harry Harootunian, 
Luce Giard, and the late Masao Miyoshi. Harry continues to 
inspire, Luce in her elegant yet determined way kept me focused, 
and Masao showed me that I could move beyond my training in the 
history of modern Japan (and cajoled me forward). Each person set 
a tenor of inquiry, a high standard that started with my mentors 
Harry and Tetsuo Najita.
Meetings, such as the symposium on “four modernities” at 
Witswaterand University organized by Dilip Menon, gave me 
confidence to see my work beyond Japan to Asia; the conferences 
of the International Network on Theory in History helped me 
decenter geography from my analyses. Berber Bevernage and his 
colleagues at Ghent have developed a wonderful occasion for 
ideas in history. And it was at a conference on historiography in 
Athens where the lecture by Antonis Liakos on modern Greek 
historiography helped me see the breadth of the system— in my 
mind, I replaced Greek with Japanese, and the isomorphism of 
temporal hierarchy in modern history was uncanny.
The second origin occurred in a not- always- scintillating meet-
ing (more than fifteen years ago) where the topic was the “death” 
of print publishing in the face of the internet. I commented to 
Michael Grossberg that we should do something to make the inter-
net suitable for historical communication, not wait for it to change 
how history published. As a forward- looking editor, he responded 
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something like, “Good idea, Stefan; you do something.” This began 
my inquiry into digital media, the digital humanities, and now 
scholarly communication.
This is the second rabbit hole— the intersection of digital media 
and academia. On the one hand, I embarked on a typical digital 
humanities track. I created a project and began to port material to 
the digital interface. My muse in this adventure has been Jan Reiff, 
who has provided sage advice as well as well as conversations that 
this exploration with digital media could be more. My first foray 
presenting research in the digital humanities was at the Confer-
ence on Digital Research in the Humanities and Arts at Darting-
ton. Thank you to Barry Smith and the committee for including 
me and to Ric Allsopp and Scott Delahunta for including my essay 
in Performance Research (2006). I was reminded that digital media 
also has a history (cliometrics) at the University of Wisconsin, 
Milwaukee; thank you to Doug Howland for the opportunity. 
For some reason, Kenneth Price, Katherine Walter, and William 
Thomas invited me to the Nebraska Digital Workshop, University 
of Nebraska, Lincoln, in 2010. This was an important moment, 
reaffirming what I was trying to do but forcing me to consider 
time much more seriously than I had. Moreover, this was, and I 
hope is, a part of the future of the digital humanities, helping us 
think differently about scholarship, understanding, and dissemi-
nation. Finally, I must acknowledge the collegiality and collabora-
tion of Jessica Pressman, Katherine Hijar, and Maura Giles- Watson. 
Through SD|DH (San Diego Digital Humanities), we worked to fos-
ter institutional presence (and to provide moral support/therapy) 
in the digital humanities locally.
The third moment came amid my waywardness, reading and 
thinking about time and history but without clear direction. Kwai 
Ng, my colleague in sociology, called and asked me to present the 
Joseph Gusfield Lecture and suggested the surreptitious title of 
the last seminar I taught in the history department, “History as 
Media.” In the course of our discussion, I suggested “History 
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without Chronology.” This led to my Public Culture essay— I’m 
thankful to Fred Turner for encouraging me to submit my work 
to that fine journal. This book is an expanded (and modified) 
version of the inquiry I broached in that essay.
This book would not have been possible without the environ-
ment of the University of California, San Diego (UCSD)— both 
because and in spite of it. Above all, it is a place where contacts 
beyond disciplines are possible, though not without contention. 
First, when I relocated from history to the Department of Com-
munication, I encountered Robert Horwitz; I send thanks to him 
for getting this going (my discussions started when Robert and 
I found ourselves in physical therapy sessions following opera-
tions). I knew life would be better but had little idea how lib-
erating it would become. This comment is not to be read as a 
criticism of my previous department; it is a worry on the ways that 
disciplines discipline, a tendency that often fosters risk- adverse 
intellectual practices. Academics all know this; I am still learning 
the different ways it happens. In short, I can now think about 
history in addition to practicing history. I am deeply grateful to 
all my colleagues in the department for our intellectually vibrant 
environment. The Laboratory for Comparative Human Devel-
opment, founded and directed by Michael Cole, was a terrific 
environment for thinking about the processes and ideas of devel-
opment and temporality. I thank Mike and the many people who 
visited and participated in the lab. Geof Bowker has become an 
important friend and confidant, which began in a class on time 
to first- year students that we taught outside of our home depart-
ments. I was able to teach a class on cybernetics through the 
Macy Foundation conferences with Deborah Forster and Eric 
Leonardis— it was a weekly adventure. An important respite from 
UCSD was opened up by a visiting position at UCLA for two quar-
ters as the Terasaki chair for US- Japan relations. Thank you, Bill 
Marotti, for making it possible; thanks as well to our class and 
the class with Jan on the digital humanities. When I returned to 
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UCSD and was trying to figure out how to foster activities in Japa-
nese studies after several departures, Seth Lerer convinced me to 
apply to be director and restart the Center for the Humanities. 
His action further convinced me that there were many ways to 
work beyond our silos; ideas matter. The center, with the able 
partnership of Sarah McCollough, the associate director, helped 
me transform ideas into programs. In talking to students over 
the years, I realize the different classes I taught turned out to 
have a similar theme: time. They perhaps saw it before I did. More 
important, they persevered. While I hope they learned, those 
classes certainly helped me work through these ideas. My thanks 
to Christina Aushana, Michael Berman, Waqas Butt, Orianna 
Cacchione, Yelena Gluzman, Jacob Hellman, Ramsey Ismail, Jes-
sica Jordan, Ji Hee Jung, Satoko Kakihara, Jack Jin Gary Lee, Kate 
McDonald, Stephen Mandiberg, Ryan Moran, Jon Paden, Erika 
Ramirez, Brizila Rodriguez, Tomoyuki Sasaki, Yi Hong Sim, Katie 
Simpson, Tad Skotnicki, George Solt, Jonathan Walton, and Rika 
Yonemura. To emphasize that these classes were often conceptu-
ally fraught, I paraphrase Gary, who recently told me that the class 
he took still haunts him. For me, that’s high praise!
Several events and people have helped in the writing of this 
book. It has been quite a test to keep it relatively brief, set the right 
tone, and convey the gist of the message. The Gusfield lecture got 
me off to a good start, and attempts to present my work through 
PechaKucha- style presentations helped me think of concision and 
audience. The Nebraska Digital Workshop was the most mem-
orable event (for a fun but less- than- successful sprint). Several 
friends have provided invaluable suggestions on earlier versions 
of this manuscript; thank you to Michael Berman, Geof Bowker, 
Michael Cole, Edward Dickinson, Sally Deutsch, Erin Glass, Kath-
erine Hijar, Robert Horwitz, Helge Jordheim, Howard Kushner, 
Jay Lemke, Chris Lorenz, Jessica Pressman, Hillel Schwartz, and 
Espen Ytreberg. Of course, I thank the anonymous reviewers for 
their generous and constructive reading.
x A C k n o w l e d g m e n t s
This work benefited from important institutional support. 
First, I was able to read and write a draft during a yearlong sabbati-
cal from UCSD. The academic senate of UCSD has generously pro-
vided research grants at different points of my inquiry, but there 
is another part of the senate that has directly, and intellectually, 
contributed to this work. We frequently see university and pro-
fessional service as taking away from research. The meetings are 
often boring, yet I have had many fruitful conversations with col-
leagues on academic senate committees. Those discussions show 
up in this book; in particular, I have fond memories of conver-
sations about time with Henry Abarbanel, Farrell Ackerman, and 
Katja Lindenberg. Finally, I recently returned from a stimulating 
and generative few months at the Center for Advanced Study at 
the Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters as a research fel-
low of the project “Insync: How Synchronization and Mediation 
Produce Collective Times, Then and Now,” directed by Helge Jord-
heim and Espen Ytreberg. It was a home of major, though off- center 
intellectuals (e.g., three historians, none in a history department) 
who share a related interest in history, media, and time. I was able to 
improve, correct, and hone the manuscript as a visiting researcher 
at the warm and intellectually vital center. Unfortunately, I learned 
of many topics, issues, and people I should have known about before 
writing and incorporated into this book. I now have ideas for 
future research on what histories without chronology might be.
Work in the digital humanities also made me aware of new 
modes of scholarly communication, including open access. There 
is much hope for more interactive forms of publishing that use the 
affordances of digital media. Margy Avery has provided important 
support and encouragement and, in particular, made me aware of 
Lever Press, and an exchange with Lisa Trivedi helped me decide. 
Beth Bouloukos has the unenviable position of building a portfo-
lio for a new press that is looking forward while negotiating the 
world of inherited practices and institutions. Thank you, Beth, for 
keeping the hope of new forms of scholarly communication alive. 
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Also, thank you to Amanda Karby for shepherding this manuscript 
through the press.
Most important, I thank my family. Kyoko has been wonderfully 
supportive even on weekends as I labored on this project. The long 
gestation for this book coincides with the lifetimes of Alisa and 
Keenan. They have gracefully shared the presence of these ideas 
and humored— and at times even respected— quips on time and 
history. This book is dedicated to them, in the hopes that they will 
continue to honor but not be unnecessarily beholden to the past.
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Recast in the mold of a taxonomic ordering of things, chronology 
becomes the alibi of time, a way of making use of time without reflect-
ing on it.
— Michel de Certeau (1986: 216)
[Time] has its origins in the life process, in the creativity of the mind, 
and in social conventions and modes of communication.
— J. T. Fraser (1987: 4)
The denial of time and complexity was central to the cultural issues 
raised by the scientific enterprise in its classical definition. . . . Today 
interest is shifting from substance to relation, to communication,  
to time.
— Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1984: 8)
My title is admittedly provocative.1 My point is not to conceive of a 
history shorn of time, nor is it a denial of successivity; it is not an end 
to history. Instead, I argue that history must embrace the richness 
and variability of different times that exist throughout our lives, are 
evident in nonmodern societies and historical writings about them, 
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and have become common in various sciences throughout the 
twentieth century. To conflate time and chronology is to succumb 
to what Michel de Certeau calls an alibi— to make “use of time with-
out reflecting on it.” Moreover, it is to ignore (as J. T. Fraser, one of 
the great scholars on time, points out) time as emanating from life 
(biological and social processes) in favor of a mechanical metric that 
I will argue has restricted the possibilities of history. The physicist 
Erwin Schrödinger writes, “We must be prepared to find [the struc-
ture of living matter] working in a manner that cannot be reduced 
to the ordinary laws of physics” ([1944] 1967: 76).2 And the “denial 
of time” referred to by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers ignores 
life processes and the structure of living matter by using Newto-
nian time (now called “classical time” in the sciences). I engage with 
what they identified as a shifting interest (thirty years ago!) that was 
moving from substance— the question of what is— to relations and 
communication. My hope, then, of a history without chronology 
is an engagement in the multiple times that already exist but have 
been subsumed or ignored by classical time.
The slowness of the shifting interest identified by Prigogine 
and Stengers suggests that this is not another fashionable “turn” of 
academic production; it should be more. To punctuate a need for 
such an inquiry, I will invoke two major intellectuals, Norbert Elias 
and Michel Serres. During the last decade of the twentieth century, 
both argued that we need a different understanding of time; they 
criticized the prevailing understanding of modern time that we use 
in everyday life, liberal- capitalism, and scholarship, especially in 
the humanities and social sciences. This is the time of Newtonian 
science, an absolute time, external to human society. First, Elias 
wrote, “An enquiry into ‘time’, as one may have noticed, is a useful 
point of departure for the great spring- cleaning that is long over-
due. There is always a need for it when an intellectual tradition 
providing the basic means of orientation within its societies has 
run its course for several centuries, as ours has from the (so called) 
Renaissance to the present time” (1992: 93– 94). Second, Serres 
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went further, pondering whether progressive time is a persistent 
myth like the idea that the earth is flat: “But, irresistibly, I cannot 
help thinking that this idea is the equivalent of those ancient dia-
grams we laugh at today, which place the Earth at the center of 
everything, or our galaxy at the middle of the universe, to satisfy 
our narcissism” (Serres with Latour 1995: 48).
I believe that it is an important moment to take up Elias’s 
challenge for a spring cleaning, and as uncomfortable as Serres’s 
statement might be, he is not an intellectual who can be easily 
dismissed. Over the past decade or so, scholars have been increas-
ingly discussing time and temporality, and there have been many 
excellent interventions from which I have benefited. But popular-
ity has also brought what one might call a casual use of the nouns 
time and temporality. Too often, despite this move toward a reflec-
tive understanding, time and temporality still operate within a 
notion of absolute time; they merely denote the past, sequence, or 
history (with all its ambiguity and generality).3 Tom Boellstorff has 
pointed out that when anthropology shifted from the hierarchical 
notion of “Culture” to heterogeneous cultures, it did not also dis-
card the linear time— here, chronology— that undergirded the for-
mer (2007a: 30– 34). In spite of the occasional and quite powerful 
inquiries into the problem of time, historians and historical think-
ing still operate within a framework that predisposes us toward 
a progressivist and mechanistic desire (or, at minimum, vocab-
ulary); time is still accepted as absolute and natural. Such work 
reaffirms Certeau’s assertion of chronology as the “alibi of time,” 
an unreflected- on category in the discipline of history. Linearity 
and taxonomy continue— barely modified, at best. We need to do 
more than change a few nouns and verbs. Unless historians— who 
should be better equipped?— also decenter chronological time, we 
still operate within the nineteenth- and twentieth- century frame-
works, despite our denials.
I take seriously Eelco Runia’s refreshingly honest but damn-
ing comment that opens his book: “Sometimes, in unguarded 
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moments, I mutter to my students that ‘historians don’t think.’ . . . 
the discipline puts a premium on ‘sorting things out,’  .  .  . And 
‘thinking,’ I go on, is turning things upside down, is awakening 
dogs that lie sleeping, is taking things apart, is, in short, will-
fully making a mess” (2014: xi). This “mess” is thinking anew— 
questioning existing structures, categories, and methods that have 
delimited the relation of the present with what is previous (past) as 
well as anticipated. Elizabeth Ermarth recognizes the potential of 
the sciences (physical and biological) since Newton for reconsider-
ing our understanding of societies. She writes, “We are surrounded 
by a world that operates on the principles of quantum theory; 
we are living in mental worlds that operate on the principles of 
Newton.  .  .  . But in the subvisible and stellar worlds that sur-
round us, things have changed, and those changes limit the scope 
and importance both of Newtonian mechanics and of historical 
thinking” (1992: 10). Thermodynamics, special relativity, quan-
tum mechanics, chronobiology, and cybernetics (complexity) have 
changed the scientific understanding of time, and these times alter 
how we understand physical and social processes. To this, we need 
to add work in cognition that shows that the modes of transmis-
sion of information— reading and learning— are but one part of a 
complex of environment, inherited understanding, and moment.
To ignore more recent understandings of time and cognition 
gives credence to Serres’s indictment that those who deny (or 
ignore) such scientific understandings are like those who persisted 
that the earth is flat. In short, our understanding of history is now 
mythical. We must recognize that continued use of classical time 
destabilizes those ideas based on it and potentially places them 
within a mythical mode of thought. Hans Blumenberg warned, 
“The mythical mode of thought works toward evidentness in the 
articulation of time; it is able to do this because no one ever asks 
for its chronology” (1985: 100). If myth is understood as the “prac-
tical verities in which the members of the community all believe 
and live” (Mali 2003: 4), then absolute time has achieved a mythical 
5I n t r o d u C t I o n
status in the merger of chronology and history. Blumenberg’s 
mythical mode (our current system) prevails; that conceptual 
system is linear and regular, and it homogenizes life according to 
mechanical, linear processes. In its merger with history, chronol-
ogy has become a social technology that guides and controls us 
(Mumford 1934). It imposes structure, an ordered mechanical life; 
it relegates humanistic work— ideas, culture, interpretation, and 
ethics— to a secondary or lesser value compared to measured work; 
and it guiles us into thinking that we are better than those before.
The epigraph from Fraser captures the difficulty of posing an 
inquiry into the relation between time and history. Indeed, time is 
embedded in life and in modernity; one can go so far as reiterate 
Marx: “Time is everything, man is nothing; he is at the most the 
incarnation of time” (quoted in Lukács 1971: 89).4 Fraser unpacks 
Marx’s statement a bit. Time is embedded in life processes, human 
reckoning, and cultural practices— that is, the rhythms of all types 
of organisms as well as the movement of the planets, stars, and 
galaxies. But there is an ambiguity in Fraser’s statement and clas-
sical time. Classical time is external to human activity; it is based 
on Newtonian physics. It has been critical in the formulation of 
modern systems that guide, organize, order, and control. He points 
out that we have been using a mechanical metric to order and 
understand life processes. Another way of conceiving of the dif-
ference is that the former necessitates knowledge of the past; his-
tory through chronological time has emphasized measurement of 
categorical units. In contrast, the latter— histories based on times 
that are from life processes, human cognition, and social activity— 
becomes an important inquiry that can emphasize human rela-
tionality and communication about pasts and their relevance to 
the present. It allows for multiple forms of evidence, and it sug-
gests narrative strategies to broaden the connections of pasts to 
some present. I don’t think this is a very controversial statement, 
and many historians have been trying to do so. Yet the problems I 
outline above persist or are getting worse.
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My hope is that in this renewed interrogation of time, scholars, 
especially historians, first recognize the historicity of chronol-
ogy as a construct that claims externality and has gained mate-
rial expression through the clocks, calendars, conceptual forms, 
and social structures built on them (chapters 1 and 2). Second, 
I hope they consider how scientific understandings of time that 
have emerged in the twentieth century might be adapted to recon-
ceive relations of the present and pasts (chapters 3 and 4). A his-
tory without chronology is an attempt to offer to history— and the 
humanistic sciences— a significance that, I believe, they deserve in 
our lives and our world. It is my attempt to think anew, to make a 
“mess” (which includes recovery) where we incorporate the mul-
tiple times and various temporalities that simultaneously operate 
in our worlds.
DIGITAL HUMANITIES
Origin stories in history (including my three beginnings in the 
acknowledgments) are always suspect. Indeed, this is especially a 
problem of chronological structures; they often disclose the con-
clusion. Nevertheless, in an essay that will argue for the transpar-
ency of process and the efficacy of stories, I should come clean. 
This project was born out of frustration and liberation. The frus-
tration is my own failure; I have long been interested in the relation 
between pasts and history (Tanaka 1993), which led me to abso-
lute time and modern society (Tanaka 2004). Yet I recognize that 
these books failed in my attempt to move beyond a teleological 
history. Criticism often reinforces the status quo despite reflec-
tion and what seems like separation. In writing those books, I was 
influenced by a number of intellectuals, such as Walter Benjamin, 
Michel de Certeau, Reinhart Koselleck, Siegfried Kracauer, and 
Hayden White. I still am. I see my failure, though, as verification 
of Lev Vygotsky’s theory of learning as a zone of proximal devel-
opment (discussed in chapter 3). As I learn more, I continue to see 
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things they wrote that I had overlooked. I now see those histori-
ans as questioning change in history and believe that history is a 
discipline that does not describe how change happens; the prob-
lem of change is discussed in chapter 4. Instead, history describes 
how societies, nations, and people (biography) became what we 
know them to be. The very structure of the historical discipline, 
despite the intent of historians, is conservative. History— whether 
through acclaim or criticism— reinforces the status quo.
The liberation is in my engagement with digital media and work 
on new media. I see this book as a project of the digital humanities. 
This text is certainly not a typical digital humanities product; it 
is the same long- form (hopefully shortened enough to get the mes-
sage across) text formatted into a pdf that is printed electronically 
or on paper. Yet it is a part of the digital humanities because my 
engagement with digital media has forced me to look anew into 
how I conceive of and write history. I have been cajoled by what I 
now call O’Donnell’s Law— uptake of digital media increasingly 
pushes us toward first principles (O’Donnell 2016)— and these first 
principles seem just to keep coming! Initial use of digital media often 
enhances current practices, and we have developed new resources, 
tools, and practices that help us port current analog practices to 
digital tools and media— for example, electronic dissemination of 
published work, building digital archives, using mapping software, 
and adding pictures to narratives.5 That process, however, gradually 
raises questions and exposes inconsistencies that lead toward an 
inquiry into first principles. This process has led me to questions 
of evidence, of a “fact,” how things are categorized, how we con-
nect (or not) those pasts, and finally to the viability of absolute time 
and absolute space in understanding human activity. These inqui-
ries today range from long- accepted assumptions and categories 
to considerations of purpose and audience. The opportunity is the 
possibility of other ways to know about and re- present pasts.
I consider this a digital humanities study in another sense. 
This book is short; that is intentional. The affordances of digital 
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media encourage scholars to think about audience and how we 
communicate— it would be ironic (but not uncommon) for a nar-
rative that argues for communication to be monologic. A regular 
academic monograph on time that covers the topics here would 
be much longer. I remember a panel at the American Historical 
Association annual meeting where I interpreted a statement by 
David Armitage as something like “historians publish to close off 
discussion.” Arguments are carefully argued with much detail, 
many caveats, and footnotes that show the nuances of the argu-
ment. We write, well aware of potential criticisms, and employ 
preemptive tactics. The result is a carefully argued narrative that 
is written for a rather tiny audience of fellow specialists.
The advocacy for communication, then, appears in two ways. 
My hope is that by unleashing history from chronological time, 
we might again allow history to be also a form of communication 
about pasts and their relevance to the present, not just a knowl-
edge about the past. Ultimately, I hope to suggest a history that 
enlarges the past into pasts as well as pasts in the present, allows 
for multiple forms of evidence, and suggests narrative strate-
gies to broaden the connections of histories to the present. With 
this book— and its relative brevity, the copyright, and the digital 
affordances— I hopefully help move academia another step from 
publishing toward scholarly communication. I had hoped the digi-
tal version would incorporate some of the affordances of that media 
not available in print.6 The one exciting addition is the opportunity 
for readers to comment and annotate the text online. This can be 
a different form of review— not only of books but also of ideas in 
books. These annotations will be open, and annotations can also 
be annotated. This can be a way for readers to amend and cor-
rect this book (occasional corroboration or praise would be nice!); 
in my idyllic world where we return to scholarly communication 
(as contrasted with publishing), the comments would accumu-
late into another (collectively authored) book. These forms do put 
into practice some of my key arguments: the value and richness of 
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heterogeneity, the presence of multiple perspectives, and the rec-
ognition of differentials in reception/learning. In short, it is not 
meant to be a book that explains a topic but one that opens up 
conversation on historical thinking.
Digital media raises another issue for humanistic scholarship, 
boundaries between objects, information, facts, knowing, and 
understanding.7 Throughout the twentieth century, intellectuals 
have variously questioned the role of the human and cognition in 
relation to technology. This continues, and despite (or because of) 
the current obsession with STEM, it remains unresolved (and is 
not readily resolvable). When we step back, we can learn from work 
on new media and media archaeology that emphasizes that we 
are in an era of information inflation (Castillo and Egginton 2017; 
Huhtamo and Parikka 2011; Smith Rumsey 2016; Standage 2013; 
and Zielinski 2006). Such work shows that history also has a con-
text. Castillo and Egginton describe inflationary media as a satura-
tion that “is provoking a crisis in how we perceive and understand 
reality” (2017: 1). They place the first major era subsequent to the 
spread of the printing press. It led to new ways of seeing, knowing, 
and experiencing through visual perspective, print culture, and the 
theater. We are in the second major era, the electronic (beginning 
with the telegraph), where information (transmitted and stored) is 
separated from the materiality of what it represents. Information 
is at the center, and time- space has been continually compressing.8
History has an interesting place in this transformation; this will 
be sketched in chapter 2. On the one hand, it becomes a knowledge 
system that creates a new reality following the first crisis. Castillo 
and Egginton point to the nation- state as one of the outcomes of 
the earlier era of inflationary media (2017: 2). History helped stabi-
lize the uncertainty that followed the spread of print; it created a 
new reality. Again, this speaks to the conservative tendency of his-
tory and its complementarity to printed work, especially the book. 
On the other hand, from a different vantage point, history can be 
seen as an early moment in the history of information. Information, 
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according to Claude Shannon, is separated from meaning (Shannon 
and Weaver 1949); this abstraction is at the heart of the rise of com-
puter science, artificial intelligence, and robotics.9 History’s notion 
of “facts” can be seen as a predecessor to Shannon’s definition. This 
similarity requires that we look beyond the division between sci-
ence and the humanities and instead consider this understanding 
of information as the naturalization of a mechanical system of 
ordering with its various biases. In the formation of modern history, 
“facts” are the contents of documents abstracted from their sites of 
creation and places of meaning. Though perhaps not at the same 
level as cliometrics, algorithms, and Big Data today, chronological 
time, nevertheless, is a metric that quantifies. As I show in chap-
ters 1 and 2, it does change what counted as history from a qual-
itative to quantitative mode of analysis, from individual accounts 
to knowledge of some collective singular. We must also remember 
that history itself is being formed at the same time that statistics 
and probability were entering our knowledge system. Clifford Sis-
kin (2016: 43– 77) shows that the words system and history became 
common and connected at the end of the eighteenth century.
If history is indeed interested in qualitative accounts, then 
historical thinking must also be open to qualitative ways of re- 
presenting pasts; the digital has pushed me to think not only 
about facts and recorded happenings but also about the similar-
ities between oral and electronic forms of communication (Foley 
2012; Herman 2013; Saussy 2016; Standage 2013). Digital media, 
then, offers us an opportunity to reevaluate the nature and use of 
past material and whether this flattening is an extension of the 
“fact” and to use the affordances of technology to present history 
in multimodal forms, beyond the text (this will be the next part of 
this project: to “write” examples of a history without chronology). 
Once we understand the ways that chronology orients us in par-
ticular directions away from people and experience and see that 
the long- form text, the book, complements that emphasis, we can 
open history to other forms (storytelling and databases) and media 
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(comics and visual forms). My hope is not to make history more 
enticing (this, I believe, is an important concern) but to write his-
tories that maintain the heterogeneity of and interweave human 
experiences and sensibilities with “major” events.
Finally, the pervasiveness of digital media; the concern about 
time, especially the compression into presentism; and the angst of 
the discipline make this a good moment to think about historical 
inquiry. While this is not a study that directly addresses the angst 
of the historical field in the second decade of the twenty- first cen-
tury, we can see the calls from Elias and Serres to reconsider the 
way we understand time and the past as their engagement with 
the second era of information inflation. When we ignore the tem-
poral distance (and presumption of advancement) enforced by 
dates, we can see a different “reality.” For example, we open up 
the possibility for connections between our current states and 
pasts, what some are calling “deep time” (Zielinski 2006). Smith 
Rumsey, for example, chastises us: “Now that we have discovered 
through empirical science that memory is a dynamic process, 
strongly inflected by emotion and spatialized in the brain, we have 
almost caught up with the ancient Greeks” (2016: 171). Certeau, in 
his encounter with mystics of sixteenth- and seventeenth- century 
Europe, looks for how they operated during moments when their 
“reality” changed in a world destabilized from the epistemology 
that had provided order (1992, 2015). As we know, mystics did not 
prevail; they were dismissed to a newly created past by a ratio-
nal and scientific knowledge system— the basis of our modern 
knowledge system. We too are in transition; we now know that 
Enlightenment thought has not delivered the promised certainty 
and truth, and its limitations are increasingly apparent. Our sci-
entific understanding of time has changed, and the gulf with the 
basis of our modern knowledge system, absolute time, is widening.
Like the mystics, today we are uncertain how to proceed. One 
reaction might be to wonder whether history is also in danger 
of becoming, like the mystics that history helped suppress, what 
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Certeau calls “a proud tradition humbled” (1992: 21). Perhaps there 
is some danger— but certainly if we don’t consider these develop-
ments in other fields. Barbara Adam suggests the importance of a 
better understanding of time: “The explicit focus on time forces 
us to question established traditions, deprives us of old certain-
ties and presents us instead with potential” (1995: 11). I agree; the 
recent decline in enrollments and criticism of humanistic inquiry 
make this a good time to reconsider our relation with pasts and 
our surroundings. Luce Giard’s description of Certeau’s goal helps 
reorient us: “to learn from the past how a social group traverses the 
desertion of its beliefs and how it might profit from the conditions 
to which it is subjected in order to invent its liberty and plot out a 
space of movement” (Giard 2015: ix). In his Rhythmanalysis, Henri 
Lefebvre argues that it is not about the self; he asserts that Des-
cartes’s cogito has run its course. Instead, to think is to consider 
“the diverse relations between human being and the universe” 
(2004: 17).
In the same way that the absence of chronology helps us see 
isomorphisms across eras, a “future” can also provide us hints. By 
future, I am thinking not of what is unknown and ahead of us but 
of the ideas and understandings of twentieth- century science, 
many of which have not yet had a significant impact on history, 
and of affordances offered by digital media.10 Various theories, 
laws, and research— for example, on relative time, thermody-
namics, biological times, and cognitive science— have suggested 
the simplicity and even inaccuracy of our current understandings 
of absolute time, absolute space, and the direct correspondence 
between object and meaning. Similarities between earlier modes 
of understanding and recent science raise the question of whether 
the rationality and science of the past three hundred years is the 
anomaly rather than the norm. The cognitive scientist David Her-
man suggests an understanding that connects nonmodern forms of 
understanding with current cognitive science: “The real becomes 
not a kernel of factuality to which all world- versions can and 
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should be reduced, but rather a zone of potentiality that refuses 
reduction to any single account of the way things are” (2013: 149).
OCCLUSIONS AND INVERSIONS
That there is a problem with linear time is certainly not a new con-
tribution; scholars, including historians, have long criticized linear-
ity. Today, more scholars acknowledge a general decline of the idea 
of “progress” and are critical of teleology, and the hope for some 
future seems absent, shallow, or short term (Bowker 2014). In Ger-
man history, David Blackbourn and Geoff Eley (1984) raise the pos-
sibility of multiple modernities to get away from the teleology of 
modernization theory; the writings of Harry Harootunian, Masao 
Miyoshi, and Tetsuo Najita have been central to the current denial 
of modernization theory in Japanese history (Najita and Scheiner 
1978; Miyoshi and Harootunian 1989, 2002). Of course, the rise of 
subaltern studies has decentered the imperium (Chatterjee 1986; 
Chakrabarty 2000), and an important debate calling teleology into 
question exists in queer studies (Boellstorff 2007a; Traub 2013). 
There is much more.
Yet despite a long history of criticism, the persistence of lin-
ear conceptualizations can be attributed to the way that chrono-
logical time is hidden, lurking in the shadows of such critiques. 
This will be discussed in chapter 2 on history. There are two basic 
acts that have recurred as I have considered chronology and his-
torical understanding. In my readings on historiography, scholars 
often use words like occult, masquerade, specter, and so on to sig-
nify hidden forms that obscure the production and presentation 
of research. Often, it is unwitting, necessary for the reduction of 
vast material into relatively short (but still long) books or essays. 
Even more, there is a powerful structure that maintains the knowl-
edge system, channeling historians to predetermined categories 
and questions. Thomas Kuhn writes, “In history, more than in any 
other discipline I know, the finished product of research disguises 
14 H I s to ry  w I t H o u t  C H r o n o l o gy 
the nature of the work that produced it” (1977: x).11 I doubt that 
history is alone here, but this is a lack of transparency for a disci-
pline that prides itself on documentation (i.e., footnotes).
When I first encountered Kuhn’s comment, I thought about the 
primary material— the documents, stories, details, contingency, and 
discoveries— that is a part of the pleasure of research but is written 
out of our (often soporific) monographs. On the one hand, the cri-
teria of documentation and the “fact” delimits and often eliminates 
experience, emotions, and the senses from modern history; the era-
sure of individual details, sensibilities, and their accounts is a part of 
the shift to a modern history. I recognize that numerous historians 
have been trying to reinstate many of these human sensibilities for 
decades but, I argue, have been restricted by a structure and meth-
odology institutionalized over the past two hundred years. With the 
digital technologies, expanded archives, creativity of many histori-
ans, and multiple times, we can bring the heterogeneity of human 
experience as well as the variability of change back into history. In 
chapter 3, I argue that an understanding of heterogeneous pasts aids 
in recovering human sensibilities as a part of history.
I now read Kuhn’s statement to reflect a more sinister problem, 
a hidden (yet in the open for all to see) framework— chronological 
time.12 The difficulty of unpacking modern time is evident in Wal-
ter Benjamin’s critique of this empty, homogeneous time (1968b: 
262). Benjamin’s words have been popularized by Benedict Ander-
son’s reuse of modern time as empty and homogeneous, thereby 
providing a critique— but one that reconfirms absolute time.13 
While absolute time homogenizes (while recognizing unevenness), 
it is certainly not empty. It is only so if one overlooks the politics of 
its making— that is, the history of time and the history of history. 
When this recurs, the politics of time disappear into the particulars 
of becoming. This notion of empty is the working of chronology 
as an “alibi of time.”
Chronology emphasizes succession, the chaining of things 
one after another. It fosters a language of accumulation and 
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replacement. Inherited knowledge and practices, historia mag-
istra vitae (history as life’s teacher), were reclassified into some 
collective singular— primarily the fragmentation of worlds into 
nation- states— while chronological time provided the structure 
for new arrangements, reclassification, and manipulations.14 In 
twentieth- century language, it is the organization of diverse places 
into the international order as well as a universal understanding of 
the world. In a different language, it is the ordering of heteroge-
neity into one homogenized system. For example, Steven Shapin 
describes the common notion of the Scientific Revolution as a 
rhetoric of “wholesale rejection and replacement” of new for old 
or modern over traditional (1996: 65– 80). Chronological time is 
behind the rhetoric of many Enlightenment intellectuals who den-
igrate the old as a ploy to elevate their “new” ideas. It complements 
the presumption that humans (or, more accurately at that time, 
men) through reason effect change; they are not beholden to God, 
gods, or nature. And from this activity, societies can move from an 
originary state to an increasingly improved state to civilization— 
progress. We should not facilely follow the rhetoric, which is 
clearly an ideology (but our ideology).15 Chronology is the “hidden” 
foundation that enables the facile argument that the new is better 
than the old. Instead, this transformation was less a “new” that 
replaced an “old” and instead an inversion of the relation between 
inherited forms and the present.16
In The Mystic Fable, Certeau suggests that this emphasis on suc-
cession occludes other processes, especially that of reassignment 
and inversion. He argues that a way to understand and move 
beyond this linearity is to recognize the inversions that occurred 
and the need to historicize our research— that is, the very frame-
works we operate within— and dehistoricize the objects of study.17 
This is perhaps an odd statement for a discipline that considers 
itself reflective about historicism, historicity, historiography, and 
so on: the various ways that research and interpretation inflect 
the past. Certeau’s statement is a recognition of the ways that our 
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current scholarly practices, though historical and performative, 
have been accepted as natural and objective. This performativity 
is hidden in chronological time through the use of inversion but 
masked historically as succession. Inversion is a process that was 
central to the formulation of chronological time. By recognizing 
inversions masked through a framework of linear replacement and 
an ideology of progress (or development), we too can employ inver-
sion to move away from the straightforward chaining of things as 
succession or replacement (from old to new).18
The trope of inversion recognizes that at the foundation of this 
adaptation of absolute time is the shift toward a structure that 
prioritizes change and movement over stability, and in that trans-
formation existing practices and ways of knowing were inverted, 
not necessarily replaced. Inherited knowledge and practices were 
reclassified into new categories; primarily, the dead past or old 
things and worlds were fragmented or consolidated into nation- 
states. Chronological time provided the temporal order for new 
arrangements, reclassification, and manipulations. What had 
been a relational condition now became fixed; spatial units, using 
absolute space, were organized into a hierarchical order based 
on absolute time and naturalized through temporal narratives of 
becoming.
This Newtonian time inverts the norm of stability from one 
of repetition and recurrence to change and motion. This move 
is brilliant. Diverse times (that are largely cyclical and recurrent 
and that exist biologically, physically, and socially) are emplotted 
as some condition before or closer to nature (again, repetition). But 
this linear system depends on the unending recurrence of past and 
present. This separated past becomes a boundary marker, a way to 
contrast the present to what is dead and outmoded, thereby “prov-
ing” progress. It takes a relational and heuristic description and 
fixes the relationship as a function of time. Serres describes this 
process that reinforces oneself: “The advantage of having at one’s 
borders an hereditary enemy is immense. So is that of having a 
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dialectic in one’s logic. It allows one to remain comfortably within 
the concept, never to contemplate multiplicity” (Serres 1995: 
83– 84). Repetition is inverted from the stability of the society 
to the stability of the system. The separation of old from new 
becomes the repeated foundational process for the maintenance 
of the modern.
Chronological time also changes what we know and what 
we look for. Certeau argues this new history makes time, via 
chronology, a way of classifying data; it creates scriptural tombs.19 
These “tombs” have been an important way to order the hetero-
geneous societies and new forms of objects being discovered since 
the fifteenth century. Time becomes a quantitative measure to 
determine distance, difference, and relations. Each place, object, 
event, and document becomes a unique point on a grid of time and 
space. Time establishes a distance between events, a sequencing 
for making connections, and a way to mark repetition or recur-
rence. It simultaneously establishes a value system— motion is bet-
ter than stasis, linearity better than repetition, and new better than 
old— while depending on that which it denigrates.
BEGINNING: HISTORIES WITHOUT CHRONOLOGY
This did not start out as an ambitious project— to change how 
we think about time and history. But my historical training took 
over; historians follow the evidence. My evidence, reframed by 
the digital humanities, took me into the ways that humans have 
conceived of and use time. This inquiry ran into history— that 
is, the ways that our particular understandings of pasts have 
remained stable as understandings around them have changed. 
As I continue, my readings extend beyond the discipline. I must 
admit, I enjoy reading accounts of the Macy Conferences on 
cybernetics, whose purpose Gregory Bateson described as “the 
biggest bite out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge that man-
kind has taken in the last 2000 years” (Pias 2016: 11), or Lefebvre’s 
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Rhythmanalysis, which proposes “to found a science, a new field 
of knowledge: the analysis of rhythms” (2004: 3). I find these 
to be earlier versions of the quotes from Elias and Serres at the 
beginning of this introduction. I have constantly been reminded 
as I continued this work that despite the brilliant work of schol-
ars before me, historians tend not to appropriate material and 
ideas unless it suits the discipline. For a discipline that is strongly 
empirical, this is at best ironic. It confirms Blumenberg’s state-
ment that “no one ever asks for [time’s] chronology” (1985: 100). 
Chapters 1 and 2 ask.
This raises an interesting tension in this short book. I am not 
nearly as confident (nor able) as Bateson or Lefebvre. My goal has 
been to provoke discussion in the historical discipline. Yet by push-
ing to expand how historians approach pasts, it connects to histor-
ical thinking that is tied to so many fields of the humanities and 
social sciences. I see this as the need for and centrality of historical 
thinking, of history in our contemporary world.
The digital humanities has also offered hope that there are 
other ways to do things. This, of course, is a frustration, as so much 
of digital media (and, even more, technology) is used to reinforce 
the existing system and conceptual structures. So be it; it can also 
offer ways outside of the silos. But to do so, we must both embrace 
and interrogate basic structures. It is not that hard to see the pos-
sibilities, once we start looking for understandings of pasts based 
on heterogeneity and nonlinearity (chapters 3 and 4). It is the basis 
of human life and societies (in Fraser’s words [1987], life processes, 
the creativity of mind, and social activity); it is in science— the role 
of perspective, location, and situatedness; and it is biology— the 
ways that time is internal to organisms and communities of prac-
tice. These reinforce a comment by psychologist Sam Wineberg 
that historical thinking “goes against the grain of how we ordi-
narily think” (2001: 7). In short, heterogeneity, multiple times, and 
complexity are around us but are obscured by a knowledge system 
that emerged to control this heterogeneity through an orderly and 
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homogenizing system. The potential is to recover these human 
practices and sensibilities.
In the second half of the book, I explore how we can attend 
to this world of multiples— heterogeneity of pasts and multiple 
times— to understand how people use and appropriate pasts in their 
present. This statement can also describe history today, but the key 
difference is in the multiple, which inverts time from an externality 
to a part of human activity prior to categorization, and in the need 
for other ways to connect these multiples— for example, through 
conjunction (Braudel 1980) or coincidence (Boellstorff 2007a) rather 
than successive emplotment.
In chapter 3, I reconceive of how we represent pasts, allowing 
for a preservation of the heterogeneity of forms prior to catego-
rization into homogenizing categories. First, we need to reengage 
with history again to dehistoricize what we study, placing things, 
people, and objects back into their “contemporary configuration.” 
This effort to use the situatedness of things is in contrast to the 
way that objects have been abstracted by using dates along a uni-
versalizing chronology to enable separation and reinsertion. When 
we do so, we find layered and complex interactions that help us see 
the myriad influences on people, ideas, and things as they interact 
and transform. Second, to historicize our research is to pay atten-
tion to what Fraser (1987) calls histories, a notion of history as a 
place of local knowledge where diversity is preserved.
Chapter 4 explores ways that such activities connect— sharing, 
interaction, relations, adaptation, and transformation— or don’t 
with other communities of activity. The goal is to think anew 
of relationality and emergence, what historians usually reduce 
to change. But change is not a truism (“change across time”), 
something that happens or does not in relation to movement. 
Indeed, these units emerge from repetition, and if we accept 
entropy or homeostasis, change is much more various: it can be 
a part of the process of maintenance, of a dynamic equilibrium; it 
can be decay, occurring at different rates depending on the internal 
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time of the activity and happening through various layers both in 
and not in connection with others. These histories are indepen-
dent, coterminous, or parallel each other and exist within, along-
side, or autonomous from a universalistic, linear time, what Fraser 
(1987) calls (and fears) the world- time compact.
Finally, for the practice of history in the digital age, with 
increasingly instant accessibility to information about pasts, the 
role of the historian as expert of “facts” during a particular time 
and space of the past becomes decreasingly important. Instead, 
the historian, whose strength has always been interpretation of 
myriad pasts, becomes highlighted. Again, we should remember 
Droysen’s sage comment that is reducible to a meme: “Facts are 
stupid without interpretation.”20 The inversion we need is to con-
sider facts as what they are— information. Information can be 
abstracted— Shannon’s bits separated from meaning— or “facts” 
can be abstracted from the situated conditions. Information can 
also be ideas, things, memory, and inherited knowledge that peo-
ple use to create understanding, make decisions, and convince 
others. As Paul Duguid and John Seely Brown (2000) argue, infor-
mation has a social life. Instead of knowing, the historian who can 
make sense of data— judgment, manipulation, interpretation, and 
rhetoric— becomes even more important in the digital age.
History is much too important a field to be limited to a knowl-
edge system of places and things. It will be needed and can be even 
more important (my hope) in the future. I will end by invoking 
Prigogine and Stengers (1984), a physicist and a philosopher of sci-
ence on complexity, and Certeau, a historian of sixteenth- century 
mystics. In their epigraph the former see how our understanding 
shifts from objects and being to relations and communication; the 
latter uses this as an intellectual quest, to “reorganize places for 
people to communicate” (1992: 165).
CHAPTER ONE
TIME HAS A HISTORY
With regard to authors, it is a mark of supreme cowardice to give 
unlimited credit to authors and to deny its rights to Time, the author of 
authors and thus of all authority. For truth is rightly called the daugh-
ter of time and not of authority.
— Sir Francis Bacon ([1620] 2004: 69)
Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own 
nature flows equably without relation to anything external, and by 
another name is called duration.
— Sir Isaac Newton ([1687] 1995: 13)
What for others are deviations are, for me, the data which determine 
my course.— On the differentials of time (which, for others, disturb the 
main lines of the inquiry), I base my reckoning.
— Walter Benjamin (1999: 456)
Time is a difficult topic for historians. I remember an occasion when 
I was in the history department and I commented that— alluding 
to Koselleck— modern history not only is in time but also operates 
through it (1985: 246). This generated a rather snide comment 
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from a colleague, a disgust with “theory,” which is the only expla-
nation for something that needlessly complicates what is so 
obvious and commonsensical as time. This reaction adheres to 
the words of Bacon in the epigraph without recognizing the 
power that Bacon bequeaths to time. This conflation of chronol-
ogy with absolute time parallels what Lefebvre identifies as a dou-
ble illusion in the simplification of space to absolute space— that 
of transparency and reality (1991: 26– 29). This refusal to entertain 
the possibility of times other than chronological time is a refusal 
to inquire into the system that guides our ways of knowing and 
being. Even more, as I will show in this and the next chapter, the 
historicity of chronological time is empirically verifiable using nor-
mative historical methods.1 A refusal to accept this history is the 
denial of the very empiricism that this former colleague espoused. 
It is the kind of thinking that leads Runia to mutter, “Historians 
don’t think” (2014: xi).
Thankfully, more and more scholars are attuned to the many 
forms of time— and indeed, times— that human understanding and 
reckoning of time are historical, and that history is a key determi-
nant of the social and cultural makeup of communities. A rich liter-
ature on time— its history and multiple forms— exists and needs to 
be brought into our writing of history and, more broadly, historical 
thinking.2 Failure to recognize this scholarship has allowed history 
(and the historical thinking it fosters) to reach at least two contra-
dictory conditions, both of which can be called “fatally confused” 
(Bastian 2012).3 First, echoing Castillo and Egginton and Rumsey 
Smith on information inflation, we seem to be reaching a moment 
where our knowledge system and understanding of the world are 
decreasingly able to account for the vast increase of information 
available today. Bigger and cheaper storage devices only solve a 
small part of the problem. Bastian provocatively suggests that our 
continued use of Newtonian time makes us oblivious to the fact 
that nature (long considered stable and unchanging) is changing 
faster than modern society. This confusion can be extended to 
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other realms. Sheldon Wolin argues that “political time is out of 
synch with the temporalities, rhythms, and pace governing econ-
omy and culture” (1997). Ermarth writes, “The tools of thought 
inherited from modernity are increasingly at odds with our per-
sonal and practical situations and thus indicate a growing and even 
urgent need for consideration and re- consideration of what the 
changes demonstrated imply for long- familiar assumptions about 
identity, time, causality, creativity and politics” (2011: 3). The list of 
examples of this fatal confusion, the disjunction between observa-
tion and inherited notions of reality, is growing.
Second, we must accept the possibility that history, the field 
of knowledge that has ordered the world, is now mythical.4 I will 
discuss this more below, but at this point, it is enough to point out 
that since the turn of the twentieth century, the science on which 
absolute time was based now exists amid newer understandings— 
for example, Einstein’s special relativity, the laws (especially sec-
ond) of thermodynamics, chronobiology, and quantum theory. 
Absolute time is now called “classical time” (not to be confused 
temporally with the classical period of history), signifying the 
presence of other notions of time more akin to modern science. 
Modern history operates on an outmoded notion of time, though 
it is commonly believed, especially socioculturally. But now that 
notion is one of several, which, if employed, must at minimum be 
defended rather than assumed.
Today, more than ever, we need to evaluate the very structure 
of historical understanding— to discern science, myth, and ide-
ology. This issue is not “new.” The examples cited above suggest 
also that the disconnect between scientific time and chronological 
time existed throughout the twentieth century, if not earlier. As 
science was moving away from absolute time, the international 
and nation- state systems, the social sciences, and the humanities 
developed through absolute time. This recalls Elias’s plea for a 
“spring cleaning.” An initial step toward a richer understanding of 
how humans use pasts to make sense of their world is rather simply 
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stated: to bring times into histories rather than describing history 
in time. There are many different times: the physical happenings, 
rhythms of chronobiology, and rhythms of assemblages both small 
and large. Each of these times might have several temporalities 
within each. These times have been overshadowed, or “colo-
nized,” by linear, progressive time that Geoffrey Bowker (2014) has 
described as a “sociotechnical imaginary” time. This is our mod-
ern time; it will not be easy to reformulate this time, nor am I 
advocating its elimination. In the sciences, absolute time coexists 
with relative and quantum times. My goals are not critique and 
replacement (which often results in supporting the status quo), 
but I suggest the multiple ways we can understand times that place 
what Benjamin in the epigraph calls “differentials of time” as con-
stituent elements of our lives rather than as emplotments along a 
universalizing sociotechnical imaginary.
Before we can move to these differentials of time, it is essential 
to outline, briefly, a history of time— that is, to show that our cur-
rent understanding is social, not natural.5
NONMODERN TIMES
Scholars who have studied nonmodern people and places (ancient, 
medieval, and non- Western) are aware of the different ways that 
time has been reckoned. When one looks, there are many fine his-
torical accounts of times in ancient, medieval, and early modern 
places. Anthropologists have long described different understand-
ings of time in the cultures they studied.6 Much of the information 
that follows in the first section is familiar; my goal is not to present 
something new but to suggest other ways people have reckoned 
time when absolute time was not the metric for order and becom-
ing. There were, simply, other ways of understanding, many of 
which can be found (or would be helpful) today.
Prior to the modern period, and in places not dominated by 
abstract time, time is episodic, local, uneven, and irregular. Some 
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days are more favorable than others. Indeed, calendars were used 
not to show the passage of time but to mark place, significance, 
and meaning.7 In post- Reformation Europe, Friday was “thought 
unlucky for any venture, whether marrying, making a journey 
or even cutting one’s nails,” and in Yorkshire (England), servants 
considered Monday an unlucky day to change employer (Thomas 
1971: 619). The luni- solar calendar in Tokugawa society (Japan) 
was not a grid of passing days but an information sheet of major 
and minor months, divinatory signs, and auspicious/inauspicious 
days. The magnificent clock at the Strasbourg cathedral includes 
an automated astrolabe, a perpetual calendar, a carillon, a virgin 
holding the Christ child, a mechanical cock that flapped its wings 
and crowed, and “a tablet showing the body parts and their cor-
relation with the zodiac for the favorable and unfavorable times for 
bloodletting” (Haber 1975: 399– 400). Such uneven time remains: 
our legacy of “superstitions” like Friday the 13th are an example, 
and in Japan today, many calendars (Gregorian) still mark the aus-
picious (taian) or inauspicious (butsumetsu) days (now important 
for deciding celebratory events like weddings). In some working- 
class communities, the regularity of the everyday is as much or 
more valued than the developmental time of middle- class societies 
(Perovic 2017; Negt and Kluge 1993).
In medieval and early modern societies, mechanical time was 
secondary to social time. What we now see as exquisite detail 
and craftsmanship on early clocks exhibited socially meaningful 
information.8 Derek de Solla Price argues, “The first great clocks of 
medieval Europe were designed as astronomical showpieces, full 
of complicated gearing and dials to show the motions of the Sun, 
Moon and planets, to exhibit eclipses, and to carry through the 
involved computations of the ecclesiastical calendar. As such they 
were comparable to the orreries of the 18th century and to mod-
ern planetariums; that they also showed the time and rang it on 
bells was almost incidental to their main function” (1959: 86). In 
other words, the positions of celestial bodies were more important 
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than the time of the day. The movement of the stars was a way 
to discern auspicious and inauspicious days, weather, the growth 
of crops, and medical information about the human body. The 
“hour” of the day, the temporal hour, was also uneven, divided into 
equal units of daylight and night. Many early mechanical clocks 
(fourteenth- century Europe) did not have a minute hand, and if 
they did, it needed to be periodically corrected using a sundial. 
In East Asia after the Jesuits introduced clocks, these mechanical 
devices became markers of wealth and prestige. In Edo society (sev-
enteenth- to nineteenth- century Japan), craftsmen added a second 
folio so that these status symbols could follow the temporal hour. 
Mechanical time had to be adjusted to social time.
Previous reckoning systems for the year varied widely. Medi-
eval Jews used three chronological systems: the era of creation, 
the era of the destruction of the Second Temple, and the Seleucid 
era (Yerushalmi [1982] 1996: 41). Our current chronology, the lin-
ear reckoning of years as BC/AD or BCE/CE, is relatively recent, 
becoming the principal system in the seventeenth century.9 Dio-
nysus Exiguus first proposed in 532 a reckoning system, beginning 
with the birth of Christ (anno Domini) as year one.10 Dionysus’s 
system was not dominant but coexisted with numerous others. 
Time systems were local. Local events, not abstract years, served 
as the key markers. The olympiads provided a regular marker for 
dating the year in ancient Greece, the indiction was a common 
system in the Roman world, and the Bible provided another.
Chronological reckoning came with the Enlightenment. At the 
end of the sixteenth century, Joseph Scaliger formulated a Julian 
period, a singular, continuous, and linear time of 7,980 years. 
Christ’s birth within this system was year 4713. In the seventeenth 
century, Domenicus Petavius moved chronology closer to an abso-
lute time by removing time from religion. He wrote, “Chronol-
ogy indeed inquires after one thing, by what signs and marks each 
thing may be arranged in its years and times” (Wilcox 1987: 205). 
Nevertheless, Petavius retained Dionysus’s birth of Christ— not, he 
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claimed, for its religious significance but as a conventional point 
of reference. Petavius’s major (and lasting) contribution was to 
add years before Christ to fill out the chronology.11 In the western 
Pacific, when new leaders sought to create the nation- state of Japan 
following the Meiji ishin (the revolution in 1868), they adopted 
two systems, a linear sequence beginning from the ascension of 
the mythical emperor Jinmu and a modified nengo that counted 
years by emperors’ reigns.12 The subsequent rendering of previous 
events and the temporal systems of other societies according to 
Petavius’s timeline is a translation into this Enlightenment system.
Clearly time was not central to the organization and makeup of 
these societies, but it would be a mistake to conclude from this brief 
outline that nonmodern places (ancient, medieval, non- West) did 
not understand or were “indifferent to time” (Gurevich 1985: 151).13 
Jeffrey J. Cohen argues that time was very important, but it was not 
the mechanical, absolute time of our world. He writes, “Medieval 
writers were just as enamored of investigating the complexities 
of both temporality (the nature and working of time) and history 
(the transformation of time into narrative) as recent theorists have 
been” (2003: 2). Cohen, like so many scholars of medieval and early 
modern periods, as well as those of non- Western places, is react-
ing to the propensity in history to conclude facilely that earlier 
periods were not as sophisticated as ours, the modern.14 One need 
merely peruse Bede’s reckoning to see incredible sophistication on 
lunar and solar cycles, sacred time, and sociopolitical times. The 
Mayan calendar is a remarkable system comprehensible today 
only to specialists. Calendar keeping was a prestigious role; con-
trolling time bore significant power. In Edo society, the imperial 
court, the bakufu (government), and some domains employed 
astronomical scholars to determine the calendars. The major 
concern among scholars in Christian Europe was determining the 
date of Easter. Adolph Holl discerned a new desire to “know 
the time” around twelfth- and thirteenth- century Europe (cited in 
Nowotny 1994: 16). This desire was partly fueled by an expanded 
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world in which merchants needed to calculate the costs of dis-
tant trade. This increased concern for time began an interaction 
between space and time that has continued through the spatial 
compression we experience today.
As the above suggests, time need not be a metric to emplot and 
organize but a way to understand the world that surrounds us. It 
was (is) a mysterious and powerful world. The historian Aron J. 
Gurevich writes, “Both space and time are axiologically and emo-
tionally charged: time and space can be good or evil . . . there is a 
sacral time, a time to make merry, a time for sacrifice, a time for 
the re- enactment of the myth . . . and . . . there are sacred places or 
whole worlds subject to special forces” (1985: 29). Interestingly, time 
is something to pay attention to. It is internal to society, something 
that one can change: “Time in archaic society is not something out-
side people, unrelated to their lives and doings. On the contrary, it 
is something within them, and therefore it is possible to influence 
its course and even its quality” (103). Today, in contrast, because 
we operate with time as an externality, we feel caught up by 
time (Eriksen 2001; Levy 2007; Rushkoff 2013).
One of the hardest ideas for us to grasp is that the constant 
passage of time— past, present, and future— did not always exist 
as we understand it today. Ancient Greeks perceived and experi-
enced their world “as remaining at rest, or as orbiting in a great 
circle” (Gurevich 1985: 31). Repetitive time was in the contem-
poraneous, while movement was the transition toward eter-
nity. Gurevich writes, “Man did not feel himself to be existent in 
time; ‘to be’ for him meant ‘to abide,’ not ‘to be in the process of 
becoming’” (133). The passage that did exist (history) was devolu-
tion toward the end, then renewal. Jacques Le Goff notes that the 
prevailing idea in medieval Europe was mundus senescit, “the world 
grows old” (Le Goff 2015: 8). This connection with passage and 
decay was also built into the Confucian Mandate of Heaven, which 
calls for the overturning of incompetent governance, and farther 
east, in what is now Japan, renewal was allowed within imperial 
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reigns. What we today call the past— things that happened and are 
prior and distinct— was not distant nor different; inherited ideas 
that were important enough to be retained were of the present. 
In a world that grows old, the future as something better did not 
exist. In his discussion of the famous early historians Polybius and 
Sima Qian, Gurevich writes that “history was no more than the 
eternal return in a prescribed order of the same political forms” 
(1985: 33). Anticipation of something to come, of course, existed. 
But for something to be anticipated, it had to be based on some 
experience. Some peoples whose horizon is based on experiential 
knowledge point behind themselves to indicate the future (Nunez 
and Sweetser 2006; Nowotny 2008: 1). This directionality recalls 
Benjamin’s interpretation of Paul Klee’s “Angelus Novum,” in which 
the angel is being blown to the future while looking backward at 
an ever- increasing accumulation of destruction (1968b: 257– 58).
In these places, iterative acts of recurrence, where knowledge is 
handed down through memory and oral traditions, can be a way 
of maintaining a particular place. Gurevich described time during 
the ancient period as “spatialized”— that is, dependent on space 
and environment: “Ancient man saw past and present stretching 
round him, in mutual penetration and clarification of each other. 
An event which took place previously and an event happening now 
can be perceived by the archaic consciousness as manifestations in 
one and the same plane, extended in one and the same temporal 
duration” (1985: 29). In these worlds, repetition invokes either a 
sense of stability through constancy or a connection to some eter-
nal ideal.
This certainly does not mean that these societies were static. 
Repetition and redundancy can be conservative (place- making and 
maintenance); it can also lead to variation and change.15 For exam-
ple, in Japan, the architecture of the Ise Shrine, because its periodic 
rebuilding depended on the memory, skill, and materials available, 
evolved over the millennia despite its reputation for originality 
(Isozaki 2006). We know that stories, fables, and epics changed 
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as they were disseminated, a mode of preservation. Today as well, 
such repetitive time from chronobiology, habits and customs, and 
repetitive labor are a constituent part of modern society (Young 
1988; Sharma 2014). Recent scholarship shows that as economic 
processes become more efficient, we increasingly depend on cycli-
cal, commodified labor. We see this process in the elevation of sub-
contracting work in Japanese factories; Sarah Sharma has shown 
how participation in the hypermanaged and efficient clock time 
of global capitalism depends heavily on cyclical and on- demand 
labor; and Lilly Irani describes how a technological startup increas-
ingly turns to subcontracting of mundane tasks to maintain its 
rapid momentum (Sharma 2014; Irani 2019).
Koselleck’s notion of two forms of social organization— spaces 
of experience and horizons of expectations— is useful while also 
showing the limitation of categories that derive from stability and 
motion. Nonmodern places are characteristic of spaces of experi-
ence. The emphasis is in the present past; depth did (and does) exist 
in an “eternal present.” The space of experience is one where locale, 
not time, provided a different understanding of depth and connec-
tivity. In such places where recursive acts are the norm, perfection 
might be the goal, but change was often seen as deterioration— 
humans could not replicate what the gods or God created: mundus 
senescit. The horizon of expectations is more common to bour-
geois society: the future made present. It is directed toward the 
not- yet as something to be revealed (Koselleck 1985: 267– 88). 
We will be moving to abstract time shortly. Koselleck argues that 
these forms are successive and/or coexistent, and in his later writ-
ings, he argues for a layering of time (Zeitschichten; 2018: 3– 9).
At this point, it is important to decouple descriptions of non-
modern places from chronology. This tendency to linearity has 
been a principal reason that these accounts are easily overlooked. 
Mobility (change) and stability are conditions of communities and 
are not characteristics of the modern/premodern. An important 
difference is in the placement of time. When time is internal, 
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various aspects of the activity remain present; both change and 
repetition are evident. When time is externalized— that is, with 
the discovery of absolute time— it becomes possible to obscure, 
hide, or ignore various parts of the process. This principally hap-
pens in two ways. First is the practice of translating (or, more 
accurately, transmuting) times to modern, chronological time 
as if it is a mechanical act. Second, and more important, is that 
these accounts of nonmodern places are located as some tempo-
ral condition of the inferior or unsophisticated. In anthropology, 
Fabian calls this allochronism, a denial of coevalness where the 
culture, even though contemporary, is primitive and foreign (1983). 
In nonmodern histories, it is of places that are past and different. 
A description of the way that these acts reinforce chronological 
time will be discussed in chapter 2.
“ABSOLUTE, TRUE, AND MATHEMATICAL TIME” 16
Our modern time— that is, the notions that time is external (abso-
lute), constantly flows linearly (true), and is regular (mechanical)— 
came into being gradually. I will only offer a general overview, 
enough to make my point; there are several fine accounts of this 
transformation to an absolute time (see, for example, Adam 2004; 
Elias 1992; Fraser 1987; Nowotny 1994; Toulmin and Goodfield 
1965; Wilcox 1987). This shift toward abstract time occurred in 
Europe, and universal time was formulated there. Le Goff (1980) 
writes about the transformation of time between the twelfth and 
fifteenth centuries as a difficult effort to deal with the coexistence 
of natural time (the various cycles of seasons, stars, planets, sun, 
and moon), professional time (measurement for trade and trans-
actions), and supernatural time (religious and supernatural under-
standings).17 By the nineteenth century, absolute time reoriented 
these times: natural time was relegated to an originary status, pro-
fessional time used absolute time to reconceive social processes 
and value, and supernatural time was relegated to the past.
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By the sixteenth century, changes were manifold. The break-
down of the feudal order involved the spread of printing presses, 
the formation of states, the discovery of the New World, the rise 
of merchants, and the Protestant Reformation (Shapin 1996: 
119– 65; Standage 2013: 48– 63). This crisis contributed to a per-
ceived need for order, what Carolyn Merchant argues was the 
“fundamental social and intellectual problem for the seventeenth 
century” ([1980] 1989: 192). In this search, absolute time was one 
alternative. Mystics explored a mystic science in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries (Certeau 1992, 2015), universal history 
recognized multiple chronologies (Jordheim, forthcoming), and 
self- organization— a distant predecessor to complex systems— 
gained ground in the early eighteenth century (Sheehan and 
Wahrman 2015).
Newton brought together a series of ideas that culminated in 
the late seventeenth century— in particular, the desire to under-
stand mathematically the mechanical operations of the world.18 
In the epigraphs from Bacon and Newton, the assertions are 
seductively simple and seem obvious to us today. Bacon inverted 
authority from the past (God) to the present (science), and New-
ton’s often- quoted declarative statement of time removed time 
from human activity to an externality. It has its own regularity, 
flows, and can be measured, creating duration.19 The order that 
is made possible through Principia is one in which the world can 
be rendered as matter and material that, subject to universal laws, 
can be ordered, known, and manipulated mathematically (i.e., 
quantitatively). But this notion of time shifts scholarship from 
relations— understanding, experience, and sensation— to knowl-
edge about material objects, their movement, and how they com-
pare. Prigogine and Stengers write, “The ambition of Newtonian 
science was to present a vision of nature that would be universal, 
deterministic, and objective inasmuch as it contains no reference 
to the observer, complete inasmuch as it attains a level of descrip-
tion that escapes the clutches of time” (1984: 213).
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The clutches of time of Prigogine and Stengers is the life pro-
cesses, the creativity, and the social conventions that Fraser (1987) 
calls for in the epigraph to the introduction. The escape from this 
time was to remove time (and scientific laws) from human activity 
and sensibility and turn it into an externality that is ostensibly neu-
tral for all measurable knowledge. Barbara Adam succinctly describes 
the strength of Newtonian time: “[Time] is linked to a number 
and the measure of motion, duration, and rate” (1990: 51). Chrono-
logical time is now hidden in plain sight, yet the transformation 
is profound. On the one hand, the scientists, who know the laws 
and abstract principles, become the omniscient, neutral observer. 
On the other hand, it transposes all previous connections of time 
in society away from experience. Fraser writes, “Gone were the 
attempts to relate time to the motion of the stars (as proposed by 
Plato), to the ‘number of motion’ (Aristotle), to the mind (Augus-
tine), to the world and mankind (Averroës), or to life and feeling. 
Time became a type of universal order that existed by and in itself, 
regardless of what happened in time” (1987: 41). Fraser is describing 
the transition from various understandings of finite worlds where 
stability begins in fixity (creation) to an infinite universe always 
in motion.
This is the escape from the “clutches of time.” Time changes 
from activity and sensibility of humans to a mechanical, clock-
like movement, a putatively neutral time that is bidirectional and 
turns motion into a default condition. Newtonian time estab-
lishes a single system that will be used to unify the many reckon-
ing systems into one system that, though formulated in Europe, 
is presented as universal. That is, the world becomes renderable 
mechanically and mathematically.
CLOCK TIME
A central, or perhaps the most important, device and symbol that 
fostered this transition to mechanical time is the clock. The impact 
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of the clock cannot be overemphasized. Mumford states matter- of- 
factly, “The clock, not the steam- engine, is the key- machine of the 
modern industrial age” (1934: 14).20 Indeed, it predates absolute 
time. Bells from thirteenth- century Europe and Tokugawa Japan 
and then public clocks in fourteenth- century Europe slowly began 
to order the work day (Le Goff 1980; Frumer 2018; Glennie and 
Thrift 2009). Clock time as a common system to synchronize large 
groups of people became widespread with industrialization (Le 
Goff 1988; Gurevich 1985; Thompson 1967).
Perhaps the greatest significance of the clock for my discus-
sion is as a metaphor, a machine. It was a part of the transition of 
knowledge from a world of gods, spirits, or animistic powers to 
the laws that we now see as a part of science (Shapin 1996; Mer-
chant [1980] 1989). Johannes Kepler writes, “My aim in this is to 
show that the machine of the universe is not similar to a divine 
animated being, but similar to a clock.” (quoted in Shapin 1996: 33). 
The artificial, which is man- made, was no longer an inferior ver-
sion of the world. This image represents a particular notion of the 
machine as humankind’s ability to exploit energy and to mech-
anize (i.e., develop) productive enterprises. The clock dissociates 
time from human activity and reinforces the idea that time is inde-
pendent and measurable.
Within this metaphor of a clock, both a progressive time and 
a repetitive time coexist; indeed, they depend on each other 
(Bowker 2014). Up to this point, time was isotropic; Newtonian 
time could move in both directions. Clock time suggests forward 
motion, while cycles of the hour and day reinforce repetition and 
redundancy. The calendar does the same through the lunar cycle, 
seasons, and solar cycle. It is important to point out that clock 
time reoriented life and work around mechanically repetitive, not 
lived processes (Thompson 1967). Much has been written about 
the transformation of industrial society around clock time. Mum-
ford writes, “Abstract time became the new medium of existence. 
Organic functions themselves were regulated by it: one ate, not 
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upon feeling hungry, but when prompted by the clock: one slept, 
not when one was tired, but when the clock sanctioned it” (1934: 
17). Clock time has become so naturalized that social and organic 
functions have merged with mechanical time. It dominates our 
modern world to the extent that efforts to resolve our imbrica-
tion in time have usually been to become more efficient, further 
entangling us in absolute time. Leisure too acts as a respite from 
regulated work life, yet it replicates the structure and regularity of 
clock time (Elias 1986).21
Applying this idea of time occurred gradually, and it was not 
until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that it was widely 
accepted. Change does not occur linearly; linear narratives often 
obscure the multiple strands of transition.22 During a transforma-
tion, there is the maintenance of inherited forms; unsuccessful 
efforts to create an alternate understanding; multiple, parallel 
ideas; dismissal of novel ideas that only later become recognized 
as significant; and, of course, the great figures (Bacon and New-
ton) who bring together many of the parallel and competing ideas. 
A linear time did not replace cyclical time. These are not antithet-
ical; repetitive time is a constituent part of absolute time. Shapin 
writes that even during the age of Newton and Boyle, “the idea 
of linear, cumulative intellectual progress was still novel and not 
widely accepted” (1996: 74). My point here is that progressive time 
is a particular understanding of absolute time where the inversion, 
repetitive time, though central, has been backgrounded in order 
to highlight progressive time. This is evident in the epigraph from 
Bacon in which he inverted the relationship between repetition 
(authority) and linearity (time).
One can cite many intellectuals who helped develop and 
spread this idea. At the end of the seventeenth century, John 
Locke described the human in developmental terms.23 In his Some 
Thoughts Concerning Education, Locke used a metaphor of wax tab-
lets to describe the education of children. That is, children were 
blank slates that needed to be schooled so that they would develop 
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into proper gentlemen.24 Jean Jacques Rousseau went further in his 
Emile, arguing that children learn and develop as they grow— it is a 
natural process— and deviation, even an acceleration of learning, 
leads to precocious, malformed adults. In both cases the human is 
now born with limited abilities and must develop, and this devel-
opment depends on upbringing and education. Development 
becomes the structure to understand physiological growth, sub-
suming the organic, cyclical process.25 Moreover, in the eighteenth 
century, the emergence of mathematics and probability offered a 
new way to look at patterns, and a sense of a future gained sub-
stance.26 Actuary tables and the lottery were two early applications 
of this new predictive form of knowledge. Individual experience 
is subsumed into a larger, abstract whole, and pasts— the data 
extracted to create the aggregates— are used to point to a future.
Nature too was discovered to fit within absolute time. During 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, people began 
to question the age of the earth, separating its creation from the 
biblical account. Comte de Buffon, using the contemporary under-
standing of physics, calculated that the earth was approximately 
seventy- five thousand years old, not the four thousand years com-
monly accepted from the Bible (Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 142– 
50). Charles Lyell’s Principles of Geology built on Buffon and many 
others to demonstrate that the earth has a history that is indepen-
dent of the Bible (or other creation myths).27 By the nineteenth 
century, there was a general agreement in the idea of progress. To 
reinforce this as a part of the sociotechnical imaginary, it is an idea 
(desire) attached to time, giving it direction. Koselleck (2002: 229– 
30) points out that progress becomes a historical agent: “progress 
of time.” It gained status as a collective singular that combines 
numerous experiences; and by the nineteenth century, it became 
nominal: “progress itself.”
To complete this brief story, the unification of the globe at the 
official level around a universal time took a big step in 1884 at 
the International Meridian Conference. The conference adopted 
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a single global time of twenty- four time zones with Greenwich as 
the prime meridian. Here, again, was the interrelation of an 
expanded world and its connection to time. The Harrison H4 
chronometer won the Longitude Prize for an accurate chronom-
eter that helped captains of ships reckon longitude. The railroad 
necessitated a time synchronized according to a single standard, 
and the proposal for the twenty- four time zones emerged from 
standard railroad time in the US (Bartky 2000). The meridian con-
ference, in a sense, brought Kepler’s desire to fruition— the clock 
synchronized the world. More broadly, the conference institution-
alized the idea of progress, which was confirmed by technologi-
cal advances— telegraph, steam engine, railroad, clock, and so on. 
However, acceptance of this unified time occurred gradually: Japan 
unified time according to the twenty- four- hour clock in 1873 and 
synchronized that time to Greenwich mean time (GMT) on July 13, 
1886; Germany unified time in 1893; France conformed to GMT in 
1911; and the US did not officially accept GMT until March 19, 1918. 
Interestingly, the International Meridian Conference also codified 
the East and the West, the Orient and the Occident, by setting the 
beginning of the day at 180 degrees longitude, not at GMT. This 
unified time culminated the increasing synchronization of the 
world, the annihilation of time and space, and the rise of simul-
taneity in the twentieth century. These processes are, of course, 
highly uneven; Vanessa Ogle cautions that it was not until the 
1950s that universal time became global (2015: 75– 98).28 Another 
way to characterize the spread of absolute time is in its relation to 
the rise of the nation- state and of industrial society. In short, our 
current use of chronological time is a metric that reinforces the 
liberal- capitalist system that emerged since the Enlightenment.
This is a good moment to bring up a statement by Serres, who 
describes the connection of progressive time to the global and 
technological history of nineteenth and twentieth centuries:
“Let me say a word on the idea of progress. We conceive of 
time as an irreversible line, whether interrupted or continuous, 
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of acquisitions and inventions. We go from generalizations to 
discoveries, leaving behind us a trail of errors finally corrected— 
like a cloud of ink from a squid. ‘Whew! We’ve finally arrived at 
the truth.’  .  .  . That’s not time, only a simple line. It’s not even a 
line, but a trajectory of the race for first place— in school, in the 
Olympic Games, for the Nobel Prize. This isn’t time, but a simple 
competition— once again, war” (Serres with Latour 1995: 48– 49).
Serres’s trenchant critique points to the way that linear time 
structures knowing and relations. Neither absolute time nor its 
application to society is neutral. The quantitative penchant (mea-
surement) of chronology prioritizes competition— a race or even 
war. This is the history of the late nineteenth and twentieth cen-
turies. It is perhaps a coincidence— but nevertheless an interesting 
one— that Eric Hobsbawm’s Age of Empire began in 1875 around the 
same time that the world was synchronized according to absolute 
time and the historical discipline was becoming professional.
CLASSING OF TIME AND SPACE
This progressive time necessitates an obvious but unstated pro-
cess, the “classing” (Serres 1995) or “breakup” of the whole (Lorenz 
and Bevernage 2013) into units that interact with each other.29 
Such classing is a constituent part of absolute time, necessary for 
the ordering and measuring of places, things, and events. It is the 
organization of parts into a whole— a competitive system.
This classing brings out the relation of absolute space and abso-
lute time, and the repositioning of repetitive time in the applica-
tion of absolute time to human society. In his discussion of the 
nation, Lefebvre argues that the nation arises from two moments, 
the market and violence.30 The market is the place of repetitive 
activity that gives focus and hierarchy. Violence is the power that 
controls and exploits— in Serres’s words, a race, competition, or 
war. The units that make up that “market” on the global level are 
the newly forming nation- states. I read Lefebvre as arguing that 
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the nation- state is historical. It is spatialized time. Lefebvre writes, 
“According to Hegelianism, historical time gives birth to that space 
which the state occupies and rules over. . . . Time is thus solidified 
and fixed within the rationality immanent to space” (1991: 21).31 
In this repetition, time is spatialized; repetitive time facilitates a 
slowing down of time to formulate these units, the nation- state. 
My emphasis is on the interrelation between time and space, 
time- spaces (and the obfuscation created by absolute time and 
absolute space) in the classing or breaking up of time into subunits. 
I will discuss this relation between classing, nation- state, and his-
tory in the next chapter.
Repetition also slowed time in another way— presented as the 
opposite of linear time, repetitive time became identified as an 
originary temporality, closer to nature. It is a part of an early state 
from which forward motion emerges; it is akin to the repetitive 
worlds from which a modern society has developed. Things clos-
est to an original state are removed from time. These are the past, 
dead, or inert objects. It enables what Carolyn Merchant calls the 
“death of nature”: “The removal of animistic, organic assumptions 
about the cosmos constituted the death of nature— the most far- 
reaching effect of the Scientific Revolution. Because nature was 
now viewed as a system of dead, inert particles moved by exter-
nal, rather than inherent forces, the mechanical framework itself 
could legitimate the manipulation of nature” ([1980] 1989: 193). 
Nature serves at least two functions. First, things within nature are 
inert objects to be used or exploited. Second, it serves as an origin 
from which, using chronological time as a metric, movement (i.e., 
development or progress) is measured. This is where repetition is 
inverted from a condition of stability to a condition of those on the 
lower end of this developmental scale: the primitive or backward 
people (labor) or societies (non- West) who are not quantifiably 
advanced.32 Repetitive things that do not move forward are closer 
to a nature that embodies some state of lacking, and movement 
away from nature orders objects onto a scale of development. This 
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connects well to the clockmaker who serves as the metaphor for 
man’s (Merchant points out that this order is gendered) manipu-
lation (i.e., improvement) of nature.
In the eighteenth century, this classing or spatialization was 
facilitated by a new technology that was gaining popularity— 
mathematics. Aggregates became a way to make sense of the hetero-
geneity of this expanding world.33 Aggregation (and the numerical 
data such as averages) was a way to order the variation of individ-
ual cases. Serres, for example, writes, “A multiplicity marks and 
shows some redundancy, it becomes spatial when this repetition 
increases” (1995: 116). Through repetition or redundancy, com-
monalities, classings, categories, and places come into being. Like 
the allure of Big Data today, numbers and aggregates were a way 
to discern “secret patterns hidden inside masses” (Sheehan and 
Wahrman 2015: 60) so that they could be emplotted along a time-
line to measure and compare. Individual variability is not elimi-
nated but subsumed into some aggregate— categories of more or 
less like things. The heterogeneity of individuals gives way to the 
commonality of the category that is meaningful within a larger 
matrix. Bowker (2014: 572) calls this process of classing a “coloniz-
ing temporality.” Probability provided a way to move the study of 
humans from individuals to categories; absolute time provided a 
way to measure and compare those categories. The result is the 
transformation of understanding from individuals and what they 
believe to quantifiable knowledge about people, things, and places.
Once the chronological order is classed, chronological time 
returns within each classed unit to naturalize, through history, 
that space.34 The discovery of the past through chronological time 
and the emergence of mathematics and probability are deployed 
again, but this time it obscures the historicity of this new spatial-
ized time. This form of successive time combines with a historical 
narrative that begins from some origin to the present day. This 
form of linking of events chronologically is Newton’s duration, but 
this notion of duration is spatial.35
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The mapping of categories (including nation- states) along the 
chronological structure, the use of chronology to write histories 
that naturalize those units, and the breakup of time into eras has 
provided a powerful sense of order for the international and now 
global world. We are able to map everything onto x and y coor-
dinates of a time and space grid. This is what the great mathe-
matician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead calls “simple 
location.” On the one hand, motion becomes stabilized as a mass 
(or event) that is between two points, while the mass has an exis-
tence independent of time. Whitehead describes this aspect of 
Newtonian time: “The material is fully itself in any sub- period 
however short. Thus the transition of time has nothing to do with 
the character of the material” (1925: 50). Everything has a distinct 
position in absolute space and occurs at unique moments that are 
measurable. This rendering of things according to simple loca-
tion has been possible at a very reductive or simplistic level, but 
Whitehead disputes this very possibility: “I shall argue that among 
the primary elements of nature as apprehended in our immedi-
ate experience, there is no element whatever which possesses this 
character of simple location” (1925: 58).36 I will take up this issue 
again in chapter 2; it is history that gives content to this simple 
location and makes it “real.”
A fundamental problem with this system is the alignment of 
human action with the movement of matter. Henri Bergson points 
to the reductionism necessary to use this mechanistic reckoning 
for human consciousness. He writes, “We can understand that 
material objects, being exterior to one another and to ourselves, 
derive both exteriorities from the homogeneity of a medium 
which inserts intervals between them and sets off their outlines: 
but states of consciousness, even when successive, permeate 
one another, and in the simplest of them the whole soul can be 
reflected. We may therefore surmise that time, conceived under 
the form of a homogeneous medium, is some spurious concept, 
due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the field of pure 
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consciousness” ([1913] 2001: 98).37 This application of Newtonian 
physics has been effective because of its simplicity (two variables), 
but we now know that when applied to people, systems, and 
ideas, there are many more variables.38 We know that people 
and objects change as they move; they do not remain unchanged. 
Whitehead argues for what I will later call relationality, the “inter-
connectedness of things,” both material and human. He appeals 
to an everyday experience rather than learned knowledge: “Your 
perception takes place where you are, and is entirely dependent 
on how your body is functioning. But this functioning of the body 
in one place, exhibits for your cognisance an aspect of the distant 
environment, fading away into the general knowledge that there 
are things beyond” (1925: 92). Historians might object that history 
covers this change of the unit. But in the adoption of Newtonian 
physics, an object, the nation- state, has been naturalized as a “mass” 
and removed from time before chronological time can measure 
its motion, duration, or rate. History structures the ordering of 
these masses, and it operates within the unit of the nation- state, the 
mass. I will discuss this separation of history into a system and 
the reinsertion of history of particular units in the next chapter.39
A temporal hierarchy emerges from the classings organized 
through this flow of time. There is a troubling connection to the 
emphasis on technology and its application to large units. This 
is one characterization of the history of the twentieth century— 
resource extraction, exploitation of labor, colonialism, and imperi-
alism. But I will emphasize the implicit hierarchies of this system. 
On the one hand, we can cite Bacon’s simple declaration that the 
recent is better than what existed before; indeed, the fetish of 
the new seems built into our thinking, but Serres writes rather caus-
tically, “It follows that we are always right, for the simple, banal, and 
naive reason that we are living in the present moment” (Serres with 
Latour 1995: 48). But this is also part of a system that turns relational 
conditions into fixed temporal positions. One part of society that 
this system removes from history is what Lefebvre calls “lived time.” 
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He writes, “With the advent of modernity time has vanished from 
social space. . . . Lived time loses its form and its social interest— 
with the exception, that is, of time spent working” (1991: 95). We see 
the effect of the escape from the clutches of time— the supremacy of 
space over time is the dominance of the state over lived experience, 
of the technological apparatus over the human.
In the context of this brief history of time, the relation between 
society and time is inverted. Time is now external to human activ-
ity, which is organized according to absolute time. Nowotny calls 
this focus an “intoxication with time” (1994: 26– 32). This intoxica-
tion is in the freedom from the past, the order and predictability 
of the world, and speed— the perceived reduction of social and 
geographical distance. But this intoxication is possible by obscur-
ing the role of chronology; it structures and orients. Michael Young 
speaks to this power within Nowotny’s notion of intoxication: “By 
giving people a sense of control over their environment, technol-
ogy has also encouraged them to think they can create their own 
future, and perhaps nothing has nourished linearity more than 
that” (Young 1988: 156). This intoxication is possible because the 
naturalization of absolute time along with its classing operations 
has removed this part of time, the historicity of time, from the 
historiographical operation. In his book System, Clifford Siskin 
notes the increasing connection between system and history by the 
end of the eighteenth century.40 But it is not just adjacency but 
interrelation. He says that an unexpected finding is that system 
“shaped modern knowledge” by reshaping “history itself” (2016: 4). 
This system is the chronological structure— external time— that 
has ordered the world to become the framework in which modern 
history is written.
TWENTIETH- CENTURY TIMES AND CLASSICAL TIME
Interestingly, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies, as absolute time was being used to organize knowledge 
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about nation- states and academic disciplines emerged,41 science was 
discovering that time is not mechanical and linear. Einstein’s special 
theory of relativity demonstrates that the measurement of time is 
dependent on the framework of observation— that is, time is relative 
to the observer. “Relativity tells us there is no such thing as a fixed 
interval of time independent of the system to which it is referred” 
(Adam 2004: 61). Einstein calls this time Eigenzeit, often translated 
as “proper time.”42 This proposal of an Eigenzeit recalls the local 
notions of time of the medieval, non- West, and nonmodern places. 
It brings out the different times inherent to each unit of analysis. 
Moreover, the direction of time in a progressive system does not 
match the arrow of time in physics (Mitchell 2009: 43). The second 
law of thermodynamics is the only law of physics in which time is 
directional. However, that arrow moves toward dissipation and 
decay, not improvement and progress. Perhaps this dichotomy is 
one reason that thermodynamics has rarely been included in social 
applications of time. For my purpose, entropy requires that we rec-
ognize multiple outputs from the use of energy, even if it is not the 
desired outputs. Processes of development or progress also contain 
transformation that is closer to decay; in history, some of these 
outcomes have been marked as waste, ignorance, or unintended 
consequences.43
Again, as Adam (1990) points out, in the social sciences we have 
known for quite a while that studies often change the object being 
studied (quantum physics— the very acts of observation and mea-
surement affect what is seen) and that perspective does depend on 
the position of the observer. Research in the humanities and social 
sciences also questions the notion of simple location and supports 
Whitehead’s emphasis on relationality. For example, work on color 
perception shows that perceived color can change depending on 
adjacency (Albers [1963] 1975). Research in the cognitive and neu-
rosciences shows that observation varies according to surround-
ing conditions and that environment does alter what is known 
and remembered (Vygotsky 1978; Hutchins 1995; Stafford 2007). 
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Research on reading and learning shows that people incorporate 
new information through their received understanding (Jauss 
1982; Wolf 2008); complex systems theories offer a different way 
to think of connections, relations, and causality (J. Holland 1995; 
Mitchell 2009; Page 2008). In his discussion of the importance of 
entropy in social analyses, Fraser uses Escher’s image “Ascending 
and Descending” to argue for the importance of the whole pro-
cess and to place repetition and decay as central rather than an 
earlier, inferior, or external part of the process (1987: 281). This 
understanding of an internal time gains further support in cyber-
netics, the work of scientists seeking to connect the workings of 
machines to organisms during the second quarter of the twentieth 
century. What begins as an effort, in Jean- Pierre Dupuy’s analysis, 
to “mechanize the human” ultimately exposes the limitations of 
classical time and points to the possibility of multiple times and 
the centrality of nonlinear temporalities.
A key element in this history of time is the recognition of bio-
logical times. At the turn of the century, biological work largely 
focused on collection, description, and classification. Darwin’s 
evolution fits this classificatory tendency, and even though Dar-
win’s evolution argues that adaptation leads toward greater diver-
sity, its application to society by Herbert Spencer fits the ideology 
of progress according to a homogenous time. Two important 
mid- twentieth- century ideas that criticized linear science are the 
General System Theory (GST) founded by Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
and cybernetics, especially the work connected to the Macy Con-
ferences (1946– 53). Norbert Wiener describes cybernetics through 
a language analogous to history: “the study of messages as a means 
of controlling machines and society” (1950: 15). The messages (or, 
more commonly, information) of cybernetics can be likened to 
facts and data of history. We don’t think of history as a mode of 
control, but it is a knowledge system that orders and guides. A key 
difference is that these sciences recognize the simplistic reduction-
ism of classical science and offer more complex understandings 
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and frameworks. Cybernetics and GST have often been merged 
as early attempts to overcome a key problem of classical science, 
the reduction of phenomena to two variables, or simple location 
(Pias 2016; Bertalanffy 1968). Warren Weaver, a key member of the 
Macy Conferences, calls the interests of classical physics “problems 
of simplicity” (1948: 536– 37); Heinz von Foerster categorizes those 
problems as “trivial” (2014: 15– 19); and Bertalanffy argues that it is 
the difference between a static (classical) and continuously chang-
ing (complex) system. We must remember that the basis of his-
tory, “simple location,” is based on the classical physics they are 
criticizing.
One of the interesting connections of the Macy Conferences 
today is the belief that mechanical and physical laws, through what 
we now understand as digital technology, can be applied to biological 
processes. These scientists were ambitious; they sought “to design 
overarching orders of knowledge with nothing short of epoch- 
changing implications” (Pias 2016: 11). According to Dupuy, the 
goal was a “sciences of the mind” (2000: 77).44 The initial title of 
the Macy Conferences, “Feedback Mechanisms and Circular Causal 
Systems in Biological and Social Systems,” indicates the effort to 
bring together the biological and social through attention to non-
linear processes.45 When the meetings began, Wiener suggested the 
analogy between organisms and machines. In 1955, Warren McCull-
och still stated confidently, “Everything we learn of organisms leads 
us to conclude not merely that they are analogous to machines but 
that they are machines” (Dupuy 2000: 50). In Wiener’s case, machines 
were technological (computational) objects; in McCulloch’s case, 
they became “logico- mathematical being embodied in the matter 
of the organism” (Dupuy 2000: 50). It is hard to overstate the sig-
nificance of cybernetics; it was a major development and warrants 
the assertion that this event marked the beginning of a second 
industrial revolution: first, the steam engine, and second, informa-
tion theory based on digital forms.46 It brought nonlinear time— 
circular causality, feedback loops, and homeostasis— to discussions 
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of temporality. It helped spawn fields as diverse as information 
theory, computer science, artificial intelligence, autonomous 
systems, and cognitive science.47
Its limits, though, are in this ambition. In the records of the last 
five meetings, discussions also show the difficulty of applying the 
analogy of the machine to the mind. One of the pithy descriptors 
of cybernetics states that it is concerned with “ways of behaving,” 
not the knowledge of things (Ashby 1956: 1). This focus on activity 
and doing when applied to biological and social systems necessar-
ily encounters human variability. Some of the papers touched on 
perception— both psychological and physiological (through a frog’s 
eyes)— language and symbolism, humor, emotions, and commu-
nication patterns in humans and animals. In a way, it replicates 
the separation of history. “Ways of behaving” emphasize the clas-
sifications, patterns of activity, and regularity of action in modern 
society. What is more difficult are issues that are beyond closed, 
classificatory problems such as the difference between causality 
and correlation, parsing abstractions, and performing logical infer-
ence (Jordan 2018; see also Marcus 2018). It should be an open-
ing for scholars interested in processes by which humans know, 
decide, and act (like history).
A few did tackle these issues. Von Foerster founded his Biolog-
ical Computer Lab, which gave rise to what has become known 
as second- order cybernetics. The key difference in second- order 
cybernetics is that the observer cannot be autonomous; the 
observer observes, is an actant, and reports. It questions the pos-
sibility of objectivity and points to the limitations of Newtonian 
science as “universal, deterministic, and objective” and with a neu-
tral observer. This work punctuates the impossibility of escaping 
what Prigogine and Stengers call the “clutches of time” (1984: 213).
Finally, today, simultaneity is more apparent than ever. We have 
increasing writings, scholarly and popular, raising the compres-
sion of time to the extent that the future is frequently displaced 
by an extended present or presentism (Nowotny 1994; Hartog 
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2015; Harootunian 2015; Rushkoff 2013). As an example, Nowotny 
begins her book Time, “Today the tension between present experi-
ence that does not value what is past and an expectation oriented 
towards what is, in tendency, endless improvement has largely col-
lapsed” (1994: 16). But rather than examining this changing rela-
tionality of time and space, today, in response to this collapse, we 
talk about innovation and invention as if they are different than 
improvement. Moreover, this seems to be our response to work 
that shows that the major technological discoveries that had the 
greatest impact on modern society occurred in the first half of 
the twentieth century (Gordon 2016). There is a conceptual dis-
connect. Society and academia seem so wedded to our chrono-
logical system— that is, have so naturalized its values— that the 
“new” suffices for innovation even though such improvements 
are usually a means of maintaining the past (the current structure), 
more efficiently. At minimum, we need to disaggregate processes. 
Michael Young (1988), for example, argues that we need to sepa-
rate social evolution from progress— the existence of the former 
does not mean that there is progress. In his effort to revive the 
idea of progress, Peter Wagner separates social and political change 
from technological and economic progress. The past two centuries 
have seen the advance of the latter (enjoyed always by an elite), 
while the former is much more mixed. We still haven’t addressed 
Simmel’s sage observation: “The things that determine and sur-
round our lives, such as tools, means of transport, the products of 
science, technology and art, are extremely refined. Yet individual 
culture, at least in the higher strata, has not progressed at all to 
the same extent; indeed, it has even frequently declined” ([1900] 
1990: 448). In short, abstract time orders societies and fosters 
technological progress, and it is the latter that has, in Nowotny’s 
words, intoxicated us to accept its elevation to a concept external 
to our world (1994: 26– 28). In the rise of science, in the continued 
violence throughout the world, and in historical understanding, 
classical time is decreasingly apposite to our world (if it ever was).
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To conclude this brief history, I return to the epigraph from 
Elias’s essay on time where he calls for a “spring cleaning.” We 
need to ask whether our application of absolute time to society 
has arrested our own development in the name of innovation and 
progress. Complex systems both close off history from the field 
and simultaneously provide an opening. The former occurs 
through emphasis on mechanistic forms of analysis; the latter 
appears in the limitations on addressing human variability. It pro-
vides fascinating possibilities for reconceiving relations between 
pasts and the present. Herbert Simon, more than fifty years ago, 
issued an oblique challenge to historians: “The profession of his-
tory places a greater value upon the validated particular fact than 
upon tendentious generalization. I shall not elaborate upon my 
fancy, therefore, but will leave it to historians to decide whether 
anything can be learned for the interpretation of history from an 
abstract theory of hierarchic complex systems” (1962: 473). This 
general avoidance of generalization in favor of the particular— 
the derision of theory at the start of this chapter— helps mask the 
role of history in maintaining what Postone (1993: 300) calls a dual 
temporality of modern capitalist societies underneath an ongoing, 
even accelerating flow; there is the conversion of time into a con-
stant present— again, linear flow and repetition. In the next chap-
ter I will explore how this dual temporality—motion and stasis—is 
enabled through the conflation of chronology and history.

CHAPTER TWO
HISTORY HAS A HISTORY
Newton’s chronological writings might be called the mathematical 
principles of the consolidation of empires because they dealt primarily 
with quantities of geographic space in a temporal sequence; the individ-
uals mentioned in his histories, usually royal personages, were merely 
signposts marking the progressive expansion of territories. . . . The sub-
ject matter of his history was the action of organized political land 
masses upon one another.
— Frank Manuel (1963: 137)
For three centuries maybe the objectification of the past has made of 
time the unreflected category of a discipline that never ceases to use it 
as an instrument of classification. In the epistemology that was born 
with the Enlightenment, the difference between the subject of knowl-
edge and its object is the foundation of what separates the past from 
the present . . . the “past” is the object from which a mode of production 
distinguishes itself in order to transform it.
— Michel de Certeau (1986: 216)
The history that showed things “as they really were” was the strongest 
narcotic of the century.
— Walter Benjamin (1999: 463)
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In the introduction, I raised Kuhn’s complaint that history obscures 
its research process. Kuhn’s comment and Simon’s observation at 
the end of the previous chapter (that historians focus on the par-
ticular) are connected in the merger between absolute time and 
history. Indeed, they operate together to obscure this historical 
process and naturalize each other— chronology and history. The 
combination serves as the basis for our understanding of the world, 
the overall structure of modern history (system), and the basic 
methods for historical inquiry (history). The “disguised” element 
of the historian’s process is in the acceptance of chronological time 
as an external (i.e., absolute) time, the subsequent elision of this 
historical transformation, and the turn of history to the archives.
The success of this transformation is in, of course, the hun-
dred plus years of the discipline. It also extends well beyond to 
historical thinking; Ermarth assesses the place of this historical 
thinking in the modern world: “Historical time, in fact, may be 
the most powerful value confirmed by the narratives of Western, 
especially Anglo- American, culture; it informs much of what we 
tell ourselves about individual and collective life. This convention 
underwrites the many touchstones of social, scientific, and eco-
nomic thought in the West since the seventeenth century” (1992: 
20). The power of historical thinking, and history as well, is in the 
way that it orders and orients us to certain ways of knowing about 
the past and our world.
This centrality of historical thinking contrasts the current 
worries in the discipline of history about a decline in interest and 
attention (and significance?) as well as a rise of a presentist mind- 
set. Historians have generally blamed external factors, especially 
the denigration of humanistic understanding in favor of science 
and technology. While there is good reason for such a view, his-
torians have ignored internal issues; we have so naturalized our 
processes that we have overlooked how history itself is a part 
of the problem. I agree with Ermarth (1992, 2011), who suggests 
that the history that developed over the twentieth century no 
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longer matches changes to our societies conceptually, practically, 
or scientifically. This statement raises questions whether history 
too suffers from the fatal confusion Bastian (2012) identified in 
our understanding of time and nature. A naturalized chronological 
time is the foundation of this disconnect.
When the chronological structure is decentered, a richer, com-
plex interaction between things before and anticipation becomes 
apparent. Things that happened often weigh heavily on anticipa-
tion as well as decision- making; they are not past and future but 
operations of evaluation, negotiation, and organization. Moreover, 
without the distance established by dates, we also begin to see 
commonalities between ideas, deeds, and sensibilities. For exam-
ple, work in digital media suggests that communicating digitally 
bears more similarities with oral rather than written modes (Foley 
2012; Saussy 2016). Work using “deep time” shifts subjects and per-
spectives where issues today might be similar to issues prior to the 
Enlightenment (Smail 2008, Standage 2013; Zielinski 2006). Augus-
tine’s notion of time might be closer to our lives in the twenty- first 
century: “It might be correct to say that there are three times, a 
present of past things, a present of present things, and a present 
of future things” (1961: 269). This seems to align better with Ben-
jamin’s quest for a history framed by Jetztzeit, an extended pres-
ent. Benjamin’s Jetztzeit was an attempt to extract humans from 
chronological time, not our current presentism as an extension 
of mechanical production. But if indeed we are in a world of 
an extended present, what does it mean for history and our under-
standing of the world (see, for example, Gumbrecht 2003; Hartog 
2015; Nowotny 1994; Rushkoff 2013; White 2014)?
Certeau suggests that our current practice of history employs 
“bewitching voices of the narration [that] transform, reorient, 
and regulate the space of social relations” (1986: 207). The phrase 
“bewitching voices,” like occlusion, points to a trickery or seduc-
tion in history itself, a similar effect to Benjamin’s identification 
of “as they really are” as the narcotic of the twentieth century. Like 
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magic, the trick involves distraction so that what is obscured has 
been hidden in plain sight, invoked frequently as a natural part 
of history. In this chapter, I argue that that bewitchment is made 
possible by the conflation of history and chronology. The obfusca-
tion can be seen in manifold situations. For example, it is evident 
in the idea that developmental policies are applicable to different 
cultures at the same levels of development, irrespective of local 
circumstances and cultural differences. Or perhaps it is in the cur-
rent fascination with algorithms that crunch masses of data, using 
the past (data) to instantiate and preserve the present in the name 
of (technological) innovation. This might lead to some kind of 
change, but often it is similar to the eighteenth- century application 
of mathematics to insurance (and chance) for profit. And today, we 
have new periodizations— Big History and the Anthropocene1— 
that attempt to deal with these changes. While both have some 
promise, they are within or subsumed by absolute time.2
From this brief introduction, I hope that it is clear that, by 
a history of history, I do not intend to write about how major 
figures— for example, Vico and Michelet— have written narratives 
and accounts of the past, beginning with Herodotus.3 These oper-
ate in chronological time (even though chronological time did not 
exist) and reinforce— through a narrative of becoming— the nat-
uralization of our current chronological structure of history. The 
historical structure that emerged during the eighteenth through 
twentieth centuries was a new way of conceiving and organizing 
social relations using the new technologies— linear, mechanical, 
and absolute time. Michel Foucault writes, “And it is in this clas-
sified time, in this squared and spatialized development, that the 
historians of the nineteenth century were to undertake the cre-
ation of a history that could at last be ‘true’— in other words, lib-
erated from Classical rationality, from its ordering and theodicy: a 
history restored to the irruptive violence of time” (1970: 132). This 
violence of time is the imposition of a new reality structured by 
a linear, mechanical chronology. By weaving itself into this time, 
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history became the mediating system between science and soci-
ety, a “squared and spatialized development.” It created a world 
order; it changed the subject, object, data, and understanding of 
those it described (thereby colonizing them). History became a 
technology for order and control; it “transform[s], reorient[s], 
and regulate[s] the space of social relations” away from persons 
toward categories of people. In short, it changed what had been 
real to a new reality based on abstract, not experiential principles. 
It created a “virtual reality.”
DISCOVERY OF THE PAST
People had (and have) different relations with and uses of pasts 
where what had happened is very much still a part of their pres-
ent. To suggest that what has happened is gone and no longer 
part of the present is fantasy. One only has to look around, read 
(or listen to) the news, and think about how our lives are framed 
to recognize that pasts are constituent parts of our present. There 
are other ways of keeping previous happenings in the present. 
One form of recording was the annal, or the chronicle. Hayden 
White points to the following entries in the Annals of Saint Gall 
(1987: 6– 7; blank years eliminated):
709. Hard winter. Duke Gottfried died.
710. Hard year and deficient in crops.
712. Flood everywhere.
714. Pippin, mayor of the palace, died.
718. Charles devastated the Saxon with great destruction.
As White points out, this is a list of extreme events that were a 
threat to “a culture hovering on the brink of dissolution” (1987: 7). 
Natural calamities and social events are not distinguished. Being, 
explanation, connections, causality, order of importance, and 
dates are not given. Yet White sees a thread: “Everywhere it is the 
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forces of disorder, natural and human, the forces of violence 
and destruction, that occupy the forefront of attention. The 
account deals in qualities rather than agents, figuring forth a 
world in which things happen to people rather than one in which 
people do things” (1987: 10). The stable condition in nonmodern 
societies is not change but repetition, the continuation of the 
past— especially ideals of some exemplary founding figure (like 
Emperor Jinmu in the Kojiki4) in the present. Change did exist, 
but it occurred gradually through recurrence, was a devolution 
from the ideal beginning, and resulted from efforts to recover that 
originary state. Gurevich describes the aura of certainty in medi-
eval Europe that existed in the repetitive present: “The past, as it 
were, returns continuously, and this lends solidity, gravity, a non- 
transient character to the present” (1985: 143).
Genealogy was another common mode of representing the pre-
vious happenings. This is closer to historia magistra vitae, exemplary 
deeds and figures, things, or happenings worth remembering to 
provide a sense of certainty when confronting a mystical and pow-
erful cosmos. Gabrielle Spiegel points out that these forms often 
had political purpose— to authorize the present through connec-
tion to before— and were organized generationally, not chrono-
logically (1997: 99– 110). The subject was usually the individual or 
family line.5 These examples suggest that nonmodern societies had 
a sense of before— a sense of its utility— and anticipation, but that 
is not the same as our understanding of the present between past 
and future. Moreover, the goal of the chronicler was transparency; 
he sought to convey faithfully what he heard or knew, including 
legend, unverified reports, and fables.
Newton himself shows the difficulty of the transition of history 
in his lesser cited Chronology of Ancient Kingdoms Amended. He did 
try to move history, especially the accounts of ancient kingdoms, 
into chronology. This is evident in the closeness of Manuel’s 
description of Chronology to our international system, world, or 
global history. It can be read as ordering all onto one progressive 
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timeline that quantifies— that is, measures and compares through 
interaction of now naturalized units— and it shifts the subject 
toward growth, hegemony, and violence. We can see how absolute 
time operates as the ahistorical structure for a historical narrative 
of a world order.6 But emphasizing the connection to our current 
system is anachronistic and gets ahead of our story: Chronology 
shows the power of inherited forms of knowledge and that our 
application of absolute time to human activity was not that of 
Newton. Newton worked on Chronology for forty years, he fre-
quently failed to precisely date events, and he predicted Armaged-
don in 2060 (Wilcox 1987: 208– 14).7 Nevertheless, he does move 
history closer to chronology.
Chronology uses an analogy that we still employ, the inter-
changeability between physical mass and human activity as aggre-
gates or categories. Manuel’s description of this work indicates 
two important changes: first, the subject of a chronological history 
becomes “quantities of geographic space in a temporal sequence” 
or “organized political land masses.” It is the shift to place- based 
units, away from the deeds and thinking of individuals. History 
uses the demand for classing within universal time described in the 
previous chapter. Second is the presumption of motion; history 
describes the interaction, conflict, fusion, or destruction of these 
places. This is an extension of priority on the movement of mass 
in Newton’s laws of motion to the expanded world. The relation 
between stability and change is now inverted.8
Our current understanding of history became possible with the 
differentiation of the past from the present (Certeau 1988: 2; Fasolt 
2004: 12– 22; and Schiffman 2011). The idea that the past had to be 
discovered is strange to us today. The key to this discovery was 
not a before but a past that is both prior and different (Schiffman 
2011: 263). According to Zachary Schiffman in his careful study 
The Birth of the Past, Montesquieu was the first to use such a past 
in his efforts to write a universal history, The Spirit of the Laws 
(1748). Schiffman writes, “Montesquieu’s writings represent a sea 
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change in historical thinking . . . he showed how to deploy Carte-
sian analysis . . . using it to grasp the relations between distinctively 
human entities. In so doing, he distinguished between these enti-
ties by holding them at a remove from each other and measuring 
the distances between them” (2011: 209). Historians will no doubt 
disagree whether the emergence of a past can be located with such 
precision to one person. The eminent medieval historian Jacques 
Le Goff sees pasts emerging earlier and history evident from the 
sixteenth century. Nevertheless, it is clear that a new form of his-
torical knowledge emerged with the Enlightenment and since the 
nineteenth century has developed into the basis of historical think-
ing today. Montesquieu’s human entities are similar to “quantities 
of geographical space.” Relations are understood through mea-
surement of temporal distance. Interestingly, Montesquieu’s Spirit 
is not chronological; his past facilitated comparison of political 
units and human sensibilities, but he did not do so sequentially 
(Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 115– 18).9 A universal history did not 
necessarily mean a history according to chronological time.
Johann Gottfried Herder is another important figure who tried 
to merge history and absolute time. Like Montesquieu, his History 
of Man is not structured along a single timeline. Iggers calls Herd-
er’s historical structure “cosmopolitan culture- oriented nation-
alism” (1968: 30).10 Herder echoes Newton in arguing that there 
are three primary concepts that serve as the organizing principles 
of the world of experience: time, space, and force (Norton 1991: 
43– 44, 141– 43). He too accepted absolute time, the centrality of 
movement, and progress among human communities. Herder 
writes that reason “is not inborn in him; instead he attained it” 
(Zammito 2009: 79). But Herder’s idea of history is not the his-
torical structure we have accepted (Nisbet 1980: 270– 72; Colling-
wood 1994: 88– 93; Iggers 1968: 34– 38). Herder dealt with this 
desire for a universal understanding of the myriad places of the 
world by arguing that peoples (races) have different characteristics 
and their development is conditioned by their internal conditions 
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and environment.11 On the one hand, he is trying to recognize the 
heterogeneity of peoples and of their development (or lack thereof). 
Yet in hindsight, his History of Man elevates the German people, 
and it would be a rather easy step to organize his history along a 
single timeline as does Hegel. But he did not take that step, instead 
criticizing universal history organized chronologically as Eurocen-
tric (Iggers 1968: 35). This brings out one of those “differentials of 
time” that Benjamin sought. Herder recognized heterogeneity (still 
with hierarchies) but did not lock them into temporal categories.
Schiffman identifies Voltaire as the first historian to write a 
chronological narrative using a prior and distant past in his Essai 
sur les moeurs et l’esprit des nations. Georg Wilhelm Hegel, through 
his Philosophy of History, is, like Newton and his Principia, the 
intellectual most acknowledged for this transformation (here, 
of history). Hegel divided his world history into three succes-
sive conditions: the Original state (Oriental world) where repeti-
tion prevailed, the Reflective state (Greek and Roman worlds) of 
increasing self- consciousness, and finally the Philosophical state 
(Germanic world) where through Reason, one understands the 
Spirit. This structure of progress was taken to the nascent social 
sciences when Condorcet and Saint Simon sought to create positiv-
ism, which would turn history into a science of becoming. At this 
point, it is worthwhile to recall the breakup of time, what Serres 
calls “classing,” as discussed in chapter 1. By the nineteenth cen-
tury, absolute time also became linear historical time. The subject 
shifted to knowledge about organized political land masses, and 
nation- states were ordered according to their condition along a 
linear structure of development or progress. This brings out one 
of the central roles of a prior and distant past; the order it provided 
enabled comparison based on temporal measurement. Koselleck 
describes this process as the movement from a new time, neue 
Zeit, to modernity, Neuzeit. Modernity not only is an era but also 
“becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right” (Kosel-
leck 1985: 246).12
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Interestingly, this convergence of chronology and history 
removes this Neuzeit from history; it becomes a system that orders 
the world. Siskin describes this relation between system and 
history: “With system now mediating the empirical connection to 
things— absolving history of that function— this was the moment 
in which temporality completed its move to history’s core. New 
knowledge groupings now had empirical content arranged 
systematically and their own chronological narratives to define 
them and to differentiate them from each other” (2016: 56). The 
system that mediated the “empirical connections to things” is this 
absolute time applied to human society by the above intellectu-
als. It provides a structure of a whole but enables a turn away to 
the parts, which still are always emplotted onto the temporal grid. 
There is a shift from relational conditions to hierarchically struc-
tured temporal categories. For example, the Orient shifted from 
being an other of Greece, as in the work of Herodotus, to Montes-
quieu’s static antithesis to a dynamic Europe, to the beginning of 
civilization in Voltaire, and to being the first stage of Hegel’s world 
history and of Comte’s positivism.
Ranke’s claim to reality, wie es eigentlich gewesen (as it actually 
was), makes sense within this system. The chronological narra-
tives that make up the parts parallel the chronological system. It 
continues to make sense in comparison with other claims because 
the structure within which he is operating is still our structure: 
absolute time. His famous line from his Histories of the Latin and 
Germanic Nations says, “To history has been given the function of 
judging the past, of instructing men for the profit of future years. 
The present attempt does not aspire to such a lofty undertaking. 
It merely wants to show how, essentially, things happened” (Ranke 
1973: 137). Ranke is quite conscious of the transition of history from 
historia magistra vitae to a “scientific” history. Like Bacon’s inver-
sion, Ranke similarly inverts criteria from accounts that keep pasts 
in the present to knowledge about a past that stabilizes the present. 
This inversion stabilizes history in two ways. First, chronological 
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history, in addition to absolute time, becomes an externality, a sys-
tem. History, like time, becomes a metric for verifying, knowing, 
measuring, and comparing. It is with this idea that units move on 
a temporal and spatial grid that objectivity becomes possible.
Second, history maintains boundaries of the various spatial 
units, what Whitehead calls “simple location.” The combination 
of this form of classing with history is, in my mind, one manifes-
tation of what Whitehead identifies as the “fallacy of misplaced 
concreteness” (1925: 58). Simple location facilitates an empha-
sis on the idea that “things happened” as akin to matter (“orga-
nized land masses”) and motion (their rise and fall). The focus 
on events in places turns history to the particular and away from 
the general. This operation is similar to a mapping process that 
Thomas Gieryn argues maintains the epistemic authority of sci-
ence. Science, he argues, is not absolute but is defined through a 
cartography in which it is surrounded by “less believable or useful 
terrain” (1999: 4). Gieryn uses a “Map of a Great Country,” where 
Mount Science is in the state of Great Knowledge and that state is 
between the states of Improvement and Fine Prospect and is near 
the state of Plenty and Enjoyment. As one goes farther away from 
Mount Science, on the other side of the Demarcation Mountains, 
one encounters the Territory of Indulgence and then Gloom, Poor 
Prospect, and Ruin (Gieryn 1999: 6– 12). The map of the world, 
divided at the International Dateline, overlays onto the tempo-
ral division of organized land masses. Asia is to the east, Europe 
is at center, and the US is to the west; the Orient (primitive) is 
the East, and the Occident (advanced) is the West. In both cases, 
what Gieryn calls boundary work fixes relationality. In the case of 
history, this boundary work is maintained through a gesture 
of exclusion, the division of the old and new, or past and present. 
This gesture of exclusion will be described below.
The durability of this historical time suggests that it is (has been) 
seductive. History shifts from things worth remembering and 
keeping alive to knowledge that establishes order and prescribes 
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measurable relations or truth. The problem is not that of objectiv-
ity or relativity; that dualism reinforces the basis of simple location. 
It returns us to Benjamin’s statement in the epigraph that Ranke’s 
notion of reality is the “strongest narcotic” of the twentieth cen-
tury. It is an opiate for nation- states, those in power, as well as for 
the scholars who use it to claim relevance and importance. It has 
obscured the way that history transforms, reorients, and regulates.
PERFORMATIVITY OF HISTORY
It is important to acknowledge the brilliance of this historical time. 
First, it was key to the rise of the Enlightenment. Whitehead calls 
this transformation the “historical revolt”— the rise of historical 
thinking— simply “the study of the empirical facts of antecedents 
and consequences” (1925: 39). This notion of a revolt brings out the 
performative nature of the idea of history that we have taken for 
granted. It still structures, for better or worse, modern political, 
economic, and social systems; it has been very seductive. Moreover, 
this new history has been a key technology in addressing what Mer-
chant, Siskin, Shapin, and others identify as the central concern of 
the era, the quest for certainty and order. Absolute time provided a 
structure rooted in science, and history provided a knowledge sys-
tem to emplot all onto one progressive timeline that quantifies— 
that is, measures and compares through the interaction— growth, 
hegemony, and the violence of politico- cultural units. This is a part 
of the transformation and reorientation of what Certeau refers to 
as bewitching voices; the historical revolt was a shift to particulars. 
Each geographic space could write its own narrative within the 
structure of absolute time. For the nations, it offers the potential 
to write the “reality” of self and even correct what others think. 
History calls this inquiry into the development of masses within 
the structure “change over time” or “continuity and discontinu-
ity.”13 In these phrases, history occludes its own history. This occlu-
sion is in the removal of time from history as if it is, at the risk of 
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perpetuating this misuse of Benjamin, “empty”; it is to ignore the 
politics of time. In the sections below, I will describe several ways 
that the performativity of history has been obscured.
Occlusion of Chronology
Chronology, of course, does not disappear; it is, though, delimited 
in ways that both make it obvious and neutral, as if without power 
to order and control. Even though the chronological structure of 
history is historical and is the very foundation of modern history, 
in the turn to the particular, time becomes both pervasive and 
limited; history is “transformed from within into a rational series 
of operations and objectified from without into a metric system of 
chronological units” (Certeau 1986: 216). The process Certeau 
describes can be attributed to two related moves: the separation 
of history from the philosophy of history and Ranke’s emphasis 
on the veracity of documents and the turn to the archives.
A philosophy of history (as separate from history) also emerged 
with the application of history to absolute time. Voltaire was the 
first to employ the phrase “philosophy of history” (Collingwood 
1994), and Hegel is well known for his Philosophy of History. In 
this phrase, Voltaire and Hegel open the possibility of separating 
this chronological system from histories within it. It serves as the 
overall structure of movement, then known as progress— a pro-
gression toward the spirit, from the Original to the Reflective and 
finally to the Philosophical state. We now shun these categories, 
yet the chronological structure still exists. This is where chrono-
logical time is, in Koselleck’s words, “a dynamic and historical force 
in its own right” (1985: 246).14 Chronological time simply is; there 
is no need for inquiry.
Once naturalized, history becomes a discipline that operates 
within that chronological system. Ranke is commonly cited as the 
iconic founding figure of modern history, especially the transfor-
mation of history to research on the particular, of nations using 
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documents found in archives. He argued that the document is the 
best way to know events of the past, and the reconstruction of 
events from these documents results in an objective, real picture 
of the past. This is familiar, but Ranke relies on juxtaposition to 
support this assertion. In his essay “On the Relations of History 
and Philosophy,” he separates the particular (history) from the 
abstract (philosophy) in order to argue for the veracity of archival 
research (Ranke 1973: 29– 32, 33– 46). An inversion occurs where the 
particular, though built on a now- hidden chronological system, is 
the part that leads to an understanding of the general and abstract. 
Siskin describes the connection of this history to a system with an 
occulted chronological structure: “This interaction [of parts to the 
whole] was the engine of Newtonian Enlightenment: the calculus 
divided wholes into an infinite number of parts, and system connected 
parts into wholes” (2016: 93). The parts are an acknowledgment of 
multiplicity, but because the general, the chronological system, is 
universal, difference is at best unevenness. This reliance on simple 
location allows for the illusion that history is like a jigsaw puz-
zle; the accumulations of parts (filling the gaps) leads to the whole 
(White 1978: 126ff). Ranke did not ignore the general; he identifies 
philosophy as the spirit or supreme idea of a society (echoes of 
Hegel; Iggers 1968); it transcends chronological time. But in doing 
so, he eliminates absolute time from philosophy and confirms that 
history operates in chronological time. (This is perhaps an early 
moment in the allergy of modern history to ideas, theory, and phi-
losophy.) Time becomes a passing past- present- future that history 
operates within; the philosophy of history is timeless— it is about 
spirit and being. The chronological structure that orders the world 
is accepted as absolute. The politics of chronology, the way that 
time transforms, reorients, and regulates is, at best, backgrounded. 
Charles Hedrick, a historian of ancient Greece, writes, “With the 
development of an overarching chronographic system . . . history 
becomes ‘one damn thing after another’” (2006: 50).
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Particulars
The turn to the particular coincides with the process of “classing”; 
it is the combination of Newton’s “organized political land masses” 
that fuse or destroy with Hegel’s philosophy of history. This com-
bination shifted the subject of history from human activity or 
quality of being to categories of humans, of the state and motion 
of those units. This shift from life to units was contested, for exam-
ple, in the writings and appointment of Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 
Schelling to the University of Berlin (Toews 2004: 1– 7). John Toews 
describes Schelling’s criticism of Hegelian philosophy as “what-
ness” (state or category) over “thatness” (quality or life): “Hegelian 
rationality shaped reality into a world of conceptual forms that 
defined experience but never penetrated beyond these forms to 
that prior ground of existence that made the shaping activity pos-
sible in the first place, and constantly threatened to break through 
the veil of concepts and reveal their contingent status” (2004: 5). 
This is another place where we can see how Certeau’s bewitch-
ing voices “transform, reorient, and regulate.” Toews’s language 
is important: “rationality shaped reality” and conceptual forms 
“defined experience.” Now the organization and understanding of 
life and experience is based on systems and categories, not human 
activity. History becomes a knowledge system (within chrono-
logical time) that values some collective singular, “quantities of 
geographic space in a temporal sequence” (Manuel 1963: 137). Pre-
vious happenings are transformed and reoriented into a past that 
describes some public, the collective singular.
Interestingly, despite its reliance on an absolute time that 
always flows regularly, this new history stops time— that is, the 
processes of life— by spatializing time. Newton’s duration, what 
is between two points in time, allows for periodization— another 
spatialized time. We must recognize the work of scholars (like 
Bergson, Harvey, and Lefebvre) who have criticized this separa-
tion of absolute space and absolute time and instead argue that 
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the two are always interrelated. Bergson unpacks the intercon-
nectedness of time and space: “That time implies succession I do 
not deny. But that succession is first presented to our conscious-
ness, like the distinction of a ‘before’ and ‘after’ set side by side, is 
what I cannot admit. . . . If we cut it up into distinct notes, into so 
many ‘befores’ and ‘afters,’ we are bringing spatial images into it 
and impregnating the succession with simultaneity: in space, and 
only in space, is there a clear- cut distinction of parts external 
to one another” (2002: 260– 61). Drawing on Halbwachs, Hartog 
connects this spatialized time to a history that is an abstraction 
that, although borrowed, is separated from human activity. He 
writes, “History, which ‘extracts changes from duration,’ forges 
‘an artificial duration having no reality for the groups from which 
these events are borrowed’” (2015: 122). New units— places, taxono-
mies, and periods— are formulated by succession in chronological 
writing. This spatialization of time is the principal way that the 
classing gains historical form (Gross 1982: 59).
This inversion from quality to state is another moment when 
history turns to the particular, ensconced within but separated 
from the chronological system that structures history. It fills in 
the content for the classings that emerge from absolute time, 
making these newly formed spatializations appear as natural. 
Through succession and repetition, history marks temporal or 
geographic boundaries and provides a semblance of order amid 
motion. Absolute time, by definition, applies to numerous scales; 
it is deployed within these units as if it is addressing the “thatness.” 
But this good faith effort to address quality is reoriented toward 
topics within that system— nations, identity, race, and class.15 To 
recall Toews, this is a “world of conceptual forms” that don’t pen-
etrate to “that prior ground.” From the nineteenth century, we 
see a proliferation of histories of nations. These are regulated 
by the temporal sequence, the chronological system that orders 
these units and serves as a metric of their differences, usually 
as the progress (or lack thereof) of the nation- state.
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This turn to the particular— the nation- state— has been intox-
icating. For Western nations, it provides a way to confirm their 
superiority in the world; for non- Western places, history (usually 
the lack of such) was invoked as evidence of inferiority, but it also 
became (and still is) a vehicle for critique, correction, and the hope 
for inclusion into the international order.16 The twentieth century 
is strewn with efforts to move beyond the hierarchies and catego-
ries of this system as well as to use them to rationalize imperial 
activities (e.g., Japan’s Greater East Asia Co- Prosperity Sphere, 
what we can call an alternate modernity). A question that will be 
addressed below is to what extent this future is captive of the past; 
the past as “prior and different” by definition always validates the 
West as the new, the future, or of the future as a continuation 
of some teleological process that can only move forward along a 
continuum from the past.17
Gesture of Exclusion
Perhaps the most devious way that history obscures its performa-
tivity is within the linear structure itself. On the one hand, the 
bewitching operation is in the ordering, the hierarchical metric 
toward an ideal end. Work on the history of time and of history 
has tended to focus on the linearity or progressive nature of this 
time. That is its main ostensible structure. I also followed this path. 
Yet as I discussed in chapter 1, linear time operates with cyclical 
processes, and increasingly scholars are again recognizing that 
this linearity depends on other forms of time and displaces these 
times in ways that support this linear structure (Michael Young 
1988; Sharma 2014; Irani 2019; Koselleck 2018). Certeau calls this 
operation a “gesture of exclusion” (discussed below), Serres calls it 
a “dogmatic expulsion,” and Marx calls it “formal subsumption.”18 
These operations demonstrate the way that pasts in the language 
of succession are transformed, reoriented, and regulated to main-
tain constantly the superiority of the modern. This is a temporal 
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form of the boundary work Gieryn uses to describe the mainte-
nance of the authority of science. While there is a structure and 
ostensible possibility for progress or improvement using New-
tonian duration, the boundary between past and present, or old 
and new, is a relational condition that does not lead to changing 
relations because the latter is defined by juxtaposition against the 
former. In the perpetual movement to some new (modern, Occi-
dent), an old (tradition, Orient) continually reinforces that new. 
The gesture reinforces those identified as modern and locks those 
identified as past into a repetitive condition— always the “not yet” 
(Chakrabarty 2000: 6– 11). To repeat Serres, “it follows that we are 
always right, for the simple, banal, and naive reason that we 
are living in the present moment” (1995: 48). This is the success 
and limitation of the historical revolt— it grounds thinking that is 
freed from the authority of a past but locks those described as past 
into a constant condition of incompleteness. Elizabeth Povinelli, 
drawing from Chakrabarty, visualizes this condition as the “imag-
inary waiting room of history” (2002: 77).19
This is one of those areas where the performativity of history is 
disguised (hidden) in the very process that enables it. The past, now 
naturalized simply as previous moments in chronological time (the 
“old”), plays a critical role in affirming the “new,” the modern, and 
the most advanced. Certeau describes this “gesture of exclusion” in 
his study of mystics in sixteenth- and seventeenth- century France. 
This gesture employs some past or marginalized object as one 
side of a binary from which a society distinguishes itself (Certeau 
1992: 17). Though his discussion focuses on heretics, he is clear 
that this position of other as past has been employed using many 
other groupings of marginalized people; he mentions cultural and 
ethnic minorities, spiritual marginalities, the Indian, the mad, the 
child, and the non- West (1988: 3; 1992: 18). Peoples now classified 
as some past facilitate the process of classing, of making nations. 
They give definition to boundaries that show progress— not as 
much by internal conditions as by juxtaposition that is focused 
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on state, not quality.20 Marx identified this process over a century 
ago as formal subsumption, a process by which the past is incorpo-
rated, used, abstracted, and reassigned, not replaced. Harootunian 
writes, “Surviving practices from prior modes of production were 
not ‘remnants,’ as such, but rather appeared as historical temporal 
forms no longer bound to the moment and context in which they 
had originated, now acting in a different historical environment 
serving the pursuit of surplus value” (2015: 11). In this gesture of 
exclusion, repetition is inverted from a stable condition of societies 
to a form that stabilizes both linear history itself and the condition 
of being modern. People of difference are transformed into some 
characterization of repetition; they are closer to nature, the ori-
gin, or primitive. They are regulated through the repetition of the 
gesture itself. Repetition is in the constant monitoring of histo-
riographical boundaries (pasts), but the operation occurs through 
the structure rather than the conscious acts of the historian. For 
example, dating calls for the comparison of things across time; it 
reinforces the new as juxtaposed to the old. This history is not 
the particular accounts of individuals but the maintenance of the 
historical structure that is a temporal hierarchy. For the modern, 
the “same” is a process by which it is forever “new” and a “histori-
cal form” more than a homogeneous (or unified) content. I should 
emphasize that this position of the excluded is not necessarily 
meant to be derisive. Kathleen Davis points to the dual character 
of this position— the revered or respected origin in contrast to a 
strange/different other (2010: 59).
The two levels of history, as system and as particularity, ensure 
the perpetuation of that “imaginary waiting room.” As long as 
chronology remains, this gesture of exclusion is a constituent 
part of history. Fasolt has complained, “So long as there is history, 
there must be a Middle Ages,” and he acknowledges the many but 
ultimately futile “well- intentioned efforts” to extract oneself from 
this position as a modern other (2004: 228). We can just as easily 
replace medieval with Asia (Orient) or some other non- Western 
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place.21 Some past other (temporal or geographical) preserves and 
reinforces the privileged position of the modern in history. A pre-
dicament of historians of medieval and early modern Europe and 
of non- Western places is that the structured categorization of 
these periods or places is built into historical chronology; they are 
some version of incompletion or a primitive form of the modern 
(Spiegel 1997; Gurevich 1985; Fasolt 2004; Cole and Smith 2010; 
Chatterjee 1986; Chakrabarty 2000; Harootunian 2007). The bound-
ary work constantly performed by the past is hidden in the argument 
for linear movement and ensures the stability of the system itself.
Tombs of Data
Up to this point, I have argued that the performativity of history 
is in its chronological system. I have discussed the connection 
to the change of subject, a transformation of “reality,” and the 
inversion of repetition that accompanies and maintains the linear 
structure of history. A reason for the longevity of this system is 
its scalability. As Siskin (2016) points out, the relation between 
whole and parts or between system and history also operates 
within each part— the nation- state to the human. Now, I turn 
to a smaller fundamental unit of history, the document and the 
“fact,” where performativity reaches the research practices, 
the ongoing filtering system of historians. It is perhaps the activity 
where the “violence of time” is most obscured. Certeau describes 
the violence of this act as a form of pacification: “This project aims 
at ‘understanding’ and, through ‘meaning,’ at hiding the alterity 
of this foreigner; or, in what amounts to the same thing, it aims 
at calming the dead who still haunt the present, and at offering 
them scriptural tombs” (1988: 2). The focus on document as the 
basic unit of historical evidence is a form of control, “scriptural 
tombs” (or archives), both to limit the multiple possibilities within 
a document and to constrict recorded happenings to only partic-
ular parts of the past.
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To a large extent, I have told a story of becoming, the merger 
of chronology and history. This connection, however, was not 
obvious. It took almost a century to merge chronology and his-
tory into the history we practice today (Wilcox 1987: 187– 220). For 
example, despite his contribution that brings chronology closer to 
absolute time, history for Petavius was still an account of human 
activity— acts, thoughts, meaning, and arguments— in which time 
is internal. He writes, “History has as its own to possess fully the 
matter of deeds and to write down their order, usually with proofs, 
arguments, and witnesses, whence the order of individual years is 
established. Chronology indeed inquires after one thing, by what 
signs and marks each thing may be arranged in its years and times” 
(quoted in Wilcox 1987: 205). The difference between the systems 
he was trying to merge can be illustrated through Herodotus. Hero-
dotus synchronized the chronologies of Athens and Persia around 
the invasion of Athens as follows: “Kalliades was the archon in Ath-
ens in the sixth year after the death of Darius, when Xerxes went 
to Greece” (Momigliano 1990: 38). We know this year is 480 BC.
The contrast between the locally specific information of the 
former against the abstractness of a year is stark. The translation 
of event markers into years transforms understanding.22 Dates 
were not noteworthy in many societies. For example, even though 
776 BC is the commonly accepted date of the first Olympic Games, 
that year was not recorded (historians disagree about the year they 
actually began), and instead, the games themselves marked time. 
It is the same for the birth of Christ; it was not on December 25, 
and we now know that the calculation of years is probably four 
years off (Dionysus Exiguus is the source of the error). These dif-
ferent sensibilities are also evident in the founding of the Hattori 
Watch Company (Seiko)— an icon for what became the temporal 
precision of Japan— it varies. In the US, the celebration of birthdays 
on the date of birth began in the late nineteenth century, a cus-
tom that emerged from Hallmark Cards’ search for a new market 
(Chudacoff 1989).
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These are examples of the ways that dating has given meaning 
to past events through modern criteria, not through the contem-
porary sensibilities. Petavius did create three rules for the applica-
tion of dates to history so that they could be ordered according to 
a single time. First, he identified a date based on authority (corrob-
orating evidence based on reliable accounts). Second, he abstracted 
the date based on demonstration (astronomical evidence). Third, 
he used hypothesis (convention; Wilcox 1987: 206– 7). The first two 
rules are close to our current practice, but in the inclusion of con-
vention, Petavius was still allowing traces of the past, especially of 
exemplary figures and deeds where meaning was situated within 
a range of interactions.
This turn to documents or “facts” is generally attributed to 
Ranke, beginning with his research on Venice in the 1830s. Ranke 
argued that documents (primarily of diplomats and civil servants) 
offered the material closest to the past and an objective view 
(Eskildsen 2008). Historians have shown that Ranke’s faith in the 
veracity of documents was optimistic, but I am less concerned 
with objectivity than the transformation of accounts into data.23 
Like Petavius and historians before him, Ranke sought to deter-
mine which information to use. Wolfgang Ernst calls this trans-
formation of material into facts a process of desemiosis (2002). 
Nowotny’s description of the scientific method as cleansing is 
apt; it is a process of identifying, naming, classifying, and discard-
ing.24 Ranke compared documents to other sources and especially 
used names and dates for corroboration and veracity. He “pointed 
to disagreements and inconsistencies among texts to determine 
their historical value” (Eskildsen 2008: 436). In Meiji Japan, 
Kume Kunitake and Shigeno Yasutsugu used similar methods to 
cull through texts in their project to collect documents, archive 
them, and write a history of Japan. Cleansing occurred; errors 
in dates, even though chronological time might not have been 
a critical marking mechanism, and even misspelling of names 
were enough to disqualify the authenticity of some documents. 
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This methodology altered the import of written traces that had 
served as authoritative sources for knowledge about earlier 
events. Those that could not measure up to these new criteria 
have become quaint or primitive stories— important because of 
their originary status, yet denigrated as historical evidence (these 
become national literature).25
This brings out the “return” of chronological time, or what 
Ernst calls a process of resemiosis. Dating facilitates the shifting 
of pasts from something living in people— meaning and values— to 
a dead past— empirically verified facts. Now chronological time 
enables a precise mapping of events and data, independent of indi-
viduals, place, or the matrix of relations from which they emerged. 
This is a part of that virtual reality, “mathematic principles of the 
consolidation of empires”— again, “simple location.” The place of 
their creation is replaced by a classing system, often the nation and 
its institutions. As Certeau points out, the “real” as represented by 
historiography does not correspond to the “real” that determines 
its production. In this case, dates organized chronologically are 
applied to order the particulars of history, the subunits— mass, 
classing, geographical space, or especially the nation- state. But it 
is important to heed Harold Innis’s work that shows the bias of 
media in societies and civilizations (1951). Documents are biased 
toward a few leaders, institutions, and fixity. This focus contracts 
pasts into a reduced realm that is acceptable for historical inquiry. 
Historical data are shorn of a vast array of evidence about pasts. 
Stories give way to information; they are further fragmented into 
“facts” disembodied from their place of former significance (Ben-
jamin 1968a). Data become portable; they become a commod-
ity. What historians call context is not the situatedness but the 
specific time and location of events. This move further separates 
what becomes this chronological system (world progress) from his-
tory (the writing of the becoming of a people— particular). More 
important, it provides a way to give the Newtonian “mass” a sim-
ulacra of qualitative change.
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The qualitative element of that history is limited. Ranke 
(and historians) argued that the particular fits in the general 
but without interrogating this general.26 Indeed, history today 
has a hard time integrating the domestic with the international 
even though both reinforce each other. Efforts to move beyond 
this limitation have tried to move away from the national yet 
do this through the national— during my career, we have tried 
new nominal forms for (but never replaced) international such 
as area studies, postnational, multinational, transnational, and 
global. While I still have hope for the global, nation- states still 
serve as the principal units of analysis, and the structure of West 
and the rest prevails. More important, the chronological metric 
orients history toward technological development and the politi-
cal and economic deeds of the nation- state; emphasis is on quan-
titative measurement and comparison.
This history was a part of a larger pattern of “science,” which 
formulates knowledge systems that order the world. Carolus Lin-
naeus ordered living organisms into genus and species. Anthropol-
ogy emerged at the end of the nineteenth century to know those 
outside the West (see, for example, Fabian 1983; Pratt 1992; Raj 
2007; and Richards 1993). Statistics, which began in the previous 
century, was accepted into the British Association for the Advance-
ment of Science in 1833.27 In each case, data became important as 
a way to mark its place in some category beyond its immediate 
environment or the moment of creation.
The identification and collection of documents, the extraction of 
data from stories, is coterminous with the rise of national archives. 
There is a clear connection of the rise of the modern archives to 
the nation- state. The Archives nationales was founded following the 
French Revolution, and the British Public Records Office was 
founded in 1838.28 Ranke increased attention to archives after 1830 
when he was disturbed by the revolutionary activity surround-
ing him. When he began, documents were scattered; research 
was more akin to field work. The organization of documents into 
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official archives gives this new reality— a “virtual reality”— material 
structure: pieces of paper— records— organized according state 
categories and to scientific standards— chronology. The key orga-
nizing principles (respect des fonds, or provenance) support this 
change in subject away from humans toward institutions (East-
wood 2010). Ranke’s turn to the archive brought his history and 
affinity for the state closer to the goals of the state.
It strikes me that this structure and institutionalization is 
another fatal confusion in which history has become overly focused 
on itself. There is a rising interest in the past but a decline in inter-
est in academic history (de Groot 2009). History has ceded a huge 
swath of the past— human sensibilities and beliefs for this appeal 
to documents. This focus has also restricted the range of the past— 
artifacts and ruins are the domain of archaeology (Holtorf 1996), 
paleography covers humans prior to settlement (Smail 2008), and 
literature focuses on human sensibilities and emotions. Environ-
ment, inherited structures, received knowledge, belief, and expe-
rience all affect reception, interpretation, and meaning.
It is important to reconsider our notion of the document 
and the “fact.” The work of intellectuals prior to and during the 
Enlightenment bears suggestive commonalities with recent argu-
ments by scientists and the work of psychologists and cognitive 
scientists that demonstrate the specificity of the event as inter-
connected. They suggest that our current thinking might be the 
anomaly, not the norm.29 I will discuss these sciences in the fol-
lowing chapters. I will remain suggestive, invoking a philosopher 
and a historian: Whitehead’s “interconnectedness of things” and 
Certeau’s notion of a text or document as a “theatre organized by 
the vocabulary and syntax of a moment of history” (Certeau 2015: 
22). For these scholars, sources or “facts,” are not objects that exist, 
isolated from the milieu of their becoming; they have undergone a 
“cleansing.” Instead, when documents are considered as nodes of 
activity, they occur among different actors with varying inscrip-
tions and differing forms. The “fact” is not always the same. The 
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understanding during the moment of eruption, the language of 
bodies, the places of writing, and of course, the moment of inter-
action possibly alter its meaning.
Second- order cybernetics is especially relevant here for recog-
nizing the roles of inherited knowledge and the observer. We must 
also be aware that the document is also information that embeds 
historical knowledge and that actors use to make their decisions. 
Multiple perspectives exist; the observer observes, records, and 
participates; this process is repeated by historians. As information, 
the document too has a history and has been received differen-
tially. This understanding of a document as a node corresponds to 
struggles to understand the significance of the past in the sixteenth 
century (Grafton 1994). Historians might counter that we do this 
through context. But again, there is an inversion. Context reinserts 
surroundings after documents are extracted from their situated-
ness. In the following chapters, I argue that historians must return 
(or move toward) this notion of the situatedness of data and of 
information. It is increasingly important in today’s societies that 
are forsaking pasts for the present.
HISTORY AS MYTH
The institutionalization of this understanding of history occurred 
at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Interest-
ingly, this is almost simultaneous to the relegation of absolute time 
to classical time. The chronological structure of history, the basis 
of what we call historical thinking, is at best one form of time that 
remains, primarily because of its deep legacy. Yet we persist on using 
it as if it were absolute. Efforts throughout the twentieth century to 
suggest other temporal structures have not had much success. Per-
haps today is different; this is also the period when communication 
and knowing are shifting from print to digital, the second period 
of information inflation. We are only now beginning to deal with 
this transformation.
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In the introduction, I invoked Serres, Blumenberg, and Mali to 
suggest that the acceptance of the merger of chronology and history 
maintains this mythical mode (our current system). It is a concep-
tual system that is linear and regular, homogenizes life according to 
mechanical, linear processes, and encompasses variation as uneven-
ness (with an enticement that one can become equal). In its merger 
with history, chronological time has become a social technology 
that guides and controls us (Mumford 1964). It imposes structure, 
an ordered mechanical life; it values measurables, especially tech-
nology and economics; it relegates humanistic work— ideas, cul-
ture, interpretation, and ethics— to a secondary or lesser value 
compared to measured work; and it guiles us into thinking that we 
are better than before.
We must admit, though, that this myth is seductive. The seduc-
tion of this history is in a hidden boundary marking and mainte-
nance system that enables us to identify the problems of others 
and thereby create for ourselves a progressive position, which 
amounts to what Fasolt calls “well-intentioned efforts” (2004: 228). 
The gesture of exclusion operates among historians and within 
historical thinking— because we are more recent, we know more 
than “them.” Those of the past give us certitude that we are 
more advanced, that we are correct; because they are before or 
behind, they are marginal and not yet informed— or worse, we will 
“help them.” Perhaps that is why Benjamin identifies “as they really 
were” as the strongest narcotic of the twentieth century. History 
is a core discipline of the social sciences and humanities; it osten-
sibly explains and constitutes our political and economic systems; 
it orders the globe; and it confirms our professional identities— 
“as a historian.”
That certitude, however, depends on the occultation of the per-
formativity of chronological time that takes a relational condition 
and elides that relationality by assigning temporal positions within 
a system believed to be natural. Ranke has bequeathed us a history 
that, in the name of objectivity, allows for the transformation of 
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cultural difference and conflict “into conditions for a progressive 
political and ethical struggle for unity and reconciliation” (Toews 
2004: 373). That has not worked; the globe is too heterogeneous 
to formulate a unified order, especially one that is hierarchical. We 
must explore other ways to think about the significance of pasts 
in our present. There are hints in the past (prior to the Enlight-
enment); there are new understandings in the sciences that we 
must consider. I would argue that it is even more important in our 
digital age than ever.
INTERLUDE
But . . . if I were asked to help make the people of the world receptive 
to the demands of a time- compact order, I would first try to make his-
tory appear irrelevant. It is much easier to secure cooperation among 
people without an understanding of history than those with many and 
usually antagonistic histories.
— J. T. Fraser (1987: 314)
A civilization which cannot burst through its current abstractions is 
doomed to sterility after a very limited period of progress.
— Alfred North Whitehead (1925: 59)
The epigraphs from Fraser and Whitehead speak to the emer-
gence of a historical thinking that operates today. I connect our 
current worries about the place of history and the humanities to 
Fraser’s worry that history appears irrelevant. History is the 
chronological structure that has naturalized our understanding 
of the world according to a linear, homogenizing time— Fraser’s 
time- compact order. This irrelevance is a logical progression of the 
discipline from abstract criteria that separate human experience 
from historical reality. Fraser’s nightmare of compliance brings 
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to mind the novels of Aldous Huxley and George Orwell. Yet it 
also speaks to scholarly work, such as that of Gumbrecht, Har-
tog, G. H. Mead, Nowotny, Runia, and others who bring up the 
increasing presentism that characterizes the twenty- first century. 
We increasingly live in a world where we are locked in the perpet-
ual present of the time- concept order. Massimiliano Tomba echoes 
Whitehead in the following rather graphic statement: “With the 
early image of the Robinsonades, the hostile behaviours of indi-
vidual atoms were hurled into a meta- historical state of nature, 
thus creating a logical- historical circularity capable of immobilising 
transformation and producing the elements of economic and polit-
ical modernity: individuals. This image has acted beyond all expec-
tations, bringing about the complete animalisation of the human 
who lives in a world without history” (2013: 61). Today, we seem to 
be locked into this world of immobilized transformation. In the 
name of innovation, search engines use data from pasts to generate 
and fulfill human desires, while technological “advances” seem to 
improve what we have; both further lock us into a future perfect.
The more I have worked on time in modern society, the more I 
feel as if I am writing about a history of what has been forgotten in 
our craft of history. One can interpret Fraser’s warning as a dan-
ger for society with a poor sense of history. Few historians would 
disagree. But I would suggest that the problem is within history 
itself; we seem to be caught within a loop of our own making. His-
tory is built on a structure that abstracts our work (despite usually 
“well- intentioned efforts”) from human activity, even though the 
discipline claims to speak about and for the human. Yet this poor 
sense of history can also emerge from a history abstracted from 
human experience. Historians (and humanists) have had the lux-
ury of juxtaposing our work against the sciences and technologi-
cally oriented fields; thus we believe that we speak for the human 
and the humanities— or so we argue. This too is an example of the 
boundary work, the operation of the gesture of exclusion. Just as 
the break from the past (the before) authorizes the new (the same), 
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history uses this gesture to maintain the fiction that it too is not 
a technology but an advocate for the past (human) against the new 
(technology).1 Yet I hope that the previous chapters have shown 
that the merger of chronological time and history has created 
a technology that has masked the mechanical conceptual frame-
work of our world. The danger of this acceptance can be illus-
trated by Hans Saussy’s observation on writing as a technology: 
“The more pervasive a technology, the more it is apt to become 
invisible, to take charge of the thinking of those seeking to think 
about it and school them in the selectiveness of its perceptions” 
(2016: 63). Self- reflection is insufficient.
History has a rich literature of protestations that we are critical 
and reflexive. Chris Lorenz (2014: 57) has an apt analogy. It is as if 
historians can will away the 130- year coal fire in Xinjiang province 
(that will require 30 years of cooling) by exhorting, “Fire, go out! Just 
go away!” Often, we invoke important historians to critique a part of 
history only to discover that the critique reaffirms the overall histor-
ical structure. Marx, Benjamin, and Braudel are three examples; they 
are recognized, often respected. Yet the discipline has rendered their 
work into segments that support the linear narrative rather than 
to using their ideas to increase the complexity and significance of 
many histories that are evident. We end up with exasperated com-
ments that lament that chronological, objectivistic history is still the 
norm. More recently, the forum in the American Historical Review 
(Akyeampong et al. 2015) on change provided a good example of this 
resiliency. Excellent historians, together in a state- of- the- field dis-
cussion, concluded with the standard— continuity and discontinu-
ity, an idea that assumes and supports the status quo.2
To move beyond this circularity, it is important to remind us 
of Certeau’s inversion: “To ‘historicize’ our research in placing it 
back into a contemporary configuration on which it is dependent, 
and to ‘dehistoricize’ mystics in showing that one cannot reduce 
it to a past positivity” (2015: 9). This is a recognition of the ways 
that our current history, though historical and performative, has 
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been accepted as natural and objective. An example of this process 
of inversion is Richard White’s Remembering Ahanagran, a fasci-
nating account of his family’s past in twentieth- century Northern 
Ireland.3 Superficially, it is an account of White’s journey into his 
family’s past. Yet it is also a story of the different pasts that exist— 
White’s, his family’s, the community’s, and Northern Ireland’s, Ire-
land’s, and England’s:
I [White] did not understand the Troubles, I didn’t understand 
Kerry, and I didn’t understand how time worked in Ballylongford . . . 
When I try to fit these stories into a history, I encounter pasts 
that do not speak the same language. They do not follow the same 
rules. . . . 
But in Sara’s stories the past is not a single frame. There are 
different pasts that hang like two pictures on a wall. One frame is 
the everyday. Within it everyday acts are repeated endlessly. And 
when acts are repeated, there is no need to specify the time of 
each act or indeed, the separateness of each act, or who, exactly, 
performed it. . . . 
The everyday does not include the extraordinary. To account 
for the extraordinary, Sara and Kerry have another way of remem-
bering: the Times of Troubles. . . . 
What history keeps distinct, this common memory of the Trou-
bles joins together. . . . The monks died in 1580. Eddie Carmody 
died in 1920. . . . The frame of the Troubles is to understand the 
dying differently. There are not multiple deaths in the Troubles, 
there is but one death endlessly repeated. It is a heroic death, and 
it cries for vengeance (1998: 35– 37).
This passage illustrates Certeau’s inversion, that we historicize 
our research and dehistoricize our objects of research. The issues 
I address in the following chapters are evident in this passage. We 
see the gesture of exclusion at work: for history as chronology, 
White’s description can be static society, a story of the repetition 
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of daily life of his Ireland. Moreover, the repetition of the deaths in 
1580, 1920, and so on proves the backwardness (a lack of historical 
understanding) of the inhabitants and the need for power (British 
imperial) to maintain the order— that is, the unevenness or hier-
archy of the imperium over the colony. But on the other hand, we 
see the possibility of understanding pasts without that gesture of 
exclusion. White’s account does not flatten lives into a chronology 
based on dates; he struggles at first but ultimately does not force 
others into his chronological time. Instead, he describes some of 
the understandings and uses of pasts that highlight how people act 
and relate, the process of living. Their time is configured according 
to their lives and events; time is internal. The constancy of daily 
life and the recurrence of the extraordinary demonstrate entropic 
processes— death and decay exist— as well as the modes of main-
tenance that often lead to change. The Troubles show a different 
understanding of duration— not as successive events between two 
dates but as a moment when past and present are the same. It is 
not that the inhabitants don’t understand that things happened, 
but what is remembered is not distant (a dead past) but still a part 
of the present. The value here is in family and community. But 
we also see different times that are layered: the time of history 
(i.e., the British imperium), the juxtaposition of migrants to the 
US and their return home, the Troubles, and the everyday. 
There are points of conjunction, and often they remain separate. 
Perhaps this is how life operates.
The following chapters will take up these issues, which question 
the normative units of the historical tool kit, the “fact,” the nation- 
state as unit of analysis, the emphasis on material and measurable 
things, and notions of change. I hope that the next chapters, at the 
very least, unmask the masquerade of chronological history and 
open the possibility to expand the ways that scholars approach 
pasts, from knowledge of the past to understanding of previous 





The supposed unity of time projected by capital and nation- state is a 
masquerade that invariably fails to conceal the ceaseless confrontation 
of different times.
— Harry Harootunian (2015: 23)
Variety and possibility are inherent in the human sensorium— and are 
indeed the key to man’s most noble flights— because variety and possi-
bility belong to the very structure of the human organism.
— Norbert Wiener (1950: 52)
The most fundamental feature of history is not the unity, uniformity, 
and homogeneity of Newtonian or Hegelian time, but indeed the plu-
rality, multiplicity, and heterogeneity of socially and historically con-
ditioned temporalities.
— Helge Jordheim (2014: 505)
The epigraphs above from Wiener and Jordheim emphasize that 
heterogeneity is inherent to life— biologically and conceptually— 
but, as Harootunian points out, for centuries we have accepted 
a myth or masquerade that has (imperfectly) hidden this essence 
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for a fictive unity, a unity rooted in chronological time. My goal of 
this chapter is to explore the possibility of heterogeneity serving 
as the basis for historical inquiry where difference does not become 
an unintended outcome, a good that serves as ornamentation, or a 
place/idea/person needing correction.
The difficulty of any discussion on the heterogeneity of time is 
the inclusion of difference within absolute time. Different times are 
hidden in plain sight as the unevenness that makes up linear time. 
I differentiate this form of variation as unevenness rather than het-
erogeneity.1 The ubiquity of absolute time throughout our knowl-
edge system makes confusion easy. The increasingly common 
phrase “multiple temporalities” is often a part, not a critique, of 
absolute time. Althusser and Balibar describe the problem: “We 
should indeed be relapsing into the ideology of a homogeneous- 
continuous/self- contemporaneous time if we related the different 
temporalities I have just discussed to this single, identical time, 
as so many discontinuities in its continuity; these temporalities 
would then be thought as the backwardnesses, forwardnesses, 
survivals or unevennesses of development that can be assigned to 
this time” (1970: 106). Critique— discontinuities in its continuity— 
remains beholden to absolute time and the Hegelian system. This 
conflation of difference into unevenness is a part of the mas-
querade; it compounds the difficulty of discussing and rendering 
understandable times where absolute time is not the standard.
My effort to formulate an understanding of pasts through a dif-
ferent epistemology of time is to turn to recent science, the “new,” 
and to pasts, the “old.” Much of what I call the “new” has been 
around for more than one hundred years. It is from the physics of 
special relativity, thermodynamics, quantum time, and now com-
plex systems; it is also from the greater understanding of biological 
processes that became common in the mid- twentieth century. It 
would be a contradiction in an essay that argues for heterogeneity 
to call for the replacement of these “new” concepts over the old, 
classical time. That would invoke the gesture of exclusion. It is 
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possible for these times to coexist. Like our use of Newtonian time, 
there is not a direct application or transfer of physical or biologi-
cal times to social forms. My hope, though, is that we see that the 
disciplines are not as distinct as our practices suggest and that 
the adaptation of this “new” can help us extend historical think-
ing into the twentieth century. Scholars such as William Con-
nolly, Barbara Stafford, and Helga Nowotny have already shown 
the potential ideas from the neurosciences or physical sciences for 
broadening our understanding of the humanities; history can too. 
The disguise or masquerade is being exposed.
This is also an opportunity to revisit the “old,” but I run the risk 
of invoking the ancient/modern dichotomy or a “golden age.” So 
be it, but without a chronological metric, the “old” and “new” can 
suggest an isomorphism rather than difference where neither 
the new nor the old is better. For example, Bertalanffy locates the 
origins of General System Theory in the ideas of Nicholas de Cusa, 
a sixteenth- century mystic. Bertalanffy rightly points to de 
Cusa’s notion of “learned ignorance,” the impossibility of knowing 
the absolute truth, and “coincidence of opposites,” or that every 
reality is manifold and depends on perspective (Bertalanffy 1968: 
11, 248; Certeau 2015: 23– 70). Increasingly, scholars are recogniz-
ing the ways that pre- Enlightenment figures sought to deal with 
information inflation, the decline of the church, the expanding 
world and its many locals, and the quest for some universalism. 
Fasolt shows the situatedness of Hermann Conring’s texts, and 
Jordheim points out the more sophisticated understanding of 
times among eighteenth- century historians, such as Johan Chris-
toph Gatterer (Fasolt 2004; Jordheim 2017). To argue for relational 
notions of space- time, David Harvey draws on Leibnitz, who crit-
icized Newton’s absolute time and space and argued that time has 
no independent existence (Harvey 1996: 250– 64; see also Hölscher 
1997). Interestingly, the ideas of such “old” early modern scholars 
compare well with recent scholarship, including on chronobiol-
ogy and digital media. The old and new sandwich absolute time. 
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Perhaps it is absolute time and our understanding built on it that is 
the anomaly.
I have increasingly wondered why histories of human activity 
follow a mechanistic, physical time to understand organisms and 
organic processes.2 The use of biological times rather than classical 
time to order history was also a possibility in the late eighteenth 
century. Herder, who was influenced by Comte de Buffon’s Histoire 
naturelle refused to separate the natural sciences from a history of 
man and raised similar doubts about what would become world 
history. He writes the following, pulling no punches in his criti-
cism of the Eurocentrism of history based on absolute time (Iggers 
1968: 35; Zammito 2009: 67):
“How foolish [it would be] for you to tarnish this ignorance and 
admiration, this imagination and reverence, this enthusiasm 
and child- sense with the blackest devilry of your age, with fraud and 
stupidity, superstition and slavery— to fabricate for yourself an army 
of priest- devils and tyrant- ghosts that exist only in your soul! A thou-
sand times more foolish [still] for you magnanimously to bestow 
upon a child your philosophical deism, your aesthetic virtue and 
honor, your universal love of all peoples full of tolerant subjugation, 
blood- sucking, and enlightenment according to the high taste of your 
time!” (Herder 2004: 11).
Herder also has received renewed attention, possibly over-
coming criticism for his emphasis on nation and race (as if nine-
teenth- and twentieth- century internationalism does not deploy 
racial hierarchies!), denial of objective criteria (Iggers 1968: 35), or 
“loose and hasty [thought]” (Collingwood 1994: 90).3 Perhaps such 
dismissal of the nonmodern makes sense in an understanding 
of history that is filled with the superiority of the West, mech-
anistic desires, and notions of progress. Must we continue this 
masquerade?
For those of us who have studied the non- West through the 
poststructuralist and postcolonialist “turns,” Herder’s diatribe 
sounds familiar. Many of our historical subjects interrogated 
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history as, to paraphrase Wiener (1950), traces (messages) of the 
past to reorganize (control) their societies. They tried to write their 
own histories within absolute time as a way to unify their territory 
around the idea of a nation and simultaneously to extract them-
selves from the locus of inferiority to the West. This very problem 
is an example of Althusser and Balibar’s caution, the domestication 
of difference within a chronological structure that homogenizes. 
Many of Herder’s ideas will sound familiar to those who have 
been seeking some common basis for understanding the diversity 
of the world by grounding human activity within people rather 
than abstract categories. People, language, and thought, he writes, 
are prior to philosophers and philosophy (Zammito, Menges, and 
Menze 2010: 673). One can see in this emphasis on activity prior 
to categories a connection to historia magistra vitae, where his his-
tory maintained a connection to human experience.4 Herder’s 
history still had remnants of communication in which it was related 
to the “life world” and the “reproduction of the social system” 
(Zammito, Menges, and Menze 2010: 673). From this prioritiza-
tion of human thought and action and his connection of the sci-
ence of man with that of nature, he recognized that peoples (races) 
have different characteristics and their development is conditioned 
by their biology— both body and environment.5 We must ask how it 
is that two centuries later, Herder’s invective still resonates. Progress?
My interest is not to resuscitate these men. Like my previ-
ous chapters, I use the methods of an historian to begin with a 
modest suggestion: rather simply, that we use dating systems 
of the unit or culture. On the surface, this operation honors 
the time system of the unit of analysis. It moves us toward an 
understanding of temporalities where times are both internal and 
possibly external to the activities of individuals, groups, commu-
nities, nations. But like my entrance into the digital humanities, 
it leads one toward first principles. The masquerade of what had 
been “common sense” is exposed to be cultural and ideological. 
This initial step opens up the possibility to accomplish Certeau’s 
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call to dehistoricize our objects of research. We see the selection 
that occurred, obscuring some of the “old,” and the ignorance or 
dismissal of ideas from the “new” sciences. Increasingly, questions 
about the operations of diverse organisms, the centrality of infor-
mation, the roles of observers, and the variability of pasts to under-
stand outcomes appear in a very different light.
Historians have long endeavored to convey accurately pasts 
to current and future generations. This book shares this ideal 
but argues that it is key to avoid, not tacitly accept, the struc-
tures and limitations imposed by absolute time. History can be 
more than knowledge about past places; it can also be a tool for 
communication and understanding. I start by arguing for a shift 
from time to times. This shift sounds simple, but the plural is 
not additive; it questions the external and naturalized status of 
classical time. It can be the beginning of an inquiry into the very 
components of history— the duration, the unit of analysis, the 
role of the observer, and the multiple perspectives within data. 
No doubt there are other things we can do, but I hope to show 
that from this rather simple move, first principles come to light 
and help in the spring cleaning that Elias called for almost fifty 
years ago.
I end this chapter with a brief discussion of uncertainty.
INVERSION TO TIMES
A polite query to the title of this book has occasionally been, 
“So what is a history without time?” This conflation of time and 
chronology is the crux of the problem: chronology is but one form 
of time— in Certeau’s words, an “alibi of time.” Interestingly, a 
discipline that operates using time and prides itself on its ability 
to describe change has failed to keep abreast of changes to our 
understanding of time over the past century. Instead, absolute 
time has remained one of the most important and now an uncon-
scious technology for communication in modern society; clock 
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and chronological times have become so naturalized that often we 
don’t realize how much it orients us to itself through synchroniza-
tion and coordination rather than helping us understand organic 
processes. The proliferation of books on how modern society is 
accelerating and how to manage time (usually by becoming more 
efficient and thereby further burrowing oneself in mechanical 
time) are indications of the naturalization of chronological time.6 
Histories without chronology, then, are not without time or 
order; they are accounts of pasts that recognize the times that 
emerge through the activity of people. The shift from time to times 
is an inversion of an external time and internal times. I prefer this 
question: What is history using times?
It doesn’t take much to show that time is multiple. Fraser 
(1987) discusses the times of physics,7 biotemporality, nootem-
porality, and sociotemporality. Biotemporality brings in the var-
ious rhythms of organisms and societies; again, we are reminded 
of Wiener’s emphasis on variety. Nootemporality is the human 
apprehension of time, the mental present. Fraser connects this to 
the umwelt, the physical and conceptual environment that makes 
up that mental present, and I would also include how people expe-
rience time.8 The idea of the umwelt underscores the situatedness 
of objects, people, and understanding as well as the limitations 
and participation of the observer. Sociotemporality is the particu-
lar system people formulate to make sense of their world. This is 
where I would locate chronological time; it is but one way, albeit 
our naturalized way, to coordinate, organize, produce, and main-
tain values.
The inversion of time and times exposes the problem of lin-
earity, of the replacement of one time with another. Instead, we 
need to untangle both so- called natural times and human appre-
hensions of time; heterogeneous times help us shift from time as a 
metric to times as a way of understanding the how and of manifold 
ways of behaving; it helps us recover human activity, relationality, 
and experience.
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Internal Times
One rather simple adjustment is to record our writings about 
the past in the reckoning systems of the people or society we are 
describing. This is especially apparent for those working on non- 
Western or nonmodern societies, but more broadly it signals a 
conceptual shift from an understanding of pasts based on exter-
nal, universalistic time to a time internal to some community or 
activity system. Certainly, using local dating systems might be dis-
orienting; it makes it more difficult for us to emplot those societies 
within our understanding of cultures and communities across the 
globe. That is the point: they remain alter rather than other— that 
is, it is more difficult to locate them using the gesture of exclu-
sion.9 Peoples in the past and today often use multiple time sys-
tems simultaneously; scholars can too. Moreover, in today’s digital 
environment, electronic aids (such as notes, mouse overs, and so 
on) are rather easy to incorporate. The point here is not to sow 
confusion or to claim something “new,” but the disorientation 
suggests the extent to which the “simple” translation of dates into 
BC/AD10 and the Gregorian calendar alters understanding and 
relations, fostering Whitehead’s “fallacy of misplaced concrete-
ness” (1925: 58). This disorientation inverts Foucault’s “violence 
of time,” where the expectation of translation and transmutation 
shifts to our, not their, responsibility.11
Historians have long struggled to study pasts without prejudg-
ing them, but that goal operates within a structure that already 
judges. Reflexivity has not sufficed. Historians do include some 
milieu in our work; we usually call it context. But what we call 
context emerged along with the birth of the past. It too is a part 
of the inversion that occurred to compensate for the schism that 
resulted when objects and happenings were filtered, abstracted, 
and transmuted through emplotment onto chronological 
time.12 When pasts became prior and different, the extraction 
of objects and documents from the milieu that had given them 
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meaning necessitates the application of context, the reinsertion 
of surroundings.13
By using the reckoning system of an activity that gives rise to hap-
penings, documents, objects, and place, these become meaningful 
in the relations and connections of their specific site. This inverts 
emphasis to the activity, which might give rise to boundaries and 
meaning or the place and ideas of people. Time- reckoning systems 
often give us hints of the significant markers of that society— in 
Koselleck’s words, a “space of experience.” These systems in so- 
called backward places were often very sophisticated. For example, 
on Java, a five- day week and seven- day week operate simultane-
ously (Boellstorff 2007b: 238– 41), and in 1900 Beirut, two systems 
for counting hours and several calendrical systems (Gregorian, 
Julian, Hijiri, and Ottoman) coexisted (Ogle 2015: 120– 32). In 
short, these are systems (many societies had several) that help us 
understand the conceptual world of people, their understandings 
of previous happenings, and how they related to each other and 
to outsiders.
An implication for understanding this situatedness of pasts is 
evident in a story from Thomas Kuhn, recalling his effort to exam-
ine the connection of Aristotle with Galileo on mechanics. Kuhn 
(1977: xi– xii) reports that he was initially dumbfounded on how 
“simply wrong” Aristotle was on motion in comparison to his other 
observations, especially in biology and political behavior. Yet when 
he realized that Aristotle was concerned with qualities not states— 
that is, when he considered the conceptual understanding of Aris-
totle’s epistemology, the “contemporary configuration on which 
it is dependent”— he understood not Aristotle’s ignorance but a 
different way of appreciating pasts.
While my discussion of units thus far has generally followed 
history’s use of nation or culture, those familiar with some form of 
complexity theory will see in this inversion the space for the emer-
gence of groupings from simple agents and the interaction of these 
groupings into larger units and eventually to nation- states and 
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beyond.14 Lefebvre describes this hierarchical relational system: 
“The outcome is that the living body can and must consider itself 
as an interaction of organs situated inside it, where each organ has 
its own rhythm but is subject to a spatio- temporal whole. Further-
more, this human body is the site and place of interaction between 
the biological, the physiological (nature) and the social (often called 
cultural), where each of these levels, each of these dimensions, has 
its own specificity, therefore its space- time: its rhythm” (2004: 81). 
I will discuss units of analysis more below, but here it is important 
to point out that focusing on activity turns attention to the ways 
of behaving and interaction of agents and groupings.
Histories that use time- reckoning systems, that retain “a 
contemporary configuration on which it is dependent,” are, 
interestingly, closer to pre- Newtonian chronologies (Jordheim, 
forthcoming) as well as to twentieth- century science, Einstein’s 
Eigenzeit, and Fraser’s and Bertalanffy’s umwelt. They are not 
the same, but they share an important principle, that time is a 
“local, internal feature of the system of observation, dependent 
on observers and their measurements” (Adam 1990: 55– 56). This 
use of an internal time shifts the way we understand pasts from a 
mechanical knowledge of how places became what they are to an 
understanding of human activity that gives rise to places. It is also 
a shift that inverts the standard temporal and spatial categories of 
modern history— the notion of duration and the units of analysis.
Duration
In the introduction to their edited book, Chris Lorenz and Ber-
ber Bevernage (2013) point to a seemingly contradictory feature 
of modern history. As time is unified, the writing of history 
depends on a fragmentation of that time. Past, present, and future 
is one way to break up time; periodization is a form of classing 
the past. These are examples of how Newtonian duration— 
between two moments— spatializes time. It goes further; the basic 
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periodization— ancient, medieval, modern— also emerges with the 
Enlightenment. We are increasingly familiar with the performativ-
ity of such historical periodization, especially its Eurocentrism and 
Western frame (see, for example, Lorenz 2017; Nowotny 2016). This 
partitioning of time is another way that time structures and ori-
ents. Its systemic quality is backgrounded; it emphasizes the par-
ticular character of a place as it progresses, moving attention away 
from human activity (Lorenz 2017; Le Goff 2015). Bergson describes 
the way time obscures through the words that science uses: “time” 
and “motion,” he argues, have eliminated duration and mobility 
([1913] 2001: 120). I will discuss mobility in the next chapter. The 
distinction, for Bergson, between time and duration is between 
a quantitative (measurement) and qualitative (mental synthesis) 
understanding of human activity. The conflation of duration with 
classical time is a spatialization of time, the emplotment of succes-
sive moments (necessarily spatial), bounded by dates. This is the 
fragmentation of time and is most evident in the historical debates 
over the beginning and end date of a period.15
Bergsonian duration is a qualitative state in which past and 
present are not distinguished. He writes, “Pure duration might 
well be nothing but a succession of qualitative changes, which 
melt into and permeate one another, without precise outlines, 
without any tendency to externalize themselves in relation to 
one another, without any affiliation with number” (Bergson [1913] 
2001: 104). White’s account of the Troubles in his Remembering 
Ahanagran is an example of this pure duration. Using times as an 
integral element of the activity of people opens up the possibility 
of historicizing “our research in placing it back into a contempo-
rary configuration on which it is dependent” (Certeau 2015: 9). 
Technology and quantitative measures are no longer the de facto 
metric. Instead, this notion of duration prioritizes activity.
Fernand Braudel (1980) and more recently Koselleck have tested 
the limits of Newtonian duration. Both suggest layered temporali-
ties. In Braudel’s case, it is the scales of geology and the environment 
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of the earth, social scales, and individual scales; Koselleck divides 
these temporalities into transcendent structures (recurring bio-
logical cycles), repetitive structures (social forms), and singularities 
(event- like happenings; Koselleck 2018: 3– 9; Olsen 2012: 226– 31). 
I will discuss the potential and limitations of these layered tempo-
ralities in the next chapter. Here, I will focus on the difficulty of 
conceiving of history apart from the homogenizing structure 
of classical time. Braudel certainly recognized the difficulty of his 
proposal for history: “For the historian, accepting the longue durée 
entails a readiness to change his style, his attitudes, a whole rever-
sal in his thinking, a whole new way of conceiving of social affairs” 
(1980: 33). Periodization (Newtonian duration) has remained dom-
inant, and despite the respect of historians for his work and the 
frequent invocation of the longue durée, that “whole new way” 
remains on the horizon.16 The uptake (or lack thereof) of this idea 
recalls Althusser and Balibar (1970); it shows the way that absolute 
time dominates and limits the historical imagination. This is evi-
dent in two recent or “new” (and important) periodizations— Big 
History and the Anthropocene— and two recent books that argue 
for a reevaluation of the boundaries of historical periods: Jacques 
Le Goff’s tantalizingly titled Must We Divide History into Periods? 
(2015) and Jo Guldi and David Armitage’s wonderfully provocative 
The History Manifesto (2014).
New periodization holds out a hope to alter how we understand 
pasts. Periodization, however, is a common way that chronologi-
cal time has been “broken up” (Lorenz and Bevernage 2013). Each 
of the above ideas and scholars makes a proposal that is important 
to broadening the understanding and use of time in history, and 
each shows the powerful hold of chronological time. Big History 
alters our historical horizon by extending history backward to the 
Big Bang; it shows how minute human, let alone modern, his-
tory is. Classical time is still the basis, now extended backward.17 
The Anthropocene is a proposal to recognize a new geological 
period, and its potential is to reintegrate recent human activity 
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with natural history, especially geologic changes (Zalasiewicz et 
al. 2011; Steffen et al. 2011; and Chakrabarty 2009).18 The poten-
tial of the Anthropocene is to change the subject from human- 
centered to earth- centered history. One can imagine two times 
or histories, the earth’s and humanity’s, that are parallel, maybe 
even converging. Yet for many, the Anthropocene claims status 
by merging these two histories. As Chakrabarty notes in discus-
sions of this era, especially in the social sciences and human-
ities, “world time” (what I call chronological time) prevails. He 
writes, “It is clear why it happens, for the science of Earth sys-
tems history has been made possible by the same technologies that 
have also produced, mapped, and measured the deleterious impact 
on the biosphere of the complex of species and life- forms repre-
sented by humans, their dependent or co- evolving living entities, 
and their technology” (2018: 25). This reminds me of Althusser and 
Balibar’s criticism (1970).
The power of chronological time is also evident in efforts to 
revise history. Le Goff’s essay follows more traditional histori-
cal methods, raising questions about the boundaries of periods. 
He has traces of sympathy for Bergson’s duration when he 
argues that the medieval and early modern periods are filled 
with areas where there is an interpenetration of inherited and 
new forms and that the two periods should be merged. However, 
he is reluctant to relinquish the homogenizing order of absolute 
time (Le Goff 2015: 113– 16); the chronological system remains, as 
does the gesture of exclusion, though the boundary between new 
and old shifts. Guldi and Armitage invoke Braudel’s longue durée 
to point to new interpretive possibilities available in the digital 
technologies. In particular, they argue that data intensive tools can 
be used to process large databases that might excavate new pat-
terns of past activity that have been obscured in traditional time 
units. An example (but not based on Big Data) of the potential of an 
extended time unit, what Braudel calls the social scale, is Marilyn 
Young’s (2012) recent suggestion that twentieth- century US history 
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is but one long war.19 Each proposal is important in getting us to 
think about time beyond the chronological periods common 
to history, yet each shows the hold of the time of Newton and 
Hegel; the masquerade, the naturalization of time into a classified 
world system, remains powerful.
As Chakrabarty (2018) suggests, adjustments will be partial at 
best; it is important to move beyond classical physics toward a time 
as a part of life processes (this is the earth- centered approach pro-
posed by Zalasiewicz et al. 2011). This shift from the physical to the 
biological is the potential of Anthropocene time, and it recalls Fra-
ser’s statement in the epigraph of the introduction: “[Time] has its 
origins in the life process” (1987: 4). Even though it has been diffi-
cult to escape these confines of absolute time, Whitehead suggests 
that it might not be as hard as we think— we already practice it:
Every location involves an aspect of itself in every other location. 
Thus every spatiotemporal standpoint mirrors the world.
If you try to imagine this doctrine in terms of our conventional 
views of space and time, which presuppose simple location, it is a 
great paradox. But if you think of it in terms of our naive experi-
ence, it is a mere transcript of the obvious facts. You are in a certain 
place perceiving things. Your perception takes place where you are, 
and is entirely dependent on how your body is functioning. But 
this functioning of the body in one place, exhibits for your cog-
nisance an aspect of the distant environment, fading away into 
the general knowledge that there are things beyond (1925: 91– 92).
Whitehead is describing the situatedness of our lives. We can 
also apply embeddedness to historical inquiry, but to do so, we 
need to unlearn (dehistoricize) our current structures. Historians 
can learn from work on cognition. For example, Connolly writes, 
“Human thinking in general involves complex culture/body/brain 
networks, and each level in this layered, tripartite assemblage is 
marked by specific capacities of speed, reception, and enactment” 
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(2002: 63). This approach is consistent with recent scholarship on 
cognition and learning. In psychology, Lev Vygotsky wrote about 
the “zone of proximal development” and proposed a “culturo- 
historical activity theory” (1978: 19– 57, 84– 91) as a conception 
of learning that is social; it considers the level of the learner, the 
social and cultural environment, and the particular conditions 
in which interaction occurs.20 In the cognitive sciences, Edwin 
Hutchins (1995) has argued that cognition is “distributed”— that 
is, cognitive acts involve a distribution of signals from the brain, 
from the environment, from other people, and from mnemonics.21 
In anthropology, Dorothy Holland (1998) has proposed “figured 
worlds” as a way to think of the interaction between environment 
and individuals in cognitive processes. These and more show the 
complex relations in any single event, record, or observer: that 
reading, memory, orality, learning, and indeed, communication 
are conditioned by the social and physical environment and media 
as well as the mental state of individuals.
For a more prosaic (historical) example, we can turn to Carlo 
Levi’s exile to southern Italy in 1935.22 It is an account of exile of 
a doctor from Milan (Levi [1947] 2006) and his interaction with 
its rural inhabitants who had not yet been integrated into the 
time- order of modern society. We see that the past is not separate 
but repeats as a part of the present; what had happened is mean-
ingful not because it is past but because it is a recurring part of 
life. One can read these encounters as modern sensibilities con-
fronting people who will eventually “catch up.” Yet as the story 
continues, it is unclear who is more advanced during 1930s Italy. 
The story becomes less about Levi than the community into which 
he was exiled.
In Levi and this community, we witness the conjunction of 
these different time scales (using Braudel’s or Koselleck’s layers, I 
see those of the earth and environment, social times, and various 
individual times); they conjoin in the moments of police action, 
immigration, and Levi’s forced encounter with their daily life. The 
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focus is on activity, relationships, and adjustments; perspective 
and expectations are highlighted. In the duration of the commu-
nity, we see the specificity— the conditions, sensibilities, and lim-
itations— of the lives of people prior to any determination of value. 
It gives us a sense of the different flows, the segmentation (not 
disconnection) of communities in fascist Italy, and a disconnect 
that is almost autonomy in a totalitarian system. In the places of 
conjunction, we see the repetitive dynamics of a people seeking 
to maintain equilibrium— the stability of the community. Change 
takes many forms beyond the forward motion of progress; 
change is evident in deviations from repetition. The layering of 
times in this passage helps us approach Braudel’s proposal of a 
longue durée. This layering will be discussed in the following chapter.
Units of Analysis
The standard unit for segmenting pasts in classical time has been 
the nation- state. As I have shown in chapter 2, this form of histor-
ical understanding itself is historical, a rather recent way of order-
ing the globe. But just as a different notion of duration inverts 
our attention to activity, internal temporalities increase the possi-
bility of units of analysis based on activity, not places. Jean Lave and 
Etienne Wenger have proposed “communities of practice,” espe-
cially related to learning activities (1991: 98– 100). Tim Ingold calls 
this the “taskscape,” where action and interaction make up what 
he calls a “landscape” (1993: 163– 64). In second- order cybernetics 
or complex systems, this is the self- organizing system or emergent 
form. In geography, this can be the notion of place, as opposed to a 
more abstract space. Each is rooted in some coalescence of activity 
of people rather than the geocultural units that make up the world. 
Many places might (and indeed do) interact to compose a nation- 
state, but they might also be autonomous from it, and they need 
not be a physical place (e.g., the virtual communities on the web). 
In history, a fine example is Paul Glennie and Nigel Thrift’s (2009) 
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focus on practices in their rich archival study Shaping the Day, an 
account of the reckoning of time in England and Wales between 
1300 and 1800. They show how communities of practice, where 
people communicate information, share material and tools, and 
foster change or technological development are effective units for 
historical inquiry.23 Repetition and positive (or negative) feedback 
can lead to growth (or decline), a new direction, or improvements 
in the practice. Glennie and Thrift identify such communities in 
the family (organizing family and household labor), market (deter-
mining the trading period in the market and setting curfew for 
tapsters and innkeepers in medieval Bristol), the city (opening the 
gate and scheduling meeting times), a particular knowledge (such 
as clock making), or an occupation (such as on a ship).
From this approach, Glennie and Thrift show how chronolog-
ical accounts skew history toward the technological. They argue 
against E. P. Thompson’s classic essay (1967) on industrial time and 
show that clock time as a means of regulating work was not new 
with industrialization but developed slowly over a long period from 
the fourteenth century. They also deemphasize the “genius” inven-
tor and focus on the social processes by which ideas circulate as a 
key factor in invention and innovation. In their chapter on John 
Harrison, the winner of the Longitude Prize, Glennie and Thrift 
argue that he was less a “lone genius” than a person who combined 
several communities of practice: knowledge of general science 
and technology circulating in his region; a community circulating 
knowledge— manuscripts, texts, lectures— about clocks, craft, and 
theory of clock making; and connections to key figures (Glennie 
and Thrift 2009: chap. 10). This argument does not detract from 
the inventor, but it does caution us against fetishizing the new, 
“neophilia.”24 When we think of practice and use, we might instead 
see the ubiquity and importance of “old” technologies, despite the 
attention to the “new” (Edgerton 2007). Finally, Glennie and Thrift 
show the importance of considering earlier “medieval” society on 
its own terms, rather than as a lack (gesture of exclusion) of 
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the modern. Even though these communities did not practice 
time as we do, they were often keenly concerned about time 
and timekeeping. To translate these out of history occults the eth-
ical thinking that is so much a part of the human experience in 
favor of mechanical processes.
The simple adjustment to dates that use the time- reckoning 
system of record begins an inversion of our understanding of time 
and human activities. It brings out a lesson I learned from the dig-
ital humanities— to adapt Jerome McGann (2001), it exposes the 
imprecision in our thinking using chronological time.25 From this 
recognition, history shifts from a knowledge of the past as a part 
of productive systems to an inquiry into human activity as a way 
to understand relations, processes, and experience. Paradoxically, 
this understanding of times as internal to activities strike me as 
closer to Ranke’s wie es eigentlich gewesen (as it actually was).
APPROPRIATION: OBSERVERS,  
INFORMATION, AND STORIES
When invoking this phrase from Ranke, the neutral, perhaps even 
omniscient, position of the historian comes to mind. But this 
understanding of the situatedness of pasts moves us to another 
first principle; it makes the observer an integral, not external, part 
of any process— the source from which “facts” emerge as well as the 
scholar making sense of pasts. Objectivity cannot exist. Again, this 
is not new— Nietzsche’s “On the Uses and Disadvantages of His-
tory for Life” (1983) comes to mind. This is an issue where history 
must decide if it is to work with contemporary understandings of 
time or remain in classical time.26 The question of the observer 
was, of course, raised by Einstein— measurement and observa-
tion is relative to the observer. Most historians acknowledge the 
limitation of objectivity in private but are especially troubled when 
the methodologies that rely on it are called into question. Fears of 
subjectivity and relativism arise. But before knees jerk, a caution 
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is in order: Bertalanffy, citing Einstein’s special relativity, writes, 
“The absolutistic conception of earlier times and of classical phys-
ics is replaced by a scientific relativism” (1968: 227). Relativity is not 
countered by objectivity; it is the norm.
Special relativity is at odds with the monological framework 
and perspective of chronological history. It recognizes situated-
ness as well as heterogeneity. An approach that incorporates this 
variability is proposed by Certeau in the second volume of The 
Mystic Fables. He proposes appropriation as the central mechanism 
in an encounter between an inherited knowledge (tradition) and 
a present (2015: 98). Appropriation focuses on information— not 
facts— to discern how people used, interpreted, and understood 
things; it is an act of reading and interpretation. Heterogeneity is 
presumed; change (no matter how small or major) is built in. In 
every act of appropriation, there is a variation from what preceded. 
Appropriation recognizes sequence, but it is not necessarily linear. 
It is not characterized by replacement, from primitive to complex 
or old to new. Recursivity and feedback loops are just as possi-
ble as forward movement. If every reading is a question of how 
information is used, the question shifts toward how people build 
from, on, or against inherited forms of knowledge and practice. In 
appropriation, “history” takes on an additional significance beyond 
a description of how people acted. It is an actant itself; it is a part 
of the inherited forms of practice and understanding that filter 
how people receive information. We bring back historical under-
standing, not just of a past but also as a form of knowledge and 
understanding that is a part of the events of history.27
Appropriation coincides with recent studies on cognition that 
demonstrate how reading, memory, learning, and indeed, com-
munication are conditioned by the social, cultural, historical, and 
physical environment, as well as the mental state of individuals. In 
my text, I call this situatedness. I have already mentioned Vygotsky’s 
culturo- historical activity theory, Hutchins’s distributed cogni-
tion, and Holland’s figured worlds. In psychology, Maryanne Wolf 
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describes recent research on reading that shows the importance 
of environment, preconceptions, and current thinking in how a 
text is read: “Reading is a neuronally and intellectually circuitous 
act, enriched as much by the unpredictable directions of a reader’s 
inferences and thoughts, as by the direct message to the eye from 
the text” (2008: 16). If every reading— those of our historical figures 
as well as current historians— reuses the text, the application of 
facile anachronistic categories too must be interrogated as histori-
cal, not assumed. The past, tradition, habits, culture, and historical 
knowledge are all agents in the filtering and acquisition of infor-
mation. In this sense, the past is not distant and different but a part 
of the present and changes depending on the understanding of the 
actors at that moment. History moves beyond a form of knowledge 
to also emphasize relations and communication.
Reading, situatedness, and distributed cognition all raise ques-
tions about the neutrality of the observer. This issue was evident 
in the discussions at the Macy Conferences even though it was 
rarely directly discussed.28 The participants focused on human 
activity, especially interpretation, learning, perception, and semi-
otics. Some of the papers touched on perception, both psycho-
logical and physiological (through the frog’s eyes), language and 
symbolism, humor, emotions, and communication patterns in 
humans and animals. In the end, the variation of such human 
activity was a big hurdle, and participants could not merge humans 
and machines into a new epistemology.
The observer reappears in cybernetics when von Foerster, a 
member of the conference, founded second- order cybernetics. In 
a later reminiscence, he describes this issue in a rather matter of 
fact but powerful phrase: “Anything said is said by an observer.” 
He calls this Humberto Maturana’s Theorem Number One and 
follows it with Heinz von Foerster’s Corollary Number One: “Any-
thing said is said to an observer” (von Foerster [1979] 2003: 283). In 
short, the observer is an actant, participant, and reporter. Here, 
I return to the significance of Fraser’s nootemporality or Einstein’s 
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Eigenzeit, the physical and conceptual environment that makes up 
that mental present, or proper time. The observer, the understand-
ing during the moment of eruption, the language of bodies, the 
places of writing, and, of course, the moment of interaction all 
affect meaning. Bertalanffy, invoking the umwelt, writes, “It essen-
tially amounts to the statement that, from the great cake of reality, 
every living organism cuts a slice, which it can perceive and to 
which it can react owing to its psycho- physical organization” (1968: 
227).29 The psycho- physical organization is the cultural- historical 
understanding, cognitive state, and material conditions of the per-
ceiving person. It is, perhaps, reappearing. Recent musing about 
the direction of artificial intelligence sounds eerily similar to this 
gap that opened up in the latter part of the Macy Conferences. For 
example, Gary Marcus sees the AI strength in closed- end classifica-
tion problems, but among its struggles are open- ended inference, 
commonsense reasoning, and a nonstable environment (2018).30 
In an appraisal of AI, the computer scientist Michael I. Jordan 
argued for the need of what he calls provenance— “Where did the 
data arise, what inferences were drawn from the data, and how 
relevant are those inferences to the present situation?” (2018).
In a sense, these questions are a part of the historian’s tool-
kit, but they also push history beyond context to the situatedness 
of information. This mode of analysis not only builds from but 
also alters the role of the historian; in my mind, it makes that role 
more important. This situatedness also alters how we approach 
evidence. Documents and recorded happenings were and are not 
as fixed as we tend to think31; they are composed through their 
surroundings— they are situated. This recognizes a fundamental 
difference in understanding between recent and classical science— 
the impossibility of complete knowledge. For example, Berta-
lanffy writes, “All our knowledge, even if de- anthropomorphized 
(abstracted as ‘fact’ or data), only mirrors certain aspects of 
reality.  .  .  . Any statement holds from a certain viewpoint only, 
has only relative validity, and must be supplemented by antithetic 
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statements from opposite points of view” (1968: 248). The rise 
of digital media, especially through the rise of databases and the 
isolation of bits of information, is increasingly showing the need 
for this relationality of the document: “Every document, every 
moment in every document, conceals (or reveals) an indetermi-
nate set of interfaces that open into alternate spaces and tempo-
ral relations” (McGann 2001: 181). Interpretation and variation of 
understanding of events is the norm; whether events happened 
or not is not questioned.
I would argue that events gain stability when the document 
is recognized as a part of a network of appropriation. Sources, or 
“facts,” are no longer objects that exist, isolated from the milieu 
of their becoming. Historical arguments become less about which 
fact is correct and should be emphasized or ignored and more 
about what the relationships and meanings are that emerge in 
the use of information. This is relevant for historical objects and 
events as well as for the historian. People then used information 
embedded in documents in their interpretations, decisions, and 
actions. Historians do the same. This is where Certeau’s argument 
that texts and documents constitute a theater is especially relevant. 
When documents are considered as a theater or nodes of activity, 
they occur among different actors with varying inscriptions and 
differing forms. We have heard this before— for example, from 
Bakhtin; it bears repeating, not forgetting or exorcising through 
claims to disciplinary purity. This variability of interpretations of 
the same event was brilliantly depicted in Akira Kurosawa’s well- 
known movie Rashomon (1950). He shows how individuals appro-
priate what they see, and this differs depending on the past and 
experience of each person. We open the possibility of extending 
history beyond what is, to how people communicate and ways 
of behaving.
Appropriation also facilitates the opening up of the past, closed 
off by focus on the document, to include traces of relations, ideas, 
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and sensibilities of various peoples. Here historians need to ask 
whether disregarding pasts that don’t have evidence based on docu-
ments and “simple location” has turned attention away from experi-
ence and relations and consequently restricts history’s significance, 
even more in a more interactive, electronically interconnected 
world. For example, the life- history approach in archaeology is an 
example of how fixed or “dead” artifacts change through appropri-
ation. Cornelius Holtorf (1996) has shown how peoples at different 
times make sense of megaliths. These monuments are not static 
(people destroy, move, repurpose, historicize, and display them), 
and their meanings often shift depending on the community at 
a particular time. In this case, appropriation uses the time system 
of the unit— that is, the contemporary society— rather than some 
external temporality. Unlike the case of Rashomon, where there 
are multiple interpretations of a singular event, heterogeneity is 
in the variation of meanings (or forgettings) that are attributed to 
this site as a part (perhaps but not necessarily a past) of the present.
Stories, we should remember, were expunged from the archive 
as history and literature were defined, and historians have since 
worked to recover bits and pieces. In his famous essay “The Story-
teller,” Benjamin laments a result of this shift, the decline of sto-
rytelling: “It is as if something that seemed inalienable to us, the 
securest among our possessions, were taken from us: the ability 
to exchange experiences” (1968a: 83). There have been periodic 
attempts to reintegrate the everyday into history; two notable 
efforts are the AHA presidential addresses of Carl Becker (1932) and 
William Cronon (2013). Much of Certeau’s The Mystic Fable engages 
with evidence that has been relegated to the margins or beyond of 
history— storytelling, oral transmissions, visuality, the body, and 
the senses. Each is an important mode of communication that 
leaves traces for thinking about relations, transmission, interac-
tion, and transmutation among people. The purpose of the story, 
Benjamin writes, “is not concerned with an accurate concatenation 
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of definite events, but with the way these are embedded in the 
great inscrutable course of the world” (1968a: 96).
For my purpose, attention to storytelling goes beyond grip-
ping accounts of past events and people. Stories are also a way to 
bring together varying accounts and perspectives. David Herman 
points out how storytelling, particularly through embedded nar-
ratives, involves several voices and perspectives that encourage 
sense- making. It “affords structure for human understanding— 
more specifically, for the distribution of mind across time frames, 
spatial locales, and contexts of social interaction” (2013: 271). Har-
old Innis reminds us of the connection of the book and the essay to 
classical time: “The use of a medium of communication over a long 
period will to some extent determine the character of knowledge 
to be communicated” (1951: 34). In other words, perhaps the long- 
form print narrative has locked history into a classical time that 
abstracts our accounts of people beyond recognizable experience.
Print media are certainly not dead; they have certain affor-
dances. Now we have tools to also “write” history differently, 
and this can impact how we understand pasts and history. This 
potential was suggested by Fasolt, who differentiates the thinking 
of Bartolus of Sassoferrato from modern history. The modern is 
categorical and singular while “for Bartolus it was but the general 
form of distinctions dividing the commonwealth into a manifold 
of subordinated spheres of thought and action . . . all of them were 
held together by a fine- grained structure of differentiation and 
relation” (2004: 203). This recalls Lefebvre’s Rhythmanalysis (2004). 
The affordances of new media for writing what Bakhtin might call 
a dialogic history can help us think and write history using multi-
ple, not just one, distinction(s).
The graphic novel, for example, offers the simultaneity of dif-
ferent perspectives— narrative and experiential— that complement 
and challenge historical forms like chronology, causality, and lin-
earity.32 Individual cells of the comic often contain multiple per-
spectives and motion; multiple voices that visualize experience, 
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verbal and embodied; pages that depict multiple and layered 
temporalities; and varied pacing.33 For history, they also offer the 
possibility of combining “major events” with the activity of peo-
ple operating among those events, and Hillary Chute argues that 
comics are a growing and well- suited genre for the documentary of 
trauma (2016: 14). Chute turns to remarkably powerful works like 
Art Spiegelman’s Maus, Keiji Nakazawa’s oeuvre on the Hiroshima 
atomic bombing, and the reporting of Joe Sacco in his Palestine. 
Mizuki Shigeru’s four- volume History of Showa is both history and 
autobiography; it offers a “normal” history of Japan from 1926 to 
1989 and his life experience as a youth in the 1930s, a foot soldier 
in Papua- New Guinea, an overworked laborer during the postwar 
period, and finally a celebrated author. The “facts” of Japanese his-
tory look different when situated within these experiences than in 
the standard histories; the story questions imperialism, violence 
of officers toward soldiers, and the anomie of the postwar years 
(reminiscent of Robert Musil’s The Man without Qualities).
Divisions between the historical and fiction are blurred. Spiegel-
man challenged the categorization of Maus as fiction; he raises 
the possibility that something is “historically true in essence, but 
not strictly factual” (Toni Morrison, quoted in H. White 2014: 
22). The historian William Steele, who possesses an encyclopedic 
understanding of popular material in nineteenth- century Japan, 
wrote an account of Goemon during the events of the Meiji ishin. 
Goemon did not exist, but his activity is based on an extensive 
reading of the broadsheets circulating at the time. Is this fiction? 
Nakazawa’s manga on Hiroshima and the atomic bomb, Spiegel-
man’s Maus, the reporting of Joe Sacco, and other media broaden 
pasts that fill our understanding of our present. These raise 
questions about the historical.
Stories are a way to confront history, to reengage parts of expe-
rience that have been marginalized. Benjamin writes, “The wis-
est thing— so the fairy tale taught mankind in olden times, and 
teaches children to this day— is to meet the forces of the mythical 
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world with cunning and with high spirits. . . . The liberating magic 
which the fairy tale has at its disposal does not bring nature into 
play in a mythical way, but points to its complicity with liberated 
man” (1968a: 102). The mythical world that stories confront can 
be history as myth. I read the complicity of nature and the liber-
ated man as a disavowal of the various dichotomies that consti-
tute modern society. I return to the mechanical or quantitative 
bias of absolute time and the need for biological times. Nature is 
not separate (so that it can be exploited or used to disparage as 
primitive) from humans. When the boundary between past and 
present becomes blurred, the various specters and ghosts of 
the past (those entombed) can raise questions about the 
binaries— past/present, tradition/modern, old/new— on which 
the modern depends. For Benjamin, stories operate apart 
from the gesture of exclusion.
This is an opportunity for history to add to its conceptual and 
practical tool kit. We must recognize that history (the discipline) 
is declining in attention while history (in a broad sense) is very 
popular in print and electronic media (de Groot 2009). I am not 
arguing for the popularization or massification of the historical 
profession— uses of the past, though, are moving to areas beyond 
the traditional historian’s reach. My point is that we must be 
aware of the confines of the Enlightenment system. For example, 
recent work in storytelling involves questioning both the linearity 
of communication from oral to written and opening the past to 
questions of human experience that had been denigrated. I have 
already discussed the latter, but the work of folklore specialist John 
Miles Foley (2012) suggests that we should also look for isomor-
phisms that have been distanced by chronology. He argues that 
recent digital media bear many similarities to oral traditions, espe-
cially in their topological natures.34 This work suggests that over 
a long term of different modes of communication— oral, textual, 
and digital— narrative print text might be the outlier.
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UNCERTAINTY? 35
From a perspective of orthodox history, my call for a meth-
odology rooted in a recognition of heterogeneity seemingly 
weakens certitude in historical interpretation and writing. Hetero-
geneous times, the relationality of interaction, the malleability of 
texts, the position of the observer in the activity, and the variabil-
ity of reading make causal and facile conclusions more difficult. 
Moreover a similar interaction at a different place and time can 
lead to different outcomes. But we know, don’t we, that history 
is reductive, always partial, and place does matter? Yet we adhere 
to our myths; and if the Anthropocene is dated from the steam 
engine, then these myths must be seen as an ideological founda-
tion of the technocratic society in which we exist. I agree with 
Chakrabarty that the time of world history must change to tackle 
the problems of the climate change.
This approach, a history without chronology, does not bring 
greater uncertainty. I readily admit that I join Fraser (1987) in his 
caution about the time- compact order in the epigraph to the inter-
lude. On the one hand, uncertainty already abounds in our cur-
rent system, but it has been differentially placed in an ideology of 
order while blaming others for problems. But this displacement, 
as Harootunian suggests in the epigraph, has failed. It is time to 
recognize this heterogeneity that the gesture of exclusion has 
occulted. In one of his characteristically succinct yet playful essays, 
Heinz von Foerster writes, “I have no doubts that you share with 
me the conviction that the central problems of today are societal. 
On the other hand, the gigantic problem- solving conceptual appa-
ratus that evolved in our Western culture is counter productive 
not only for solving but essentially for perceiving social problems.” 
Historians and humanists can remain smug and read von Foerst-
er’s observation as a recognition of the limitation of science. It is, 
but it is more; von Foerster continues that the root cause for these 
“cognitive blind spots” are causation, deduction, and objectivity 
112 H I s to ry  w I t H o u t  C H r o n o l o gy 
(1979: 283– 84). These are keywords of modern historical inquiry, 
of historical thinking, of our modern world. We circle back to 
the hidden base in chronological time that facilitated causation 
and objectivity as fundamental components, now root causes. 
These blind spots are (and continue to be) a source of our failure 
to encompass what we think we understand. This has been true 
throughout the twentieth century (rebellion and revolution 
were a part of the colonial edifice) and is perhaps even more press-
ing today as technologies for communication and for killing are 
reaching more and more people and the earth is changing faster 
than our institutions and policies. The others (even more, those 
who act against the conceptual confines) are the numerous specters 
that haunt our current understanding, and they seem to increase 
along with the inability of current categories to make sense of (and 
contain) the diversity of our world.
In Certeau’s complex and remarkable study of mystics, he asks, 
“Out of their strangeness . . . can something be born?” (2015: 4). For 
Certeau, “mystics” is a stigmatized category, like inner city, immi-
grant, and those “behind.” He recognizes the temporal distance, 
yet sees a similarity, which makes sense if we accept Simmel’s sep-
aration of technological change and sociocultural stability (quoted 
in chapter 1). Without chronological time to measure old and new, 
we might learn from distant pasts as well as recent science. Serres 
argues for the similarity of Lucretius’s writings on the motion of 
atoms and that of Jean Perrin (and by extension— quantum theory; 
Serres with Latour 1995: 48– 52). More recently, Siegfried Zielinski 
(2006) turns to “deep time” to look for the new in the old. Both de 
Cusa and Bertalanffy were writing when the prevailing knowledge 
system, the church and classical science, lost their power for expla-
nation and understanding. Both sought to formulate something 
else rather than to reiterate some comfortable mode of knowing. 
It seems that we too are in a moment when the existing system, 
absolute time, is decreasingly able to contain the world it claims to 
order. This is related to our current concern of time— presentism, 
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fatal confusions, things out of sync, and questions about digital 
media. Strangeness is no longer the other; it seems to be in our-
selves. What might be born is greater emphasis on qualities and 
relations; these are not far from Certeau’s statement that “mystics 
does not have its own content: it is an exercise of the other in rela-
tion to a given site; it is characterized by a set of specific ‘operations’ 
in a field that is not its own” (2015: 22). Heterogeneity makes more 
possible inquiries that ask, following von Foerster, “What are the 
properties of an observer?”
To consider this question, historians already use perhaps 
the most important tool for addressing these issues— reading. His-
torical thinking requires skill in finding, filtering, interpreting, and 
encapsulating data and narratives. These skills are more important 
than ever in our digital age. But I am arguing for less a reading 
to absorb and know than one to also appropriate, communicate, 
and understand. It is a form of reading that inverts practices from 
knowing structures within which people and objects existed to 
understanding the ways people make sense of and engage with 
their surroundings. This practice is a form of reading that seeks a 
“way of doing” that constitutes the text and helps us understand 
ways of behaving.36 Reading needs to be attuned less to the emplot-
ment of data onto a grid of time and space and more to a recogni-
tion of the heterogeneous views of an object or event. In Practices 
of Everyday Life, Certeau emphasizes the variability of reading not 
just as information transmission but also as a way for readers to 
visit some other place. He writes, “The reader produces gardens 
that miniaturize and collate a world . . . but he, too, is ‘possessed’ 
by his own fooling and jesting that introduces plurality and dif-
ference into the written system of a society and a text” (1984: 173). 
If every reading— those of our historical figures as well as current 
historians— reuses the text, the application of facile anachronistic 
categories must be interrogated as historical, not assumed. Von 
Foerster’s compact distinction— “It is how you say it,” not “Say how 
it is”— is particularly apt (2014: 129). History can again be a form 
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of understanding and communication as well as bodies of knowl-
edge. It is by incorporating these varying views and perspectives 
that I believe we have a better understanding of pasts.
Finally, up to this point, my discussion on heterogeneity has 
only hinted at how these multiple units relate (or don’t). It does, 
though, destabilize change as a linear description of becoming. 
Bergson writes, “The point is that usually we look at change but 
we do not see it. We speak of change, but we do not think about 
it. We say that change exists, that everything changes, that change 
is the very law of things: yes, we say it and we repeat it; but those are 
only words, and we reason and philosophise as though change did 
not exist. In order to think change and see it, there is a whole veil of 
prejudices to brush aside” (2002: 248– 49). Again, we encounter the 
language of hiding— masquerade, veil, occult, and so on. This dis-
cussion on heterogeneity is important in itself, but it is necessary 
for my next chapter, to think anew about change. Serres writes, 
“The work of transformation is that of the multiple” (1995: 101).
CHAPTER FOUR
CHANGE AND HISTORY
At the heart of the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century there 
was an almost miraculous improvement in the tools of production, 
which was accompanied by a catastrophic dislocation of the lives of 
the common people.
— Karl Polanyi ([1944] 1957: 33)
If you imagine a change as being really composed of states, you at once 
cause insoluble metaphysical problems to arise. They deal only with 
appearances. You have closed your eyes to true reality.
— Henri Bergson (2002: 259)
In order to be able to accept change, time has to be created. In order to 
be able to accept changes with time, it could be continued, the catego-
ries of time have to be changed repeatedly.
— Helga Nowotny (2016: 50– 51)
Perhaps the most unsettling question that a decentering of 
chronology and a framework that emphasizes heterogeneity raises 
is the ability of history, in contrast to claims, to discuss change. The 
modern discipline of history sees itself as study of change (Rüsen 
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1995: 120). Yet I am more and more convinced, after writing two 
books that sought (unsuccessfully) to move beyond a teleologi-
cal history, that I also have been confined to the mythical struc-
ture. I discussed, through a lens that challenged some common 
understandings, how things came to be, not how change happens. 
History’s concept of change is to describe (or critique) how units— 
nations, societies, and communities— became what we know them 
to be. Within a homogeneous time, we begin history from the end 
(usually the present) and move backward to some origin to discuss 
the unfolding toward that endpoint. The epigraph from Polanyi 
exhibits this pattern; the critique is important but reinforces the 
linear structure. I too complied.
I now believe that history is a field of knowledge that maintains 
states and conditions through a language of movement. In history, 
change is an external measure that too often, in Bergson’s words 
in the epigraph, “deal[s] only with appearances.”1 The dislocations 
described by Polanyi, resulting from technological improvement, 
continue. This recalls Manuel’s description (in an epigraph of 
chapter 2) of Newton’s effort to write history— “quantities of geo-
graphical space in temporal sequence”— and Toews’s observation 
that Hegelian rationality is a world of forms that do not reach the 
level that “make the shaping activity possible in the first place” 
(2004: 5). I read the “metaphysical problems” that Bergson refers 
to as states.2 These states are “appearances,” extracted from flows, 
that facilitate quantitative measure across dates (Adam 1990: 51). 
Historians call this “change over time.”
The limitation of the concept of change in history is evident in 
a recent forum of the American Historical Review on “Explaining 
Historical Change” (Akyeampong et al. 2015). The panel was 
composed of important historians in their respective fields. The 
discussion traversed a rather sophisticated terrain, including 
hermeneutics and the impossibility of describing a “reality.” Yet 
the whole seemed to return to the common denominator; the 
panel concluded with a reiteration of history as continuity and 
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discontinuity; classical time remained the norm. It returned to the 
standards, goals, and metrics of existing units— the nation- state, 
eras, institutions, and identity— but with a critical edge. Within 
this system, change “occurs,” and we feel more knowledgeable 
simply because the date is more recent— it is “new.” This is the 
gesture of exclusion at work; an improved technology is applied 
(often reinforcing an existing practice), or simply the more recent 
is juxtaposed to something existing (now categorized as past).
In the previous chapter, I introduced Bergson’s identification 
of time and motion as two words science uses as a “veil” and dis-
cussed how the notion of duration can be a way to conceive of time 
through human sensibility rather than mechanical processes. Here, 
I take up the second of his veils, the difference between motion and 
mobility. When I first became interested in temporality, I taught 
seminars on time and space. Among the readings, David Harvey 
(1996: 261) describes “permanence” as space carved from the flow 
of processes. History gives credence to the idea of the nation- 
state as a “permanence,” as if it has always existed. Then motion 
and circulation are the principal ways to discuss movement— 
development and progress— within and among this permanence. 
It is important to point out that the purpose of this spatialization 
is certainty, organization, and control— in short, stability. I have 
been calling this spatialized time. The veil, the elevation of time 
and motion over duration and mobility, is to operate within 
these permanences as if they are external to rather than created 
from human activity. My switch from temporalities to times is my 
way of centering time as an internal part of activity.
Like duration, mobility provides a conceptual path to invert 
motion from movement between abstract externalities to activity 
that makes up units. Various forms of activity— extension, contrac-
tion, interaction, passing, recurrence, redundancy, and so on— are 
elements of the flow of processes. By focusing on such activity, the 
ordering systems become one, not the only, possibility. More import-
ant, the potential for conceiving of change moves more toward 
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the qualitative conditions— the activity that comprises the unit— 
rather than the quantitative measurement of states.
From the mid- 1990s, mobility— the “mobility turn” or “new 
mobilities paradigm”— has become a popular new subject or 
approach (Cresswell 2006: ix). It emerged more in anthropology 
and sociology; history has been slower to embrace it. Perhaps one 
reason that history has not as readily embraced mobility is because 
of its role in maintaining spatialized time through its focus on 
time and motion. Bruce Clarke’s concise description of the dif-
ference between classical science and second- order cybernetics 
contrasts this difficulty; “one discovers that whereas circularity 
is death (by infinite regress) to structures, it is life (by autono-
mous self- regulation) to systems” (2009: 36). Movement is central 
to both, but descriptions within classical time presume forward 
movement that is juxtaposed to fixed forms, repetitive action, and 
dead “facts” that are contained by or move between forms. On the 
other hand, the mobility of organisms includes variability, process, 
and relations that are necessary for their existence. Recurrence 
is a basic activity of organisms from which interaction, growth, 
transformation, homeostasis, or decay occurs.
Tim Ingold aptly shows this difference through his description 
of how people operate rather than how they function within mod-
ern structures. He compares wayfaring and transport; the way-
farer moves along, taking in the surroundings, and inhabits that 
which he traverses. This is juxtaposed to the traveler, who moves 
across from point to point.3 Ingold applies this formulation to 
narrative, and I would extend it to the historical discipline: “This 
fragmentation .  .  . has taken place in the related fields of travel, 
where wayfaring is replaced by destination- oriented transport, 
mapping, where the drawn sketch is replaced by the route- plan, 
and textuality, where storytelling is replaced by the pre- composed 
plot. It has also transformed our understanding of place: once a 
knot tied from multiple and interlaced strands of movement and 
growth, it now figures as a node in a static network of connectors” 
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(2007: 75). Wayfaring becomes a metaphor for recentering our 
understanding around human activity rather than in the catego-
ries that speak for and encompass them. It focuses on process, the 
recursivity where pasts are as much of the present as they are of 
the future. It makes possible lateral thinking— the transposition 
of ideas and tools from one place to another as processes of living 
rather than as prescriptions for the not- yet (the behind) to become 
like us. Place, then, is a part of the process rather than something 
preexisting. As in my discussion of duration, mobility enables us to 
envision the situatedness of the units and the encounter. Change 
is less the becoming of what we know than, first, the ways organ-
isms, people, and environments operate, adapt, and use their spe-
cific conditions and, second, how these activities lead to larger and 
larger structures as well as interaction of larger units.
I ended the previous chapter with Bergson’s questioning of our 
ability to see change. Bergson, in the epigraph, asserts that we have 
closed our eyes to true reality. We don’t have to go as far as Berg-
son, and one must be suspicious whenever encountering the “really” 
or “truly” real. But this statement coincides with my account that 
history, when established (in the nineteenth century), was itself a 
“virtual reality,” especially in comparison to what previously existed. 
It also aligns with Simmel’s separation of material progress from 
sociocultural life and with increasing scholarship pointing toward 
a desynchronization (as if they ever were synchronized). The reality 
that we see has been refracted through a lens that abstracts and 
classes; that lens emphasizes the quantifiable, mechanical, and tech-
nological, and it simultaneously deemphasizes human sensibility.
Nowotny suggests a corrective: “Change, or a more fashionable 
word, transformation, is the normal state of natural and human 
affairs, exacerbated by the increasingly intricate interaction 
between humans and their environment” (2016: 38). This rather 
simple, but powerful, statement inverts— maybe even upends— 
our current thinking based on classical time; change is decou-
pled from chronological time. Instead, activity is the normative 
120 H I s to ry  w I t H o u t  C H r o n o l o gy 
condition of organisms— nature, human, and social— which 
are constantly transforming and intricately interacting. Again, I 
recall Certeau’s inversion to historicize our research and dehistori-
cize our objects of study. Change (as activity) is a constant; whether 
it is significant requires values, evaluation, and metrics. Perspective, 
environment, and goals are integral factors. To understand change 
apart from chronology, we might start from the complex interac-
tion of humans with each other and with their environment.
Before discussing the ways that times can be used to under-
stand such interactions, I will first return to entropy and biology. I 
mentioned these in chapter 1, but here I will emphasize how these 
times help us approach Nowotny’s argument in the epigraph that 
“categories of time have to be changed repeatedly.” If we do so, 
we broaden what might be historical: the past is not necessarily 
a dead past, people’s sensibilities are important, transformation 
is local and situated, perspectives vary, ideas are constitutive of 
societies, and multiple times coexist.
TWENTIETH- CENTURY TIMES4
Entropy
Most social scientists and humanists who work on time see the clock 
as the metaphor for the modern world, and I too have generally fol-
lowed this tendency. Yet Prigogine and Stengers (1984) distinguish 
Newtonian science— the clock— from the industrial age that was 
based on the burning of energy. This difference indicates that ther-
modynamics, especially the second law, has not been a significant 
component of the understanding nor of a critique of modern time.5 
Again, we are confronted by the mythical basis of our chronological 
system— it is true because we accept it, not because of a scientific 
basis. My use of entropy is to raise the need for a more complex 
understanding of times that become apparent when we recognize 
these laws.6
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Interestingly, entropy, the idea that things move toward disor-
der, bears similarity to premodern forms of thinking where gods 
(or God) created the perfect world and human activity (history) by 
definition has been a devolution from that world. I do not mention 
this because I seek to return to some idealized past. Instead, we 
need to recognize that this earlier view, when placed alongside a 
more recent (late nineteenth century!) scientific understanding of 
energy, is not an outmoded notion— a dead past from which we 
have progressed. Instead, it points to the reductive or narrow range 
of analysis of mechanical processes based on Newtonian time that 
has ignored or obscured outcomes that are a constituent part of 
the very same process. The obscured or ignored outcomes become 
separate issues or lamentable problems, are categorized as waste, 
have unintended consequences, or are blamed as the fault of oth-
ers. Linear time facilitates this occlusion through its focus on the 
new technological “innovation” and production— measurables.
Perhaps the most important aspect of entropy for social pro-
cesses is that it forces us to recognize multiple outcomes from a 
single process. Jeremy Rifkin and Ted Howard write, “Many people 
think that pollution is a by- product of production. In fact, pollu-
tion is the sum total of all available energy in the world that has 
been transformed into unavailable energy. Waste, then, is dissipated 
energy” (quoted in Adam 1990: 62). All aspects of the process are 
important, and Adam writes that what had been waste becomes 
“a source of order and creativity” (1990: 64). When we open our 
fields to include all, not just desired, output, we see a much more 
complex relationship that might involve different time scales and 
times. There are many examples: we can turn to the burning of fos-
sil fuels for energy and transportation, the generation of waste, the 
rise of pollution, and the changing geoclimatic system (Zalasiewicz 
et al. 2011; Gabrys 2011). Colonialism was a constituent, interactive 
part of modernity, not its effect (Harootunian 2007); and the global 
corporate traveler relies on a series of on- demand and low- wage 
workers (Sharma 2014). In these examples, what we have too often 
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ignored, written off as externalities, or pitied and suggested aid for, 
are integral parts of the process. Entropy helps lift the veil. This con-
nects to the epigraph from Polanyi and the statement from Simmel 
in that we must at minimum be specific on our subjects, and more 
important, recognize divergent outcomes, rates, and decay. Peter 
Wagner’s recent effort to reconceive of progress similarly separates 
epistemic- economic progress from sociopolitical control (2016).
This incorporation of entropy upsets the very foundation of his-
torical understanding. Newtonian mechanics and Hegelian devel-
opment are inverted. We can no longer begin from a structure that 
celebrates the move from some originary, natural state toward civ-
ilization and order. The question is how long can we continue this 
myth; Sir Arthur Eddington warns, “If your theory is found to be 
against the second law of thermodynamics . . . there is nothing for it 
but to collapse in deepest humiliation” (quoted in Georgescu- Roegen 
1986: 14). When applied to biological and social systems, from cells 
to large social systems, an exchange of energy is basic. The organism 
is never at rest (stasis), and instead, without active maintenance, 
it is degrading. Repetition and feedback loops (positive or neg-
ative) are central temporalities of the process, not some prior 
condition. Maintenance is necessary to keep a steady state, and 
in maintenance, change also occurs. In short, when we include 
thermodynamics, change becomes multilinear and complex; it is 
degradation, trade off, loss (high entropy), emergence, coevolution, 
and improvement. This helps us move toward an understanding of 
the epigraph from Bergson that change according to chronological 
time is that of appearances and that a system that recognizes the 
dynamics of organisms moves us closer to “true reality.”
Circular Causality
If someone today were to propose the use of an abstract metric for 
mechanical motion to understand life processes, he would, at best, 
have a difficult time convincing us of its suitability; mechanical 
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motion and life processes are “completely different” realms (Vester 
1979: 53). Yet the conflation of life processes into mechanical 
motion is the legacy of classical science, which leads us to think of 
causality as linear and circularity as repetitive, a condition of sta-
sis. This encounter between physical time and biological processes 
returns us to General System Theory (GST) and the Macy Con-
ferences on cybernetics.7 Both, from different sciences, turned to 
organic forms to formulate a richer and more complex conceptual 
system to study and understand physical, social, and life processes.8 
Just as the presence of entropy brings out the multiple outputs of 
a process and inverts directionality, the turn to biological systems 
inverts the basis of understanding of mobility and stability and 
presumes multidirectional and multitemporal movements.
In contrast to Newtonian motion, the basic unit of biologi-
cal and social systems or the agent (the cell, the individual, the 
community, or the nation- state) is not at rest but is dynamic. 
Activity— repetition, dissipation, decay, recursion, feedback, and 
interaction— is constant. Purpose (what was often called teleology 
at the Macy Conference) varies, but importantly, it is local; it exists 
in the activity of the unit rather than as some conceptual ideal in 
the future. Finally, what we have understood as universal laws 
or “nature” (and which I have pointed out are historical forms— 
chronological time and history) are described here as secondary 
regulations. What we might call stability— homeostasis— is fre-
quently the purpose rather than a negative of progress.9
While homeostasis suggests an equilibrium, it doesn’t mean 
static or unchanging. This is where Koselleck’s concept of layered 
times (discussed in chapter 3) is important; the second layer, the 
structure of repetition (social form), is a temporality within which 
the first layer, singularities (event- like happenings) emerge. Main-
tenance, decay, or something “new” emerges from repetition. For 
example, in his Evolutionary History, Edmund Russell describes 
how evolution happens through repetitive activity: “Evolution 
is ordinary, not exceptional. It happens all around (and inside) 
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every one of us— you, me, and the dog next door— every day. We 
rarely notice it, but it shapes our lives continually” (2011: 5). This 
understanding returns to Darwin rather than Spencer’s adapta-
tion of evolution as human progress. This process is the regular 
cycles of organisms including reproduction— each organism has its 
own time, multiple organisms of different time scales coexist and 
interact, and coevolution happens at differential and barely percep-
tible rates. Russell’s use of the word continually is an example of what 
I have called circular causality. This is where we move change beyond 
Newtonian states. Bertalanffy points to a key difference: mechanical 
processes are oriented toward “certain products or performances”; in 
contrast, “the order of process in living systems is such as to maintain 
the system itself” (1968: 78).10 This is the difference raised by Vester. 
In human life, adaptation is a part of the process of living. Change is 
coevolutionary— the adaptation of one thing in reaction to another 
(say, an external stimulus) leads to the mutual adaptation of each; 
humans have fostered the changes of other organisms, which in turn 
continue to shape human history.11
The attentive reader will note the similarity to Gurevich in 
chapter 2, where he describes stability as a result of repetition: 
“The past, as it were, returns continuously, and this lends solid-
ity, gravity, a non- transient character to the present” (1985: 143). 
My point is to emphasize the centrality of the process and activ-
ity that is involved rather than to emplot such behavior as some 
form of lessness, of incompleteness, or of ignorance. Change is 
constant; occurs at different, often very slow rates; is multiple; and 
is not limited to developmental or forward motion. Change can 
be degeneration, disorder, decay, or death. These are outcomes of 
entropy— gradual decay without input. Imagine the changes that 
would be necessary to maintain the global average temperature 
at what it is right now (which will be higher by the time you read 
this). Redundancy gives rise to patterns and commonalities (space), 
but encounters with different forms and changing environments 
generate feedback loops and lead to adjustment, adaptation, and 
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learning (history). These processes require the exchange of infor-
mation. Cybernetics (Shannon and Weaver 1949) also extended 
this notion of entropy to information theory.
This process elevates the significance beyond a description of 
some past. History, or historical understanding, plays several roles 
that go beyond description. People incorporate ideas and under-
stand situations based on their conceptual systems (as well as the 
environment at that moment). Recorded happenings serve as infor-
mation that systems, institutions, and individuals might filter into 
data or “facts.” Historical knowledge, the learned understanding 
of the community, also filters information in the act of learning, 
interpreting, and decision- making, and the historian writes history 
based on the community as well as outside (including abstract) 
ideas and influence. That history then provides another filtering 
mechanism for recorded happenings. Repeat. History acts on past 
observers/actors/subjects as well as on our present.
This process is well beyond linear systems. The emphasis is on 
the various connections and relations that are parts of a process; 
Dupuy explains circular causality: “In a ‘system’ (that is to say, an 
organism), the laws of physics allow the individual elements a 
number of degrees of freedom. This indeterminacy at the lower 
level ends up being reduced by the constraints imposed upon it 
by the integrated activity of the whole— constraints that them-
selves result from the composition of elementary activities. The 
whole and its elements therefore mutually determine each other. 
It is this codetermination that accounts for the complexity of 
living beings” (2000: 136). This notion of circular causality con-
trasts with the repetition and cyclical forms of classical science. It 
does not eliminate change; instead, it helps emphasize the param-
eters, activity, interactions, and emergences of a system.
Dupuy’s description points to what we today tend to know as 
a complex system. The basic units are heterogeneous and unique; a 
variety of actions are possible from their interaction. Mobility is 
constant; repetition, dissipation, reproduction, feedback loops, and 
126 H I s to ry  w I t H o u t  C H r o n o l o gy 
interaction are central. Networks and assemblages are metaphors 
that have become common ways to think of nonlinear relations. 
Learning or adaptation is a central part of the interaction. The 
inversion is evident through von Foerster’s distinction of change 
as trivial and nontrivial (see especially von Foerster 2014: 15– 23). 
The former is linear cause and effect; the latter is multilinear 
and complex. In the latter, after each interaction, the qualitative 
state of actor and actant changes and the operation of the system 
changes. Nontrivial change helps us discern the problem of states 
and appearances in Newtonian mechanics. The various actors and 
actants shift and adjust; the next operation is different. This process 
is affected by and affects its environment. Each agent, its embodied 
condition, and each interaction is situated within a unique setting. 
This helps us get to the qualitative processes of human activity.
The variability of these interactions inverts our current sys-
tem that marks and emplots variation onto an ideal or univer-
salized geometric grid. Nowotny writes, “What makes complex 
systems complex are their multiple feedback loops and indirect 
cause- effect relations, which play out at different timescales and 
speed” (2016: 129). From this interaction of agents, new forms 
emerge. Emergence is not additive but a result of a combination 
that leads to something different, beyond the qualities of individ-
ual agents. These systems can be self- organizing— for example, 
urban systems or schools of fish— or they can be hierarchical, such 
as families and nations. Maintenance of the system through repet-
itive action is as important as “new” actions.12 Emergence can be a 
recurrent process, or it can be an adaptation (evolution). Indeed, 
change might come from repetition itself or the failure of repeti-
tion rather than from some innovation that claims the new.
TURBULENT, CRUMPLED, TATTERED TIMES
So we understand that time is multiple and that we should focus on 
activity (duration to reconceive of time and mobility to reconceive 
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of motion), incorporate entropy, and adjust to circular causality. 
What does it mean now to think historically? In a sense, this clari-
fies Benjamin’s statement that objectivistic history is “the strongest 
narcotic of the century” (1999: 463). Simple location, linear causal-
ity, and a reduced archive produce and maintain a false certainty.
I hope it is clear that we need to recognize that classical time— 
unless we choose to follow a mythic notion— is one (albeit major) 
time of many that operate in our world. It is not easy to relinquish 
its centrality because our world, our conceptual systems, and our 
daily lives are organized around it, but the claimed certainty of 
linear history has produced an uncertain world. Again, this is not 
new. The more I have worked on this short book, the more I feel 
as if I am writing about a history of what has been forgotten in our 
craft of history, an amnesia that accompanies or is shrouded by 
Benjamin’s narcotic. The power of this narcotic is borne out by the 
criticisms that existed as far back as the Enlightenment. Herder 
writes sarcastically, “Would that everything went in a nice straight 
line, with every subsequent human being and every subsequent gen-
eration being perfected according to his ideal in a beautiful progres-
sion for which he alone was able to provide the highest exponent of 
virtue and happiness!” (2004: 70– 71). Thomas Carlyle complained 
in 1830 as chronological history was becoming popular, “Things 
done were not a series, but a group” (2002: 7). One can think of 
Braudel’s longue durée, Foucault’s archaeology, and more recently 
Harry Harootunian has shown how Marx’s multiple and layered 
temporality was reduced into a linear Marxism. We end up with 
comments like Benjamin’s and Runia’s laments that chronologi-
cal, objectivistic history is still the norm; the discipline that sees 
itself as concerned with change has failed to change along with 
the world.
This multiplicity of times does produce greater variability, and 
no doubt there will be unease in this heterogeneity, even relativ-
ity. But perhaps the greatest worry (apart from those who desire 
to maintain the mythic structure) is the loss of the synchronizing 
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(ordering) function of chronological time. But we must remember 
that synchronization in our linear system is of forms and appear-
ances that have masked the diverse human and social processes 
that are a part of life. We forget that people have long coordinated 
communication despite different times, and if we remember 
Whitehead’s statement in the previous chapter, we already practice 
it. We also need to remember that the certainty is of a knowledge 
system (spatialized times) in which “humanity would be increas-
ingly written out of the story of our planet” (Bowker 2005: 71).
My proposal is to overcome the difficulty by recognizing the 
variability of ways that a less homogeneous time can be used to 
achieve gradually histories that are built on multiple times. I adapt 
an idea, decision trees, from the Force11 scholarly communication 
community (see Force11 2017). The collective recognizes that the 
inherited mode of dissemination of scholarly research has a long 
history but that in today’s environment, its continuation is unsup-
portable (financially). Many argue that it no longer fosters commu-
nication (in favor of publication), and better alternatives are already 
available.13 This is not a project to eliminate corporate involvement, 
especially of the commercial presses; that is not possible nor neces-
sarily desirable. A major goal is to shift scholarly work from produc-
tion (publication) to communication where work flows and access 
have fewer legacy impediments. A major problem is the breadth, or 
the ecology of scholarly communication— individual practices, dis-
ciplinary and institutional cultures, and built environments. The 
strength of this community is its recognition that achievement of 
goals (varied and often disputed) requires new tools, institutional 
support, and— more difficult— the transformation of scholarly hab-
its, work flows, and institutional systems— scholars, departments, 
libraries, publishers, foundations, and so on. The idea of decision 
trees recognizes that movement occurs at varying levels, depending 
on a variety of conditions. The decision trees help practitioners— 
newcomers and experienced— understand the different ways that 
they may participate, even though not yet at the ideal.
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Below, I will suggest different levels by which we can move 
toward histories (and historical thinking) that are aware of the 
multiple times within which we operate and of how people might 
put this understanding into practice. There is a limitation to the 
metaphor of trees; it is directional. Decision trees include feed-
back but do not easily include interactions among the differing 
outcomes— in von Foerster’s words, nontrivial change. I hope, 
though, that as my discussion proceeds, the possibility of inter-
actions and of complexity becomes apparent.
Serres has used several metaphors— turbulent, crumpled, 
tattered— to imagine heterogeneous times. Turbulence makes it 
easier to visualize multiple temporalities where the linear flow of 
modern society is still strong, if not dominant. He writes, “Time 
does not always flow according to a line . . . nor according to a plan 
but, rather, according to an extraordinarily complex mixture, as 
though it reflected stopping points, ruptures, deep wells, chimneys 
of thunderous acceleration, rendings, gaps— all sown at random, at 
least in a visible disorder” (Serres with Latour 1995: 57). Turbulence 
allows for the flow of classical time (still the basis of our liberal- 
capitalist world), multiple layered times and temporalities (speeds 
and scales), and nonlinearity (iteration, recursion, and feedback). 
The images of time as a crumpled handkerchief and as tattered will 
help extend the notion of turbulence, the heterogeneity, distur-
bances to the system, the complex convergences, and relationality. 
The multiple metaphors are not an indication of confusion or a 
lack of consistency; instead, they suggest the multiple and com-
plex ways that times coexist, are coincidental, conjoin, or interact. 
Crumpled time questions the efficacy of absolute time and abso-
lute space to our understanding of pasts. In this time, time and 
space are mutable, not absolute. Tattered times returns us to the 
multiple times of each unit, and from these units, we can, along 
the lines of complex systems, discern the complex from collec-
tions of smaller components. Together, I hope that these meta-
phors help us imagine how heterogeneous times can be discussed 
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as interacting in a heterogeneous world; they provide various ways 
to reconceive of history without chronology.
Layers of Time: Toward Turbulence
The first step in using this metaphor is to recognize the laminar-
ity of flow, the layers of multiple time scales. The recognition of 
different time scales is an important step in historicizing our prac-
tice. Again, this is not new. In chapter 3, I discussed Braudel’s three 
temporal scales— geographical, social, and individual man— and 
Koselleck’s three layers: transcendent structures, repetitive struc-
tures, and singularities. We can also see the depiction of layers of 
timelines in Rosenberg and Grafton’s Cartographies of Time, and 
Marx recognized the importance of different temporalities as well 
as their layered coexistence (Tomba 2013: 159– 86). More recently 
work on biology and on the environment has led to several pro-
posals. John H. Holland, one of the early proponents of complex 
adaptive systems, extrapolates from varying processes to argue for 
time scales that emanate from the unit of analysis: hours in the 
central nervous system, days in the human immune system, years 
in business systems, centuries in species, and millennia for our 
ecosystem (1995: 9– 10). Each operates individually but also might 
interact and combine into a hierarchic system composed of inter-
related subsystems that are often layered or nested. Hierarchic 
systems are one of the basic operating forms of complex systems. 
Small units following simple rules interact forming larger units, 
which then form larger units, and so on. The physicist Freeman 
Dyson has proposed six sociotemporal scales necessary for human 
survival: years, for that of the individual; decades, for the family; 
centuries, for the tribe or nation; millennia, for the culture; tens 
of millennia, for the species; eons, for the web of life on the planet 
(1992: 341– 42). Stewart Brand adapted these time scales to focus on 
the pace and size of civilization: fashion/art, commerce, infrastruc-
ture, governance, culture, and nature (1999: 35– 39).
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The recognition of multiple time scales that are connected to 
natural— physical and biological— and social phenomena is an 
important step in dehistoricizing our objects of study. Change 
happens at different rates, depending on the particularities of the 
activity and unit. What one sees of these pasts (which are also of 
the present) is not the rise of civilization or the happenings of the 
nation- state but a number of different processes: the earth, cul-
tures, societies, persons, organisms, and cells. It moves our under-
standing more directly toward the behavior and activity of units 
and toward greater variability— that is, layers of temporal systems 
that at different moments interact with one another.
These different time scales have coexisted throughout the 
existence of the earth. We are connected to all of them; they are a 
part of the past and present even though they have not been a part 
of the discipline of history. When one allows for these different 
time scales, the copresence of different units of analysis as well as 
the potential for different metrics becomes apparent. I emphasize 
potential because different time scales can operate within classical 
time. There is an important difference in these versions of mul-
tiple time scales. Holland’s time scales are of different times that 
are generated in the activity of each unit. The others tend toward 
different temporalities that operate within absolute time. Both are 
important steps in moving away from a homogeneous time toward 
the multiple times that are a part of our twentieth- century under-
standing of time.
Layered time scales loosen the stranglehold of absolute time 
and absolute space as externalities and begin the movement 
toward multiplicities. Big History, national histories, capitalism, 
biographies, and stories of everyday life operate at different lev-
els, often with different metrics. Scholars can debate the validity 
of these time scales (if we accept the idea of a time internal to 
activity, there are many more), but what becomes apparent is that 
our current chronological system is but one of several possibili-
ties connected to the nation in Dyson’s formula and to commerce 
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and infrastructure in Brand’s formulation. What appears as 
static and repetitive (unchanging) in Dyson’s time scale of the 
individual might appear as transformation at the time scale of 
the tribe or nation. Placed within the long existence of the earth, 
our chronological system projects backward and forward from 
units of analysis of but one or two scales— those that emerged in 
concert with the industrial revolution, capitalism, and the nation- 
state. When considered in relation to the history of time, history 
and chronological time become fields of knowledge that organize 
pasts in support of an Anthropocene even before it was recognized 
as such.14 Classical time is a metric that highlights, guides, and per-
petuates a system of the recent several hundred years where prior 
thousands of years of happenings on the earth are its precursor and 
where other temporalities at the human or global levels have been 
folded in as states of unevenness (primitive or Orient) or without 
time (repetition or nature).
Layered times also have the potential to allow multiple per-
spectives in historical work. Each time scale places emphasis on a 
particular unit. In Holland, it might be the central nervous system, 
the human immune system, business systems, species, and ecosys-
tems. For example, Patrick Anderson’s Autobiography of a Disease 
(2017) shifts the perspective of a disease and its treatment from 
the patient, medical provider, or medical science to the microbe 
and the immune system. By recognizing the Anthropocene as an 
era rather than activity buried as a part of the natural evolution 
of the earth, this emphasis on ecological systems is an import-
ant attempt to shift nature into an active component of history 
rather than the inert and static object of use and exploitation.15 
Similarly, the overlay of biographies and stories has become a way 
to recenter the past around how individuals think and act. In each 
case, perspective is based on the activity of the time scale. Our cur-
rent system based on classical time remains a part of the narrative, 
but it is decentered as one of several systems with which other 
time scales occasionally interact.
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Historians need to be attentive to multiple time scales; we have 
long operated amid layered temporalities that have been subsumed 
into classical time.16 This use of layered temporality begins to bring 
out the potential of multiple, coeval times. When we do, we might 
achieve what Braudel proposed decades ago and Koselleck sug-
gested more recently. The next step toward Serres’s notion of tur-
bulence is to unpack absolute time itself.
Crumpled Times
Serres’s crumpled time helps us think of relationality (as opposed 
to classification or order) among different units. In this metaphor, 
he suggests visualizing time using a handkerchief. When flat, it is 
geometric and one can mark things onto a two dimensional grid; 
we recreate the mechanical regularity of classical science. But 
when crumpled or torn— turbulence from interaction or external 
forces— time and space are mutable; distance, perspective, and 
relationships change. On the one hand, time is no longer a fixed 
metric suitable to measure similarity (closeness) or difference (dis-
tance). What was temporally distant might be proximate or vice 
versa.17 Second, the various spatialized times— categories, classifi-
cations, and nations— lose their homogenizing status. Variations 
within those units become more pronounced and might alter the 
units themselves. The significance of this metaphor of crumpled 
time is to deny absolute time and absolute space a position external 
to activity. Time in this case, now times, is inherent to the activity 
itself— for example, through communities of practice. Through 
this notion of crumpled time, the separation of past from present 
as prior and different is no longer predetermined; we need to find 
other ways to understand relations, connections, and interaction. 
Pasts are no longer pasts (as prior and different); categories 
and spaces are heuristic assemblages; and things that were 
described as static might operate at a different time, where events 
distanced by dates might share many qualities.
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With this understanding of crumpled times, we can expose 
how a “neophilia” operates to veil the gesture of exclusion. The 
historian of science David Edgerton points to a constancy of 
technological hype: “History reveals that technological futurism 
is largely unchanging over time” (2007: xvi). In the field of media 
archeology, several scholars have shown that the social appli-
cation and utility of many “new” technological discoveries are 
similar to much earlier discoveries (Gitelman 2006; Kittler 1990; 
Huhtamo and Parikka 2011). Siegfried Zielinski (2006) explores 
the possibilities of “deep time,” times where there is potential 
to understand beyond current categories. He looks for inter-
sections of magic, technology, and culture to learn new things 
from the chronologically old. Jussi Parikka demonstrates how the 
Anthropocene can be more than a reconfigured era (spatialized 
time). The “obscene” in the title of his Anthrobscene is the recog-
nition of entropy— waste, decay, and pollution— as a part of the 
process of production.
These examples show the possibility of times that move beyond 
the technological “new.” They recognize that chronology fos-
ters a technical or technological variation (improvement) over a 
past, the “old.” Moreover, they question such linearity as change; 
instead, the new serves as a form of function optimization, a form 
of enhancement of the current, or what David Levy calls “more, 
better, faster” (Levy 2007). This function optimization might be 
change on Brand’s scale of commerce, but it is the homeostasis 
of capitalist production on the scale of governance masqueraded 
through an ideology of progress, as if it is “new.” Multiple times, 
not just scales, coexist within the same process. Edgerton has 
pointed out, “Calling for innovation is, paradoxically, a common 
way of avoiding change when change is not wanted” (2007: 210). 
For example, according to a Google Ngram on the word innovation, 
we see its increasing popularity from approximately 1950. Yet this 
is inversely related to Robert Gordon’s study in which he finds that 
the major innovations of US society occurred between 1870 and 
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1970. In short, we are quite possibly using the word innovation 
more even as we are innovating less.18
Chronological time has led us to presume difference, even prog-
ress, and it has obscured the regularity of liberal- capitalist systems. 
William Sewell (2008: 519), for example, compares the tulip bubble 
of 1635– 36 with the dot- com bubble at the beginning of the twenty- 
first century. He writes, “This suggests that in spite of the birth 
and death of firms and industries, the transformations in technol-
ogy, the development of ever more sophisticated financial instru-
ments, the greatly increased capacity of states and repeated shifts 
in economic policy regimes, there is some central mechanism of 
capitalism that has remained essentially unchanged for a cen-
tury and a half” (520).19 This repetition echoes Fukuzawa’s worry 
of Japan’s past, but now it is an indictment of our own notion of 
progress. Gary Fields has written a powerful study on the similarity 
of use of enclosure for governance in twenty- first- century Pales-
tine, seventeenth- century England, and eighteenth- century New 
England. As in Sewell’s example, differences, change, and progress 
are marked through classical time. But chronological distance and 
geocultural difference obscure the similarity, the “ongoing recon-
stitution” of the fundamental relationship of power— the repeti-
tive process that maintains a certain economic or political power 
structure. These examples might be closer to the duration of the 
Troubles described by White than we have thought; I am reminded 
of Bergson, who argues that time obscures duration. They rein-
force Wagner’s separation of epistemic and economic progress 
for a few and the perpetuation of hegemony socially and politi-
cally; they support Bastian’s fatal confusion where temporalities 
are changing differentially in unexpected ways— nature is moving 
faster than institutions.
In this regard, we must wonder today whether the fascination 
with innovation is less about change, the “new,” than a condition 
that perpetuates the technological aspects of modern society; 
Innis complained about a bias toward present- mindedness in 1951, 
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more than a half century ago (1951: 75– 83). Accelerating time, espe-
cially the increase of a presentist perspective, is now a common 
refrain. Perhaps we are nearing an end of this era of inflationary 
media— the separation of object from representation— begun with 
the telegraph. In the first era of print, the copy sufficed for mate-
riality. With digital media, this materiality becomes imaginary. 
My argument fits with Huhtamo and Parikka’s Media Archaeology 
that this presentism is not a change caused by technology. Digital 
media are certainly related and exacerbate the condition. Instead, 
there seems to be an extension of the linear structure of time that 
has obscured its perpetuation through a reliance on sociocultural 
“stability.” Technological improvements, efficiencies, and replace-
ments are described as a form of change. But improvement of 
what? It is the improvement of a process of production and con-
sumption that enhances and strengthens the current system.
I don’t deny the possibility of change or the desire for innovation; 
I do, though, believe that these words are overused to the extent 
that, without greater specificity and understanding of times, they 
lose meaning and, worse, mask the repetitive process. Nowotny 
suggests that we don’t understand the process. She writes, “The 
linear model of innovation . . . has been discarded, but innovation 
remains a process which, despite or because of its tight links to 
policy, is relatively little understood. As of today, there is no theory 
of innovation” (2016: 106). In the examples above, we see linear-
ity when we begin with ourselves as the modern endpoint within 
our own time. But when examined in other times, the perspective 
changes. Following Wagner, we cannot deny epistemic- economic 
(including technological) progress, but if we use a metric of society, 
we raise questions about the direction of change. In 1992, Fran-
cisco Varela discerned a bias in cognitive science: the emphasis of 
abstract units of knowledge over units that are concrete, embod-
ied, and lived and that form the basis for those abstractions. He 
continued that one of those abstractions is development (or, in his-
tory, progress) but suggests the valuation of cognitive development 
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should be inverted: “It became apparent that the deeper and more 
fundamental kind of intelligence is that of a baby who can acquire 
language from dispersed daily utterances, or can constitute mean-
ingful objects from a previously unspecified world” (Varela 1992: 
98). If making sense of diffuse activity is the metric that demon-
strates creativity or complex thinking over acquisition of informa-
tion, then adults don’t fare as well.
This returns us to a fundamental issue for history and non-
modern places. If we extend Varela’s observation to the premodern 
periods or nonmodern societies and replace baby/adult with social 
units such as medieval/modern, Orient/Occident, or East/West, 
the inversion of placing the former after (i.e., superior to) the latter 
might strike readers as absurd. The reverse has been common— 
medieval culture and the Orient have frequently been described 
as childlike, the “not- yet.” But without the gesture of exclusion 
that uses the past to validate the modern through measurables like 
power, wealth, and the military, twentieth- century history looks 
different. It does not automatically elevate the “not- yet” but allows 
for other representations.
My point is not to criticize or debunk. Instead, I hope that when 
freed from the limitations of chronology and modern categories, 
history and historical understanding will broaden and become 
richer. One of my suggestions throughout this work is the pos-
sibility of isomorphisms between the pre- or nonmodern and the 
digital; in this case, it becomes possible that our modern system is 
the anomaly rather than the norm. Saussy (2016) has argued that 
oral literatures have their own rhythms and ways of communicat-
ing; they should not be considered as prior and less accurate forms 
than written modes, especially since they bear many similarities to 
recent forms of text messaging. Foley (2012) argues in his “Pathways 
Project” that there is much in common between oral forms of trans-
mission and the new electronic forms.20 The similarities between 
oral and electronic forms are the networks of transmission and 
interaction, the openness and the sharing/remixing of material, 
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the malleability of stories within rule- governed patterns, the con-
tingencies of outcome, and the distributed forms of authorship.
Finally, crumpled time also calls into question the categories 
and spatialized times through which we have ordered modern 
society. We must remember that in the Enlightenment, the rise of 
statistics, probability, and history changed subjects from individu-
als to aggregates of populations. This move toward aggregates was 
accompanied by the breakup of time into eras (spatialized time), the 
fragmentation of places into nation- states, and the rise or “discov-
ery” of the social. Classification facilitates knowing, predictability, 
order, and control; these are tools of maintenance and stability, not 
change. Serres points out the limitations of classification: “Once 
more, the same thing can be said again where science is concerned. 
The more classification there is, the less evolution there is, the more 
classes there are, the less history there is, the more coded sciences 
there are, the less invention and knowledge there are, the more 
administrating there is, the less movement there is” (1995: 94). My 
point is not to invert the order but to examine the nature of the 
processes by which stasis and mobility occur.
Edmund Russell (2011) shows how an understanding of hetero-
geneity within a category alters historical understanding. He argues 
that the industrial revolution became possible because of the rise of 
a long- fiber cotton in the New World. Cotton differed. By treating 
all cotton as the same, previous accounts emphasized the genius 
of man’s invention of machinery. Russell shows, however, that 
cotton threads from the Old World were shorter and not strong 
enough for mechanization. Instead, he draws on layered times and 
crumpled time to offer a different explanation for the industrial 
revolution: the many- thousand- year process of domestication of 
New World cotton (Gossypium hirsutum) by the Native Americans; 
the slave- trade route that brought New World cotton to Liverpool; 
and the technological development of machines— spinning jenny, 
water frame, and mule— around Lancashire. In other words, many 
processes were involved in the lead- up to the mechanization of 
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the cotton industry. For my argument, the two key issues were the 
multiple processes— indeed, the circularity of the technological 
development— and the importance of the specificity of cotton.
This brings us back to the difference between mechanical time 
and biological times. We have created a system of always work-
ing against organic processes— not unlike our tendency to ignore 
entropy (remember the warning of Sir Arthur Eddington?). The 
former moves toward homogeneity; the latter moves toward disor-
der. Classifications— spatialized time— serve as important heuris-
tic devices. Yet they are a part of a system that trumpets uniformity 
and sameness while “the common rhythms of life, produce not so 
much uniformity as variety” (Michael Young 1988: 39). Diversity is 
a key to change; homogeneity is biased toward continuity. In evo-
lution, morphogenesis often comes from variation in species that 
adapted in some way to changing or external conditions. Wagner 
argues that social progress (as “the increase in the human capacity 
to live life as one wants to live it”), when it has occurred, has been 
the result of struggle, especially from the margins (2016: 70). The 
computer scientist Gary Flake describes the importance of diversity 
in the following way: the fit agents “have little to gain and much 
to lose from large mutations.” In contrast, the unfit agents, those 
on the margins, “are better served by attempting large probes, for 
in times of trouble, big changes are needed. If the change makes 
things worse, well, things were bad already” (1998: 421). Scott Page 
(2008), a scientist of complex systems, has conducted research that 
shows that diverse groups of individuals are often able to problem 
solve better than a group of like- minded experts. Heterogeneity is 
more than a question of diverse groups of individuals; it is central 
in fostering change, or the more trendy word today, innovation.
Tattered Times
The last metaphor for time used by Serres that I will discuss 
is “tattered.” Tattered times focus on the specific historicity— the 
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concrete and lived activity— and situatedness within each unit as 
well as its varied goals and purpose. We must recognize that each 
unit has its own history and experience. Serres writes, “Basic time 
is a tatter, a patchwork or a mosaic, it is a distribution, through 
which, at times, redundancy passes. A multiplicity marks and 
shows some redundancy, it becomes spatial when this repetition 
increases” (1995: 116). With this metaphor, we invert the relation 
between part and whole. The diversity of many units and their 
combination into larger units (the mosaic) is emphasized, not the 
units as a part of the whole. This time offers us a conceptual frame-
work for finer- grain analyses that allow the heterogeneity of pasts 
so we can pay attention to the specificity of an activity and of the 
interaction between the different components prior to the cod-
ification of practices and places. In this activity and interaction, 
there are multiple times, various flows, and disturbances of tur-
bulence. The whole is affected by this complex confluence. Emer-
gence depends on the specific combination, inherited knowledge, 
and environment. As each participant adjusts, there is a change of 
quality. This process recurs. The iterative process that recognizes 
the change to actant and actor in every interaction approaches the 
nontrivial change that von Foerster differentiates. Interestingly, 
it places history as a part of the process as well as the post hoc 
recounting of actions. The potential for history is to become less 
a narrative of particular places and events than a recounting of 
ways that people move, how objects and things are formed from 
repetitive patterns, and the emergence of “permanences.”
Tim Ingold’s notion of a “taskscape,” the pattern of dwelling 
activities, provides an example of an internal time that emerges 
from activity (1993: 153).21 He describes it as “a total movement of 
becoming which builds itself into the forms we see, and in which 
each form takes shape in continuous relation to those around it” 
(164). Ingold then continues, encapsulating the significance of the 
taskscape: “The world itself takes on the character of an organism” 
(164). Ingold brings out the relevance of organic processes over 
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mechanical time. The difference can be illustrated through two 
rather similar descriptions that are based on very different under-
standings of time and motion or of duration and mobility. In his 
critique of history, Jacques Rancière describes its basic framework 
as development and progress that go “from the simplest activi-
ties to the most complex systems of activity” (1994: 80). Melanie 
Mitchell describes the goal of complex systems as “to explain how 
complex behavior can arise from large collections of simpler com-
ponents” (2009: x). The words are similar but the difference is in 
to and from. Simple to complex is linear: repetitive to progressive, 
backward to advanced, slowest to liveliest, and so on. This cor-
responds to time and motion. Complex from simple is based on 
the activity of basic units that coalesce into increasingly complex 
systems; this corresponds to duration and mobility.
Crucially, redundancy (repetition) is not the characteristic of an 
originary state but the action that leads to more and more complex 
systems. Repetition often gives rise to place. It slows down time; it 
is the spatialization of time. Change also emerges from repetition; 
repetitive acts do not repeat exactly. The changes might be small, 
but in each iteration, the environment, conditions, and under-
standings all differ. After several iterations, variation (change) 
becomes more noticeable. These times can be that of some organic 
system: a pathogen, flea, dog, plant, human, ecosystem, and so on. 
This is one place where the interaction of diverse agents— of the 
same or different times— brings about nontrivial change. Hannah 
Landecker (2016) shows the potential— indeed, the necessity— 
for analyses that recognize different times in her essay on drug 
resistance. As antibiotics, such as penicillin, seemed to work like 
“miracle” drugs, other processes were also continuing— pathogens 
were also changing. She calls the former a history of biology and 
the latter a biology of history. At the same time that labs were engi-
neering new bacterial genomes to cure diseases, there is another 
story of growing resistance where plasmids (carriers used to move 
DNA) move horizontally to more than the targeted bacteria, often 
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transferring resistance. It is an iterative, evolving, and coconsti-
tuting process. Bertalanffy writes, “The organism is not a static 
system closed to the outside and always containing the identical 
components; it is an open system in a (quasi- )steady state, main-
tained constant in its mass relations in a continuous change of 
component material and energies, in which material continually 
enters from, and leaves into, the outside environment” (1968: 121). 
If we focus on these times that are based on organisms (of which 
humans and society are a part), our notion of change becomes 
much more varied and richer. We must consider growth, decay, 
different rates, durative times, homeostasis, repetition, recursion, 
feedback, and so on.
One place of potential for historical understanding is to open 
the possibility of histories that move away from a structure that 
is biased toward the mechanical and measurable. Above all, this 
emphasis on the activity of organisms and communities of practice 
inverts the role of temporalities— such as repetition— in our under-
standing of humans and societies; a focus on activity and practice 
decenters units and categories as default subjects and opens inquiry 
to experience and life. This is the power of Varela’s statement; he 
questions whether the categories we have internalized are valid— 
the more one knows, the more advanced he or she is (maybe or 
maybe not true— this is especially relevant for academia, where the 
internet places information at the fingertips of many).
Scholars have long recognized repetition as a problematic con-
dition within modern society. In 1893, Emile Durkheim wrote, 
“Civilisation has imposed upon man monotonous and continu-
ous labor, which implies an absolute regularity in habits” (Michael 
Young 1988: 73). Anson Rabinbach (1990) has written a fine study 
that shows the rise of disease (neurasthenia) during the late nine-
teenth century related to increasing speed and repetitive motion. 
Robert Musil muses over the decline of human sensibility in the 
face of mechanistic processes of modern society. He writes, “What 
has arisen is a world of qualities without a man, of experiences 
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without someone to experience them. . . . Probably the dissolution 
of the anthropocentric way of relating . . . has finally made its way 
to the self. What one still calls personal destiny today is threatened 
by collective and ultimately statistically comprehensible processes” 
(quoted in Luft 1980: 217). Elizabeth Goodstein points out that 
boredom is a modern concept that is tied to progress and clock 
time (2005: 1– 7). This acceleration of repetition arose around the 
same time that Ranke turned to the archives to write (and trans-
form) history. As history was becoming institutionalized, common 
people were increasingly subject to mechanical and progressive 
time, but it was in the mechanical repetition of factory work and 
everyday life. Goodstein calls this boredom “experience without 
qualities,” and we can connect these accounts to recent comments 
on the increasing speed and banality of life. I am sympathetic to 
these critiques, yet they operate through mechanical, classical time. 
Repetition is treated as a malady— banality, boredom, or anomie. It 
is a living death. But too often, this has been an ideological pana-
cea that has locked people into the system they are trying to move 
beyond. Kant recognized this problem, but advocates deferred 
gratification: “To feel one’s life, to enjoy oneself, is nothing other 
than to feel oneself continually driven to go beyond the present 
state” (quoted in Goodstein 2005: 90– 91). The difficulty, if not the 
futility, of this remedy is increasingly apparent today.
But this focus on activity has the potential to bring back repeti-
tion as a form of stability, a desired human sensibility that modern 
history has deemphasized, even denigrated. Georg Simmel offers 
a provocative interpretation that suggests a more organic basis of 
time. It turns our focus toward the human first rather than the 
categories and institutions of modernity. He writes, “The deepest 
problems of modern life flow from the attempt of the individual 
to maintain the independence and individuality of his existence 
against the sovereign powers of society, against the weight of the 
historical heritage and the external culture and technique of 
life” (Simmel [1903] 2002: 11). Simmel is concerned with individuals, 
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but we can also think of other scales of social units— communities, 
objects, ideas, kingdoms, and nation- states. Similarly, the sciences 
of cybernetics and GST also moved beyond the mechanical causal-
ity of classical science and looked for behavior and process. Berta-
lanffy writes, “Experienced time is not Newtonian. . . . It depends 
on physiological conditions” (1968: 230).
Experience and relations exist independent of, in interaction 
with, and against pasts that are of the present— heritage, external 
culture, and techniques of life. We must pay attention to people 
who, although within the nation- state, do not always subscribe to 
its conditions. Serres, echoing Simmel, describes the absence of 
history from his childhood home: “I knew and still know places 
and people who exist without history.” They did not participate in 
it, did not seek to understand it, were uninterested, and when they 
encountered it (conscription), they hated it (Serres with Latour 
1995: 19). This distrust or disinterest in history is evident in Haroo-
tunian’s description of his parents’ forgetting of and disinterest in 
the Armenian Genocide in their new lives in the US (2017). For the 
decades following World War II, few Japanese Americans discussed 
the concentration camps.22 Indrani Chatterjee (2013) focuses 
on the “forgotten” peoples of Northeast India through the activi-
ties of monastic orders, the administrative, social, and economic 
center of the lives of inhabitants. This community, though, is grad-
ually written out of history— first by the British colonizers, who 
described the people as savage and the community as tribal, and 
second by postcolonial historians, who repeated the categories. 
Sanja Perovic (2017) has examined the Peterlee Project of Stuart 
Brisley, a public history project to establish a history of a new com-
munity created by displacing people from their mining past. The 
relevance here is the blockage by community members themselves 
against the critical (liberal) ideals of Brisley himself. Each operated 
in different times.
One can see in each of these cases how heterogeneous pasts 
exist in different times and how those activities might conjoin at 
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particular moments.23 Each operates according to its own time; 
the cases are trying to maintain their own dynamic equilibrium 
yet encounter turbulence when a linear history shows its agential 
desires and tries to colonize them (through help, advice, incorpo-
ration, or violence) if they allow it. That is their separation from 
history. These histories are heterogeneous and operate through 
their own internal time. They bring out a tension with the multiple 
times and temporalities and what Fraser identifies as the time- 
compact order, the homogenizing tendency of history.
BEGINNINGS, AGAIN
In arguing for the histories that reflect the multiple times in our 
worlds, I am not arguing for another or “new” narrative style 
that should replace our current system. To do so might lead to 
a subsumption that reduces heterogeneity into a new homog-
enizing structure. I am advocating for multiples where chrono-
logical time is decentered to but one of many times (currently 
the dominant one). Without the metric of chronology, we (his-
torians) have the opportunity to think anew about change and 
order— that is, to open up to Bergson’s “true reality” (quoted in 
the epigraph). I agree with Marc Bloch that “history is the science 
of people in time” (1953: 27) but modify it to the multiple times 
now common in the sciences. History then becomes a science24 in 
heterogeneous times— repetition, layered time scales, circular cau-
sality, and nonlinear processes— that are inherent to the activity of 
systems. These multiple times coexist; they might be independent, 
and at different points, they interact, coincide, conjoin, or collide. 
From this activity, interaction, repetition, or recurrence give rise to 
patterns and commonality— the spatialization of time. Change can 
be maintenance (homeostasis), decay, innovation, and/or growth. 
Events separated by chronological time might not be that different 
while rates of activity vary: viruses multiply very quickly, society 
moves rather slowly, geological masses move even more slowly, 
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and today, the environment seems to be moving faster than the 
latter two.
When we recognize these multiple times, historical change 
becomes much more than measurable movement in chronolog-
ical time. Change is in the activity, interaction, and outcome of 
one thing in connection with others, each with their own time and 
operating at different rates. The particular environment matters, 
and history is also actant, as a filter of what one sees, of how one 
understands, and of what one ignores. Perspective, heterogeneity, 
and multiplicity are assumed, and relationality and situatedness 
become fundamental conditions. This is certainly more complex 
than linear causal narratives, but it is increasingly apparent that 
our current system is out of sync. Almost fifty years ago, Ernst 
Bloch (1970) used the work based on the nineteenth- century math-
ematician Bernhard Riemann for a flexible time and space to con-
ceptualize our world in his A Philosophy of the Future. He wrote, 
“The firmer the refusal of a purely Western emphasis, and of one 
laid solely upon development to date (to say nothing of discredited 
imperialism), all the stronger is the help afforded by a utopian, 
open and in itself still experimental orientation. Only thus can 
hundreds of cultures flow into the unity of the human race; a unity 
that only then takes shape, in non- linear historical time, and with 
an historical direction that is not fixed and monodic” (140– 41). 
I believe multiple times is closer to Bergson’s “true reality.”
CODA
My working hypothesis is that all views of history have been funda-
mentally shaped by the way records are duplicated, knowledge trans-
mitted, and information stored and retrieved.
— Elizabeth Eisenstein (1966: 40)
Now is the time to imagine how we will reconstruct our memory sys-
tems to accommodate abundance.
— Abby Smith Rumsey (2016: 136)
This work began with what I thought would be a fun, short dig-
ital essay— I now know that there is no such thing as a short 
digital project. That original work is still unpublished, and I will 
turn back to it soon— hopefully it will be a digital example of a 
history without chronology. It has pushed me to first principles, 
an inquiry into chronological time in historical thinking, and else-
where explorations into new practices of scholarly communication. 
The most worrisome aspect has been the ways that digital media, 
especially the way that information is dynamic— how it is created, 
duplicated, stored, and disseminated— is transforming the condi-
tions on which we know and decide.1 This is Eisenstein’s important 
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hypothesis. Historians— indeed, all scholars whose work touches 
pasts— certainly need to attend to these processes that affect “all 
views of history.” Whether we agree or not, we should all pause 
when reading Mayer- Schönberger’s simple but disturbing state-
ment: “Digital remembering erodes time” (2009: 113). It certainly 
erodes chronological time. There are other times that, I believe, 
operate and can help us comprehend these changes.
When we understand that history and time have their own his-
tories, we also see that those histories are also situated in a complex 
ecology, with various actors seeking to adapt, forestall, combine, 
understand, or embrace the myriad events. This relation between 
information inflation and society has a long history. We can see 
this as the interplay between new artifices of recording (back to 
Socrates) to today’s anxiety about how recording technologies 
change cognition and sociality.2 The history we practice today is 
a part of earlier work to order and control a world of expanded 
information; it has been about taxonomies and hierarchies that 
unify diversity into a predictable system. In the process of creating 
that system, it inverted the way people know and understand their 
surroundings. In history, it has become about the past of collective 
units— places and people— using the filtered information— that is, 
the facts that support those narratives. Chronology has been a key 
metric in this structure of order and control.
From her perspective in the computer sciences, Melanie Mitch-
ell describes the limitations of our current knowledge system based 
on Newtonian time and space: “Many phenomena have stymied the 
reductionist program: the seemingly irreducible unpredictability 
of weather and climate; the intricacies and adaptive nature of liv-
ing organisms and the diseases that threaten them; the economic, 
political, and cultural behavior of societies; the growth and effects 
of modern technology and communications networks; and the 
nature of intelligence and the prospect for creating it in comput-
ers” (2009: x). This covers most of the sciences, social sciences, and 
humanities! We operate in a system that is increasingly unsuitable 
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as a framework for understanding our world; our knowledge sys-
tem is desynchronized from the structures it helps stabilize. On top 
of this, today digital media are destabilizing inherited institutions 
and concepts through the exponential growth of information.
This is a good moment (indeed, now more important than 
ever), as Abby Smith Rumsey suggests in the epigraph, to imagine 
our relation with pasts. It is an important moment, a famous intel-
lectual argues, to consider “the ways we operate for whom our past, 
history, or traditions are part of our makeup” (quoted in Kleinberg 
2017: 5). Few historians, I believe, would disagree with this state-
ment. For me, it suggests the need to invert, again, our under-
standing of where we begin from mobility as opposed to masses 
that move and see stability as an outcome, not some originary 
state.3 This shifts the basis of our knowledge from Newtonian time 
to times of organic processes. This then leads us to embrace the 
heterogeneity of the globe and also to emphasize relationality; it 
is grounded in the science of the twentieth century (and hopefully 
beyond), not that of the seventeenth century. The famous intellec-
tual quoted above is Jacques Derrida. He suggests this inversion, 
a different engagement with pasts. They are not the dead archives 
but a constantly changing arena that is also a part of the pres-
ent, varies as things come and go, and has multiple meanings and 
perspectives; history is more than a narrative of becoming some-
thing that was “real.” Tradition can be the inherited knowledge, 
understanding, and practices that also filter what people know and 
believe. For scholars who criticize Enlightenment- based knowl-
edge, the past has always been mutable. Today, pasts are dynamic. 
Regardless of whether pasts are dead, mutable, or dynamic, these 
changes indicate more attention is needed on the use, function, 
and content of those pasts. This certainly challenges if not changes 
“all views of history.”
I believe that the past (or, more accurately, pasts) is and remains 
crucial. If we weaken pasts (and histories), we risk moving toward 
Fraser’s fear, a time- compact order. We need to maintain pasts, but 
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pasts should not be juxtaposed to the new. Instead, they should be 
connected to various features of society. History is decreasingly 
able to maintain the aura of solidity that has characterized our 
liberal- capitalist societies as well as the international one since the 
nineteenth century. Above all, we need to be wary of the various 
categories that we thought were natural or common sense.4
To begin parsing these distinctions, we must embrace and also 
be cautious of digital technologies. Digital media can be disrup-
tive; digital technologies can reinforce the status quo. Today, they 
are doing both. As digital media are changing the basis of informa-
tion, digital technologies are also tools that facilitate the manage-
ment (or aura of containment) of the ever- increasing information. 
For example, using digital archives, database technology, word pro-
cessing, and social media offers the illusion of being at the forefront 
(of digital humanities, Big Data, etc.). Some tools are. But more 
commonly they offer the way to do more, be faster, and find bet-
ter information. This process of innovation reinforces the existing 
system. The idea of being “cutting edge” (temporally measured) or 
more advanced masks a repetition, a maintenance of a practice. For 
example, it supports the treadmill of academic production.5 I agree 
with critics who see most digital humanities projects as porting 
analog systems and concepts to digital technologies; it becomes a 
digital variation of a discipline (history) that seeks order and con-
trol of information.6 But this is a reason to seriously engage, not 
to avoid it. This is the excitement of our uncertain system; the 
opportunity, as Smith Rumsey asserts in the epigraph, to “imagine 
how we will reconstruct our memory systems.”
I hope that this argument to decenter chronology provides 
provocations to explore the rich diversity of pasts and presents 
that history has tended to subsume. The recognition that our cur-
rent understanding fixes relational understanding and then masks 
it through system and ideology of progressive motion is central 
to understanding history; it also guiles us to accept technologi-
cal advancements as an overall improvement while maintaining 
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the status quo. I find this recognition intellectually liberating; it 
has opened doors to similar concerns in different fields, to new 
questions, to formerly discarded pasts, and to other ways to make 
connections among pasts and of pasts with the present. It also 
provides linkages and openings— the situatedness of evidence, 
the variability of reading and learning, the multiplicity of times, the 
relationality of interactions, and a reconsideration of change— that 
connect to the disruptions of digital media. History can be more 
and more important than it currently allows itself to be.
We will not know where we will end up— whether we are facing 
a breakdown of our existing system, whether we are in transition, 
or whether we have already entered some new understanding— 
until it has passed. Though I did not set out in this direction, this 
book joins more and more research in a wide range of fields that 
is questioning whether our current knowledge system, post- 
Enlightenment, is an anomaly, not the norm or the most advanced. 
It is hard to resist the similarity with Certeau’s description of the 
world that the church had dominated. Certeau describes the effort 
of mystics: “They intended to reorganize places for people to com-
municate in the aftermath of the breakdown of a system that until 
then had implemented relation through a hierarchized and cosmo-
logical network combining ontological states (lineage, truth values) 
with stable alliances (social clienteles, or contracts between words 
and things)” (1992: 165). In our world today, chronological time cre-
ates the hierarchy, science is the cosmology, and liberal- capitalism 
inserts stable alliances into the ontological state. Opening up his-
tory as a place for discussing relations and meaning strikes me as 
a good endeavor.
THE PASTS THEY ARE A- CHANGIN’7
The word and concept of information is today ubiquitous. We 
hear much about the “information revolution,” whatever that is. 
It certainly appears as an inundation; information, databases, and 
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algorithms are more and more ubiquitous. Big Data, the emerging 
field to manage this inflation, is hot (or the latest panacea). Yet 
there are similarities between this current moment of informa-
tion inflation and the previous one, from which modern history 
emerged. Historians have long dealt with information as facts 
and documents; algorithms too are meant to order, manage, and 
control more and more data. Both make claims to objectivity or 
neutrality, but an important variation is that even though, as I 
have argued, situatedness makes documents and the “facts” less 
stable; electronic media makes even the facade of that stability 
less tenable. Data and information today are dynamic. Documents 
are produced, transmitted, reproduced, stored, and read electron-
ically. Furthermore, at each step, there are electronic mediations 
that are also dynamic. There is no materiality to fall back on to 
claim originality, authenticity, reality, and so on (Ernst 2002: 115). 
More than ever, this calls for a need to examine the situatedness 
that gives rise to facts or data as well as their varied meanings that 
depend on perspective.
In our digital age, the idea of the historian as an expert who can 
recount facts of a particular time and space is a futile endeavor in the 
face of the internet, with its growing and near instantaneous abil-
ity for recall. Yet the role of historians— of historical knowledge, I 
believe— becomes more important. The folklorist John Miles Foley 
exhorts, “Put aside the expectations that arise from the ideology 
of texts— that knowledge, art, and ideas can be converted to finite, 
fixed things— and embrace the truth that you are negotiating and 
co- creating through exploring pathways” (2012: 74). What Foley 
calls the pathways— the meanings, semiotics, interpretations, and 
perspectives that are usually ignored in the cybernetic sciences 
(what has been attributed to Claude Shannon’s category of “noise” 
in his classic essay [Shannon and Weaver 1949])— speaks to a meth-
odological strength of historians and humanists to understand the 
surroundings, embeddedness, situatedness, and environment. It 
is important to remember Droysen’s statement, “Facts are stupid 
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without interpretation,” which would make a terrific meme if facts 
were changed to “Data are stupid without interpretation.” Like the 
mystics described by Certeau, historians, by moving beyond 
the context to situatedness, can be well equipped to “reorganize 
places for people to communicate.”
A shift from chronological time to multiple times began this 
inquiry. History is not just description of the past. History and 
pasts are also actants, filters that people use to understand situ-
ations; they become a constituent condition of any interaction. 
Events are interpreted (and altered) several times— by the witness 
(or witnesses), by the historian, and by the reader/audience. Per-
spective necessarily shifts from the monocular to the multiple. 
Interestingly, this recalls the controversial essays by Jordan (2018) 
and Marcus (2018) that point to the limitations of decontextual-
ized data in the deep learning subfield of artificial intelligence. 
Repetition seems to also be a part of our current knowledge sys-
tem. There seems to be a parallel to the creation of Ranke’s paper 
archive in the 1830s to the digital archive today. Information is 
shorn of the milieu that gave the data meaning, even existence, 
in the first place. This abstraction of data recalls the bracketing of 
issues of meaning and human variability at the Macy Conferences.8
This is not a “mere” appeal for the humanities; it is hard to 
imagine a society that remembers everything and cannot interpret 
(or forget) its data. I must modify my statement that the past is 
important: it is important, but not all pasts need be remembered. 
Alexander Luria (1987) documented such a person in his classic 
book The Mind of a Mnemonist. S. remembered everything. Long-
term planning was impossible; he was always in the present (the 
past is still remembered and active). Yet we have become a soci-
ety that seemingly records everything (Mayer- Schönberger 2009). 
I see the concerns about presentism or extended present as consis-
tent with our twentieth- century understanding of time. Hartmut 
Rosa (2003) suggests that this presentism is a logical outcome of 
our system of constant forward movement— he calls it acceleration.
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In his introduction to the transcripts of the Macy Conferences, 
Claus Pias suggests that while cybernetics has brought a multilinear 
understanding of times, especially through feedback and homeosta-
sis, it has also perhaps helped shorten our horizon into the future. 
He writes, “It suddenly seemed conceivable . .  . to program ‘con-
scious human targets’ that, so long as the appropriately oriented 
mechanisms of communication and control are in place, would 
always already have been met. The tense of cybernetics would thus 
be something like the future perfect: Everything will have been” 
(2016: 20– 21). Pias describes how research in datacentric fields (like 
Big Data) is concerned about predicting behavior. Fields such as 
artificial intelligence, computer science, and robotics depend on 
models (from some past behavior), which machines use to predict 
what will happen— for example, weapons targeting, self- driving 
cars, and social media. (The field of targeted advertising adds new 
meaning to “conscious human targets.”) Extrapolation, prediction, 
or anticipation of some pattern or model suffices for the future. It 
is, again, a legacy of linear time. Peter Bexte writes, “Modern soci-
eties depend on the future like drug addicts on their dealer” (2011: 
222). Today, it is data; before, it was facts. In both cases, there is 
an obsession with recording. I see a parallel with Benjamin’s state-
ment that “as they really were” is the narcotic of the twentieth 
century. These words turn to both ends of the gesture of exclu-
sion; a certain past stabilizes what is to come. A good example is 
the reports from several years ago about search algorithms that 
were drawing from and reinforcing gender and racial stereotypes 
of the (one had hoped early) twentieth century (Jobin 2013; Chem-
aly 2015). We must recognize that history and its various methods 
have served as a filtering system.
My point in raising this is not to dispute the truth or falsity 
of these searches. Instead, they suggest the need to parse out the 
ideology of change, the multiple times that coexist, and the oper-
ations within which events occur. At minimum, this calls for an 
understanding of time that is beyond the simplistic (and mythical) 
155C o d A
notion of time as past, present, future. This linearity ignores the mul-
tiple ways that these temporalities are used to support a mechanical 
process; it obscures a bifurcation where (as in other structures of 
modern society) technology, the new, has a hand in maintaining 
the past. Technological innovation facilitates the future perfect 
“everything will have been” (Pias 2016: 21). More broadly, this 
repetitive system that serves a belief in technological progress 
is also the communicative world of social media— the perpetual 
present that is maintained with feedback loops (e.g., likes on social 
media). This relationship between prediction, anticipation, and 
repetition is not new. It has existed within history but has been 
masked as progress. Nowotny calls this the extended present. At 
minimum, we must also consider the contents embedded in these 
categories. It is necessary to question this notion of the future; 
anticipation, the future, and goals are not the same.
Historians can be among the most equipped scholars to under-
stand this relationship of times and the different ways that they 
are used despite ideologies of innovation. It is, to repeat Derrida, 
to focus on “the ways we operate for whom our past, history, or 
traditions are part of our makeup” (quoted in Kleinberg 2017: 5). 
Each— the past, history, and traditions— is much broader and plays 
a more active role than our current history allows.
Finally, this inquiry suggests the importance of turning to recent 
science as well as pre- Enlightenment (and nonmodern) practices. 
The cybernetic turn to existing models and patterns to anticipate 
adjustments can be a beginning for how we think about history 
without chronology. Time frames must be much more extensive 
and variable. The past can contain realms that make histories 
more important by freeing them from the confines of chronolog-
ical time. This past is not a dead, distant past but has ideas and 
practices that still have relevance today and tomorrow. On the 
other hand, scholars in widely divergent fields are interestingly 
turning to earlier forms of understanding, operating, and inter-
acting for ways that people operated (and might operate) without 
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the teleologies of development or the homogenizing structures. 
Theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli suggests that a world with-
out chronological time will look “in the simplest way, the same 
way we had thought about the world until Newton” (2018: 117). 
Historian Helge Jordheim (forthcoming) argues for eighteenth- 
century chronologies as the basis for a new history, but they are the 
chronologies of universal history, before the unification of time 
and the formulation of a world history. Andrew Shyrock and Dan-
iel Lord Smail (2011) argue for a “deep time.” The folklorist Foley 
(2012) argues that the oral mode of communication is more similar 
to the digital modes and the text- based mode is the outlier. In the 
field of media archaeology, many scholars, such as Siegfried Ziel-
inski, are looking to the distant past to “find something new in the 
old” (2006: 3). Shorn of chronological ordering that marks events 
and periods as old or outmoded, these scholars are finding modes 
of understanding and interacting that might offer suggestions for 
our future. But this is not a romantic escape to a “better” time. It 
is searching for hints for how people and things interoperate (and 
how we might re- present these complex interactions). These are 
worlds where observers are also actants, multiple perspectives 
are recognized, and knowledge of the past— inherited understand-
ings and practices— affect how people adapt. This is one of the 
goals of Certeau’s work on mystics— history should again empha-
size how people communicate.
HUMILITY
A good place to start for histories that embrace the times of the 
twentieth century is with humility; we must recognize the impos-
sibility of the past century’s effort to regularize and order the 
world into some universal system that maps, orders, and knows 
the world. That was the goal of the Enlightenment; it has been a 
system that dealt with the information inflation that began with 
the printing press. Newton’s science provided the structure. We 
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know it is flawed; following it brings the uncertainty suggested 
above by Mitchell. Perhaps a plea for humility is a bit incongru-
ous for a study that proposes that history think differently about 
time, a system historians have used for two hundred years. I am not 
the first. Gabrielle Spiegel writes, “With all due humility, I would 
like to register my plea that we read medieval historical texts as 
cultural phenomena, by returning them to the social context in 
which they originated and from which they drew both form and 
meaning” (1997: 110). I would modify this by removing one word, 
medieval. This is an inversion where the excluded— past, foreign, 
Orient, and marginalized— no longer constitute but inform the 
modern. Without the metric of chronology, we can see similarities 
to earlier periods. We can learn from Nicholas de Cusa in his work 
Of Learned Ignorance ([1954] 1967). For de Cusa, human apprehen-
sion can never attain that of the divine, the Maximum. To this, we 
might add the belief in complete knowledge by filling in all the 
gaps or that we have reached the end of history. A goal of clarity 
and understanding is certainly desirable, but we must recognize 
that the impossibility of knowing is in the diversity of the world as 
well as the limitations of humans. For hints, we can turn to some 
of the sciences; Bertalanffy argued that organisms are dynamic: 
they are actants, not just objects, in continuous change, always 
interacting with material and energy even in a (quasi- ) steady 
state. Representation and understanding shift with the relation 
of observer and observed. Sheila Jasanoff argues for “disciplined 
methods to accommodate the partiality of scientific knowledge 
and to act under irredeemable uncertainty” (2007: 33). We can 
replace the word scientific with the word historical. Jasanoff calls 
for “technologies of humility.” When she describes these technol-
ogies, she is describing what I see as the strength, or what should 
be the strength, of history: those tools “compel us to reflect on the 
sources of ambiguity, indeterminacy and complexity” (2007: 33). 
This is what many historians have tried to do— to encompass such 
variability. Yet the structure and methods, I believe, have steered us 
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in a different direction.9 My emphasis on heterogeneity and revis-
iting change is my attempt at more than reflection, but I propose 
to think anew about our pasts. For those uncomfortable with this 
variability, it is time to understand that the quest for a singular 
truth is a myth of the Enlightenment. We must recall Bertalanffy 
(1968), who writes that objectivity is not the counter to relativity; 
relativity is the norm.
The immediate outcome is unclear; risk is involved. But I find 
that option better than following a system that has proven to be 
mythical and has been suitable for mechanistic rather than human 
organization.
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 1. Chronology, as I use it, refers to the passage along a linear and regular time-
line based on the idea of absolute time. It is the time reckoning system that 
we use throughout much of the globe today. For a critique and modification, 
see Jordheim (forthcoming) for his equally provocatively titled essay, “Return 
to Chronology.”
 2. Schrödinger offers a brief and thoughtful description of the limitation of 
using physical laws to describe biological processes ([1944] 1967: 76– 85).
 3. Long ago, Hayden White pointed to the rich work of historians throughout 
the nineteenth century, which in the end remained within a discursive whole. 
He writes that the various tropes “have permitted me to view the various 
debates over how history ought to be written, which occurred throughout 
the nineteenth century, as essentially matters of stylistic variation within a 
single universe of discourse” (1973: 427).
 4. I have relied on the Lukács translation. The account in the Collected Works 
translates this phrase as “time’s carcase” (Marx 1976: 127). The use of carcase 
is common and goes back at least to H. Quelch’s translation (Marx 1900: 
25) where he uses “carcase of time.” I read incarnation (or embodiment) to 
be closer to the German: “Die Zeit is alles, der Mensch is nichts mehr, er is 
höchstens noch die Verkörperung der Zeit” (Marx 1974: 85).
 5. Digital humanities has been especially strong in building tools and approaches 
that facilitate and enhance analog modes of analysis. For a fine critique that 
suggests (like this book) that digital humanists must go further into concep-
tual and other realms, see Kleinberg (2017), especially chapter 4.
178 n ot e s
 6. The implementation of this transition provides an example of my discus-
sion on change in chapter 4. Change is not linear or a replacement but 
involves legacy structures, entrenched cultural practices, multiple rhythms, 
and attempted disruption. For a description of a similar but bolder case, see 
Shoemaker 2015.
 7. I realize that the word information has more ambiguity than fact or data. I 
use it though for that reason. It has portability, an aura of autonomy, and 
(almost contradictorily) the suggestion of social situatedness. Above all, it is 
important to recognize these variations as we use it. Geoffrey Nunberg (1996) 
has a fine analysis of the word.
 8. The compression of time- space has been occurring since the mid- nineteenth 
century, beginning with the railroad (Schivelbusch 1986) and the telegraph 
(Standage 1999; Kittler 1990).
 9. In his essay “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” first published in 
The Bell System Technical Journal in 1948, Shannon wrote, “The fundamen-
tal problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point either 
exactly or approximately a message selected at another point. Frequently the 
messages have meaning.  .  .  . These semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem” (Shannon and Weaver 1949: 3). This 
technical essay was republished with Weaver’s explanation in the book The 
Mathematical Theory of Communication. Weaver brings the level down a notch 
from that of the mathematician to describe the relation between this tech-
nical problem in relation to semantics and effectiveness (95– 117). Wolfgang 
Ernst described a similar process of separation in his work on the archive 
where artifacts were “desemioticized” and then subjected to a “process of 
resemiosis” to support the narrative of the nation (2002: 108).
 10. I recognize that throughout the twentieth century, there were many quite 
important efforts to bridge these knowledge systems. Overall, though, they 
have been marginalized if not forgotten.
 11. I first became aware of Kuhn’s statement in Fasolt’s important and provoca-
tive book (2004).
 12. Paul Roth frames Kuhn’s statement, pointing out that while Kuhn describes 
history as an explanatory enterprise, its narrative form or structure is hidden 
(2013: 550).
 13. For a fine critique that recognizes both Benjamin’s quest for an alternative 
to this time and Ben Anderson’s misreading of this phrase as “being,” not 
“critique,” see Davis (2010: 60– 63). Lorenz (2017: 118– 19) argues that “empty” 
time did not exist during the European Middle Ages.
 14. For a fine essay on historia magistra vitae, see Koselleck (1985: 21– 38).
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 15. Historians have been questioning progress and considering multiple forms 
of change for decades. See, for example, Cole and Smith 2010; Shapin 1996; 
and Wagner 2016.
 16. For example, writings that conceive of the past as a foreign country would 
not be conceivable prior to this application of absolute time. See, for example, 
Lowenthal (1985).
 17. In his appeal to reappraise mystics, Certeau writes, “A set of new social and 
theoretical interests transforms the way mystics appears in the field of our 
interrogation. To specify that relation is to exhume the present postulates 
of our analyses and explore the issue of what work that past experience per-
forms in our epistemological sites. It is to ‘historicize’ our research in placing 
it back into a contemporary configuration on which it is dependent, and to 
‘dehistoricize’ mystics in showing that one cannot reduce it to a past positiv-
ity. In exploring what our sciences do with mystics, we also recognize what it 
writes into them” (2015: 9).
 18. For a wonderful history that helped me think about this issue, see Edgerton 
(2007), where he discusses technological development through utility (e.g., 
donkeys and horses in World War I and corrugated metal throughout the 
twentieth century).
 19. At the outset of The Writing of History, Certeau quotes Alphonse Dupront: 
“‘The sole historical quest for “meaning” remains indeed a quest for the 
Other,’ but, however contradictory it may be, this project aims at ‘under-
standing’ and, through ‘meaning,’ at hiding the alterity of this foreigner; or, in 
what amounts to the same thing, it aims at calming the dead who still haunt 
the present, and at offering them scriptural tombs” (1988: 2). For a statement 
on the relation of chronological time to classification, see his epigraph in 
chapter 2.
 20. His actual words are the following: “It is only in appearance that the ‘facts’ in 
such a case speak for themselves, alone, exclusively, ‘objectively.’ Without the 
narrator to make them speak, they would be dumb” (Droysen 1967: 52– 53).
CHAPTER ONE: TIME HAS A HISTORY
 1. For a wonderful critique of linear historical thinking, see Ermarth (2011).
 2. The writings are now vast. There are many important works today; I will not 
recount them here. Some of the most important influences on my thinking 
are Adam, Nowotny, Fraser, Wilcox, Certeau, Koselleck, Luckmann, Hartog, 
Runia, and Spiegel.
 3. I am indebted to Geof Bowker for bringing this essay to my attention.
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 4. I have relied on the work of Mali and Blumenberg for my understanding of 
myth. Mali calls myth the “practical verities in which the members of the 
community all believe and live” (2003: 4).
 5. There are many good works on this history. Beyond what I have already men-
tioned, David Landes’s Revolution in Time is a classic, especially in connection 
to clocks. The books of Barbara Adam have helped broaden and steady my 
understanding. Toulmin and Goodfield’s The Discovery of Time for quite a 
while seemed to be a standard, and I still return to Donald Wilcox’s The Mea-
sure of Times Past.
 6. This would be a long list. A good start for history is the reference- like work of 
Richards, and I have frequently returned to Wilcox. In anthropology, Munn 
has a fine overview, and Birth has a more recent account. Fabian remains 
one of the best conceptual critiques, and Povinelli has brought a much more 
layered and conceptual understanding of multiple times and otherness.
 7. In his work on Bali, Clifford Geertz succinctly described the significance of 
the calendar: “They don’t tell you what time it is; they tell you what kind 
of time it is” (1973: 393).
 8. According to F. C. Haber, the purpose of early clocks was less to tell the 
time than to represent the motions of the heavens; it was a machine harmo-
nized with religion (1975: 399). Price argues that the early mechanical clocks 
should be seen within a lineage of astronomical devices that go back to the 
Antikythera mechanism, not the sundial and clepsydra (1959).
 9. Throughout this book, I will use the abbreviations for “before Christ” and 
“anno Domini.” Using these names, in my mind, is more accurate to the his-
tory of time; our linear time was connected to the church, and declaring it as 
common only seeks to naturalize the particularity of this reckoning of time, 
hiding its historicity.
 10. Dionysus was four years off. Most scholars now date the birth of Christ in 
4 BC.
 11. For a more detailed account, see Wilcox (1987: 187– 220).
 12. Previous to the Meiji ishin one reign often had several nengo. Following the 
ishin, the reign and nengo became the same, an “invented tradition.”
 13. I will discuss below the way that such conclusions— as an earlier moment of 
the modern— themselves are conditioned by modern chronology.
 14. Barbara Adam (2004: 76) writes, “While there is no doubt that the temporal 
relations of archaic societies are different from those of ‘modern’ societies, we 
will see that they are no less complex, sophisticated or temporally extended.” 
In the next chapter, I will discuss how this separation of old from modern is 
essential to the maintenance of the modern.
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 15. Michael Young writes, “Habit is not only the most precious conservative agent 
of society, it is also its opposite, its most precious radical agent, enabling us 
to pay attention to new departures” (1988: 124).
 16. This statement is taken from Newton’s definition of time in the Scholium of 
The Principia ([1687] 1995: 13).
 17. We have come a long way: A fourteenth- century church document responds 
to the validity of what we now call interest: “In doing so he would be selling 
time and would be committing usury by selling what does not belong to him” 
(Le Goff 1980: 29). Le Goff is clear that we must be careful to see this not as 
proof of a secular/religious divide but as a transition to multiple understand-
ings of time and changing society.
 18. For example, Nicholas Malebranche used another new technology, mathe-
matics, to measure relations between units (Schiffman 2011: 228– 33).
 19. I will discuss this notion of duration below. Newton’s duration is an activity 
between two points; this is a measurement that spatializes time. See also 
Adam (1990: 54– 55).
 20. This emphasis on the clock keeps our understanding of time within Newto-
nian physics. When we bring in other times— for example, that of energy use 
and of biological organisms— it becomes possible to move beyond physical 
time. This will be discussed later in this chapter and in chapter 4.
 21. For an interesting criticism of how clock time imbricates intellectual life, 
see Levy (2007). The Slow Movement is an interesting effort that emerged in 
the 1980s to counter the ways that this accelerating time dominates the way 
we live. It started as a protest against the building of a McDonald’s fast- food 
restaurant near the Piazza di Spagna in Rome. A bowl of penne became the 
symbol of this movement.
 22. See, for example, Glennie and Thrift (2009); Nead (2000).
 23. The various ages of man describe the growth of man in relation to stages 
connected to world view. These stages recognize the life course but are not 
developmental.
 24. Locke did not believe all men were capable, only gentlemen. Moreover, 
women had different roles (and abilities) in his scheme.
 25. Darwin’s (1877) observations of his son are a fascinating read. For us, his 
descriptions are obvious, even naive, but his essay was important in fostering 
an understanding of child development in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.
 26. The use of mathematics in this discovery of the past and future were the 
components of what Alfred North Whitehead called the historical revolt, 
the use of history to revolt against the authority of the divine. He wrote 
182 n ot e s
that the historical revolt “is the divination of some characteristics of 
a particular future from the known characteristics of a particular past” 
(1925: 44).
 27. Bowker points out that Lyell’s geology was not structured linearly but 
was built on cyclical action (Bowker 2005: 53– 62). See also Winchester 
(2001).
 28. For recent work that discusses the synchronization of non- Western places to 
this world time, see Barak (2013), Ogle (2015), Tanaka (2004) and Wishnitzer 
(2015).
 29. Serres writes, “When a system expands, in dimension, number, and complex-
ity, it always has a tendency to form into subsets” (1995: 84).
 30. A terrific example of Lefebvre’s moments is in Meiji Japan and the Japanese 
historiography that celebrates the desire for and success of Japan’s transition 
into a modern state, illustrated with the slogan “Fukoku, kyōhei” (Rich coun-
try, strong military).
 31. Even though space has gained an elevated status in academia as a discrete 
mode of analysis, my reading of geographers such as Entriken, Harvey, 
Lefebvre, and Sack brought me to understand that space in modern society 
is the stoppage or slowing of time (see, for example, Lefebvre 1991: 84– 85, 
94– 96). In his introduction to Rhythmanalysis, Stuart Elden argues that the 
reading of Lefebvre as spatial overlooks the historical and temporal dimen-
sions of his writings (Lefebvre 2004: ix.)
 32. Many scholars— for example, Certeau, Chakrabarty, Fabian, Harootunian, 
Marx, and Sharma— have pointed out that the primitive is the other that 
reinforces the view that the modern is always advanced.
 33. Whitehead states, “Classification is the halfway house between the imme-
diate concreteness of the individual thing and the complete abstraction of 
mathematical notions” (1925: 28).
 34. Bergson writes, “In order that the number should go on increasing in pro-
portion as we advance, we must retain the successive images and set them 
alongside each of the new units which we picture to ourselves: now, it is in 
space that such a juxtaposition takes place and not in pure duration. In fact, it 
will be easily granted that counting material objects means thinking all these 
objects together, thereby leaving them in space” ([1913] 2001: 77).
 35. Georg Lukács writes that time “freezes into an exactly delimited, quantifi-
able continuum filled with quantifiable things . . . in short, it becomes space” 
(quoted in Gross 1982: 64). I will be discussing a different notion of duration 
in chapter 3.
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 36. One can, of course, dispute Whitehead’s argument, yet to do so goes against 
recent (twentieth- century) science— in particular, relativity and quantum 
mechanics and some social sciences, especially those of cognition.
 37. Later, he writes, “We shall see that time, conceived under the form of an 
unbounded and homogeneous medium, is nothing but the ghost of space 
haunting the reflective consciousness” (Bergson [1913] 2001: 99). This is akin 
to Certeau’s discussion of tombs.
 38. The transcription of the second five meetings of the Macy Conferences is 
a wonderful read on the effort of scientists to integrate cognition into a 
mechanical (physics) understanding of the brain (Pias 2016).
 39. One of the problems of this formulation is that periods and nation- states 
become the naturalized containers, the “mass” that then must be filled in by 
history. The “becoming” is only a becoming of something that has a natural-
ized status.
 40. Siskin uses a form of text mining where he looks at the title pages of Eigh-
teenth Century Collections Online to discern the propensity of words appearing 
in the same title as the word system. He finds that between 1700 and 1739, 
history and system are distant, with ancient and modern more likely to appear 
with system. Between 1740 and 1779, he finds greater likelihood, but in the 
final two decades of the century (1779– 1800), system, history, ancient, and 
modern are adjacent to each other (2016: 49– 52).
 41. If we measure the founding of a discipline through the formation of its national 
society, we see that the disciplines emerge as absolute time is superseded. The 
Modern Language Association was founded in 1883, the American Historical 
Association in 1884, the American Anthropological Association in 1902, 
the American Political Science Association in 1903, and the American Socio-
logical Association in 1905.
 42. For a description of proper time, see J. T. Fraser’s forward to Nowotny’s Time, 
whose German title is Eigenzeit.
 43. Until recently, one of the few social scientists to apply entropy is Georgescu- 
Roegen (1986), an economist. I am indebted to Keith Pezzoli for bringing this 
intellectual to my attention. The work of Jennifer Gabrys (2011) invokes a 
Benjaminian- style natural history (as opposed to Darwin and evolution) that 
examines waste and decay. The media archaeologist Wolfgang Ernst (2002) 
uses entropy to build his interpretation of the archives, especially in relation 
to digital media.
 44. Three papers stimulated the conference. They were McCulloch and Pitts 
(1943); Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow (1943); and Shannon and Weaver 
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(1949). There are several fine accounts of these conferences (Heims 1980, 
1991; Dupuy 2000; and Hayles 1999).
 45. The title was changed following the sixth conference in 1949. Cybernetics 
is the title of one of Norbert Wiener’s books; etymologically it is from the 
Greek, translated as “steersman.”
 46. In many ways, it was the foundational moment for today’s emphasis on 
the STEM fields.
 47. For a map showing genealogies of complex systems, see Brian Castellani 
(2013). I began this inquiry into complex systems through researchers con-
nected to the Santa Fe Institute. I decided to focus on cybernetics and gen-
eral system theory to draw attention to the potential for not just complex 
relations— usually applied to the social sciences as networks— but also how 
they bring a different epistemology and multiple times into our conceptual 
structure and understandings of society. For a recent effort to bring these 
ideas to the humanities and human sciences, see Clarke and Hansen (2009).
CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY HAS A HISTORY
 1. Big History extends the past to the Big Bang. The Anthropocene is a proposed 
epoch that incorporates human impact on earth systems.
 2. I hope that the Anthropocene will not be subsumed and can remain a separate 
but converging layer, but Chakrabarty’s recent discussion on Anthropocene 
time shows the difficulty of moving beyond what he calls world history (2018).
 3. I could actually begin my narrative with Herodotus. In contrast to the nar-
ratives that locate Herodotus as the father of history as a descriptive media, 
recent research has emphasized the multivocality, multiplicity, and relationality 
in his work, as well as his emphasis on communication. Egbert J. Bakker writes, 
“‘History’ for him is not an object of study, something you write, or write about; 
it is an intellectual tool and a communication activity” (2002: 3).
 4. The Kojiki is the earliest extant text (completed in 712) of the mythical and 
historical rule of emperors and empresses in what we now call Japan. Rather 
than a “history,” it is closer to a genealogy described below.
 5. Collingwood (1994: 257– 61) derisively calls such histories “scissors- and- paste” 
history.
 6. For a recent argument on the value of such a singular time, see Le Goff (2015: 9). 
Importantly, Le Goff understands many of the problems wrought by a unified 
time but argues that the benefits are greater.
 7. Having just read recent predictions on sea- level rise, Newton might be more 
accurate than I care to believe.
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 8. The analogy of physical mass and units of people becomes possible with the 
rise of aggregation described in the previous chapter.
 9. For example, Montesquieu stated, “For the occasions which produce great 
changes are different, but, since men had the same passions at all times, the 
causes are always the same” (quoted in Schiffman 2011: 258). According to 
Schiffman, his past was essential for “the importance of context for under-
standing all things human” (263).
 10. I will return to this in chapter 4. In her thoughtful extended essay The Cun-
ning of Uncertainty (2016), Helga Nowotny’s call for a global contextualism 
echoes some of the characteristics of Herder’s cosmopolitanism. This is an 
example of thinking about modernity as the anomaly, where the thinking 
prior to modernity has similarity to the situated and heterogeneous think-
ing of today. To paraphrase Zielinski’s words, this is where we might find 
the new in the old (2006).
 11. As Toulmin and Goodfield point out, this grounding of heterogeneity and his-
torical change in race is, of course, wrought with potential for racist theories. 
German national socialists emphasized the racial dimension to justify their 
ideas, but Toulmin and Goodfield show that his writing is cosmopolitanism 
(Toulmin and Goodfield 1965: 139). It is fascinating that though Herder cre-
ated greater space for heterogeneity, his world system was still ordered with 
Asia at the earlier level, Greece and Rome next, and then with Germany. For 
a recent reappraisal of Herder, see Zammito, Menges, and Menze (2010).
 12. Peter Osborne (1992) argues that modernity is a qualitative, not chronological 
category.
 13. I interpret these statements as truisms that have little use except to obfuscate 
notions of repetition and change. Change will be discussed in chapter 4.
 14. In the social sciences, it is known as development; in biology, it is evolution. 
In technology, it was progress and is now innovation. Here, this mechanical, 
linear time becomes natural, an externality that exists.
 15. For an example of a work that critiques the structure yet ultimately reinforces 
it, see my Japan’s Orient (Tanaka 1993).
 16. Echoing Hegel’s world history, Ranke exclaims in the essay “On the Character 
of Historical Science” that “India had philosophy; she did not have history,” 
as if that were factual (Ranke 1973: 34).
 17. Kathleen Davis (2010: 52) points to the similarity of the way that history posi-
tions the Middle Ages and Europe’s non- Western others. Both are prior and 
different.
 18. Serres writes, “History is thus the projection of this very real exclusion into 
an imaginary, even imperialistic time. The temporal rupture is the equivalent 
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of a dogmatic expulsion” (Serres with Latour 1995: 50). For Marx and formal 
subsumption, see Tomba (2013) and Harootunian (2015).
 19. Povinelli’s discussion is on recognition and experience rather than linear his-
tory. It is a rich discussion, especially in thinking beyond either the dominant 
or the victim, where recognition invokes experience as well as conditions of 
espionage and camouflage (2002: 76– 79).
 20. Certeau writes, “The ‘same’ is a historical form, a practice of dichotomy, and 
not a homogeneous content” (1992: 18).
 21. For example, Fukuzawa Yukichi, the intellectual celebrated for his enlight-
ened (i.e., Western- oriented) views, lamented the previous state of society 
in his famous An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, “Therefore, throughout 
the whole twenty- five centuries or so of Japanese history, the government 
has been continually doing the same thing; it is like reading the same book 
over and over again, or presenting the same play time after time” ([1874] 
1973: 142). Japan, with more than a millennium of recorded pasts, had 
no history.
 22. In a very different field, the media theorist Marsha Kinder remarked that she 
was reluctant to date her ethnographic notes because of the way that dating 
signifies “objective detachment” (1991: 24– 25).
 23. For a concise critique of this emphasis on facts as objective, see White (1978).
 24. She writes, “The aim was to ‘cleanse’ the facts to be able to put them on a 
solid foundation of proof that is stripped of their original context and thus 
generally valid” (2008: 16).
 25. In Japan, the discipline of national literature emerged simultaneously with 
the historical discipline. For a description of a similar process transforming 
medieval texts, see Wilcox (1987: 137– 42).
 26. See, for example, his “Preface Universal History” (Ranke 1973: 160– 64). 
For Ranke, the way to this universal history was through the specificity of 
national histories. Ranke died before he completed this manuscript.
 27. When the British Association for the Advancement of Science was founded in 
1831, statistics was not accepted, primarily claiming that it lacked theoretical 
basis and was influenced by values of its practitioners (Poovey 1994: 401)
 28. For a fine discussion of the way that archives support the rule of the liberal 
state, see Joyce (1999).
 29. Work that pays attention to recent findings in cognitive fields is a growing 
and important area. For a good beginning, see Wolf (2008) for work on read-
ing, Vygotsky (1978) for interaction and learning, and Hutchins (1995) for 
distributed cognition. For examples of works that explore the ways that these 
fields alter the humanities (and vice versa), see Stafford (2007) for cognition 
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and visuality, Connolly (2002) for connection to politics, and Smail (2008) for 
rethinking subjects of history.
INTERLUDE
 1. It is interesting to consider the similarity between history and its purpose 
and Norbert Wiener’s definition of cybernetics as “the study of messages as a 
means of controlling machines and society” (1950: 15).
 2. An important exception to this conclusion is Caroline Arni, who on several 
occasions attempted to raise questions about history itself, categories of anal-
ysis, and the politics of time.
 3. I am indebted to Sally Deutsch for bringing this work to my attention.
CHAPTER THREE: HETEROGENEOUS PASTS
 1. For a discussion of unevenness, see Jameson (2003: 699– 701).
 2. Some scholars today are turning to “natural history” or “deep time” to avoid 
the limitations of chronology. See, for example, Gabrys (2011), Parikka (2014), 
and Russell (2011). We can also extend this search to the cognitive sciences. 
Humberto Maturana writes, “Living systems are cognitive systems, and liv-
ing, as a process, is a process of cognition” (quoted in Clarke 2014: ix).
 3. Herder’s emphasis on national language and race has been cited as a “roman-
tic” aberration. Moreover, his rejuvenation by Nazi’s to support their argu-
ment for purity certainly taints him.
 4. Rainer Wisbert comments on Herder, “Man is a unity of feelings, imagination 
and understanding and in all his powers— and this is the decisive— a creature 
of historicity” (quoted in Zammito, Menges, and Menze 2010: 665).
 5. Herder writes, “Nature’s year is long; the blooms of her plants are as many as 
these growths themselves and as the elements that nourish them. In India, 
Egypt, China, that has come to pass which nowhere and never will again 
come to pass on the earth; and so in Canaan, Greece, Rome, Carthage. The 
law of necessity and congruity, which is composed of potencies and place 
and time, everywhere brings forth different fruits” (quoted in Toulmin and 
Goodfield 1965: 139).
 6. David Allen’s very influential Getting Things Done is an example of this mech-
anization, or the Taylorization, of the mind.
 7. Fraser indicates the limits of the analogy of recent physics to social forms. He 
argues that “time in the physical world is so primitive that it cannot accom-
modate the idea of a present with respect to which one could speak of a 
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future and a past” (1987: 222). For a more optimistic view from a quantum 
physicist, see Rovelli (2018).
 8. There are numerous important works in this area. See, for example, Daniel 
Kahneman’s Thinking, Fast and Slow (2011), McTaggart’s classic essay (1908), 
and Alfred Gell’s The Anthropology of Time (1992).
 9. Alterity and otherness tend to be conflated; they are related. I follow the 
work of Levinas (1969), Blumenberg (1985), and Buber (1970), who distinguish 
between a dualistic self and other and a process of interaction where the self 
(and other) are in constant flux, the face to face.
 10. I have chosen to continue this system. BC and AD, after all, fit my argument 
better than the current use of BCE and CE, an effort to naturalize the Chris-
tian chronology.
 11. Confusion did exist, showing the problems of synchronization. The 1896 
Olympics in Athens was held March 25– April 3 (Julian) or April 6– 15 (Gre-
gorian). The US team planned to arrive two weeks early for preparation, 
but when it arrived in Italy, it learned that Greece was still on the Julian, 
rushed to Greece, and barely made the event. The 1908 Russian team was 
twelve days late for the London Olympics in 1908. To bring this closer to 
today, the Mars Climate Orbiter crashed into the Martian atmosphere 
(1999) because system engineers used two standards: US (foot pounds) and 
metric (newton).
 12. Schiffman argues that a key moment was in the writings of Montesquieu. 
He writes, “The commitment to understanding any given entity from within 
its context derived from an analytical view of the world that contextualized 
from without, by gauging the differences between entities” (2011: 209).
 13. Fasolt writes, “Only the faith that some real boundary exists between the 
present and the past lends plausibility to the belief that historians can actu-
ally place things past into the context of ‘their’ time and place” (2004: 12).
 14. For a description of the hierarchy in complex systems, see Simon (1962: 468– 
69) or Mitchell (2009).
 15. See, for example, Guldi and Armitage (2014), who sought to address recent 
attacks against humanistic study and a decline of history enrollments, argu-
ing that historians should embrace new methods, especially digital technol-
ogies and Big Data, to explore pasts beyond traditional time frames. A rather 
vitriolic critique by Deborah Cohen and Peter Mandler (2015) followed. For 
my purpose, the debate is over the boundary markers (beginning and end) 
and the nature of the content, spatialized time.
 16. In 1958, Braudel reflected on the impact of the longue durée: “In all logic, this 
orchestration of conjunctures (political and social), by transcending itself, 
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should have led us straight to the longue durée. But for a thousand reasons 
this transcendence has not been the rule, and a return to the short term is 
being accomplished even now before our very eyes” (1980: 30).
 17. See, for example, a wonderful video produced by Claire L. Evans, “The Evo-
lution of the Earth in Sixty Seconds” (Lores 2009), which literally punctuates 
the shortness of the history of humans, let alone the Anthropocene.
 18. For an inquiry that takes up the Anthropocene but operates using dif-
ferent times, see Parikka (2014). I find the work that invokes “deep time” 
to be more willing to question the ordering and classing propensities of 
classical time. See, for example, Smail (2008), Zielinski (2006), and Parikka 
(2013).
 19. Young writes, “Initially, I wrote about all these [wars] as if war and peace were 
discrete: prewar, war, peace, or postwar. Over time, this progression of wars 
has looked to me less like a progression than a continuation: as if between 
one war and the next, the country was on hold” (2012: 1).
 20. In psychology, an important thread is the work that translates the ideas of 
Lev Vygotsky for US psychological sciences. See Cole (1985), Wertsch (1985a, 
1985b), and Vygotsky (1978).
 21. See especially the work of Edwin Hutchins.
 22. I am thankful to Harry Harootunian for bringing this classic to my attention.
 23. In my reading, they develop this idea independently of Lave and Wenger 
(1991), which in my mind further supports the similarity across disciplines, 
especially the shift away from categories of being to activities that constitute 
groupings or categories.
 24. This is a particularly apt term coined by Jonathan Walton in my seminar, the 
Politics of Time.
 25. McGann writes, “The simplicity of the computer is merciless. It will expose 
every jot and tittle of your thought’s imprecisions” (2001: 142).
 26. History has generally ignored this understanding of time. See, for example, 
Novick 1988: 134– 43; Liakos (2017: 144– 45).
 27. For a discussion of how the document narrows the archive of history, see 
Smail (2008: 43– 66).
 28. The one paper that directly addresses the observer is Laurence S. Kubie’s 
paper “The Neurotic Potential and Human Adaptation” (Pias 2016: 66– 97). 
For a fine description of the problem of the observer in cybernetics, see 
Hayles (1999: 73– 80).
 29. Bertalanffy explained psycho- physical organization: “Thus what is seen 
depends on our apperception, on our line of attention and interest which, in 
turn, is determined by training” (1968: 236).
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 30. I recognize the debate that has surfaced in reaction to Marcus. A key issue in 
that debate, perhaps the central one, is whether deep learning should work 
with the cognitive sciences.
 31. Certeau, though, in criticism describes this well: “Historiography tends to 
prove that the site of its production can encompass the past: it is an odd 
procedure that posits death, a breakage everywhere reiterated in discourse, 
and that yet denies loss by appropriating to the present the privilege of reca-
pitulating the past as a form of knowledge” (1988: 5).
 32. What shall we call these? They are accounts, often rather narrative, of historic 
matter. See, for example, Doxiadis and Papadimitriou (2009). They include 
pictures; thus are they historical comics?
 33. See, for example, Scott McCloud’s discussion of the multiple temporalities, 
pacing, and motion possible in comics (1994: 94– 117). In Unflattening, Nick 
Sousanis (2015) uses the comic to argue that textual narratives are “flat” 
and that greater nuance and more dimensions are possible in the comic 
medium.
 34. This is especially evident in Foley’s website, http:// pathwaysproject .org. The 
electronic site uses the affordances of the technology to show relations. 
The same networked topics in the book are organized alphabetically. The 
juxtaposition between print text and electronic print demonstrates the affor-
dances of electronic media where, in the words of Bolter and Grusin (2000: 
34), “the logic of hypermediacy multiplies the signs of mediation and in this 
way tries to reproduce the rich sensorium of human experience.” It is debat-
able whether Foley succeeds, but the contrast to print demonstrates well its 
limitations.
 35. For a sophisticated and honest appraisal of the false certainties in our current 
system and a wonderful meditation on the possibilities that can emerge from 
this weakening of previous certitudes, see Nowotny (2016).
 36. Certeau finds this characteristic in de Cusa, who “devoted himself to think-
ing potentiality in terms of positions defined by a reciprocal determination” 
(2015: 28).
CHAPTER FOUR: CHANGE AND HISTORY
 1. DeLanda calls this form of reification “taxonomic essentialisms” (2006: 28).
 2. Bergson describes this cognitive process, the spatialization of time: “We need 
immobility, and the more we succeed in imagining movement as coinciding 
with the immobilities of the points of space through which it passes, the 
better we think we understand it” (2002: 257).
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 3. I think of Augé’s description of the airport as “supermodernity’s” nonplace, 
a nowhere we pass through, in solitude. Sharma (2014) reminds us that cir-
culation is only possible through the production of and dependence on mar-
ginalized temporalities, especially that of labor.
 4. I use the twentieth century because the understanding of time that follows 
is from the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is still much more 
recent than seventeenth- century Newtonian time.
 5. For a fine analysis that brings entropy to considerations of time in social 
theory, see Adam (1990, especially chapter 2).
 6. For a trenchant analysis of ways that economics ignores thermodynamics, 
see Georgescu- Roegen (1986). Recently, scholars in the humanities (Ernst, 
Parikka) and social sciences (Gabrys) have incorporated entropy in their 
analyses.
 7. The original title was (and it still makes me pause) “Feedback Mechanisms 
and Circular Causal Systems in Biological and Social Systems.”
 8. Bertalanffy writes, “It can be shown that the primary regulations in organic 
systems . . . are of the nature of dynamic interaction. They are based upon 
the fact that the living organism is an open system, maintaining itself in, or 
approaching a steady state. Superposed are those regulations which we may 
call secondary, and which are controlled by fixed arrangements, especially of 
the feedback type” (1968: 44).
 9. For a good description of homeostasis, see Michael Young (1988: 37– 40).
 10. Smail juxtaposed the Darwinian biological model to the Lamarkian model 
of cultural influence (ontogeny vs. philogeny) to question intention and 
causality. Instead, he argued for “blind variation and selective retention” 
(2008: 111).
 11. In his new book, Russell (2018) shows the coevolutionary process through a 
study of greyhounds in England.
 12. DeLanda writes, “The identity of any assemblage at any level of scale is always 
the product of a process . . . and it is always precarious, since other processes 
can destabilize it” (2006: 28).
 13. We are the only major industry in the twenty- first century of which I am 
familiar that gives away intellectual property to businesses and corporations 
that then charge us for access to what we gave away! It is actually worse than 
this sounds.
 14. For a provocative work that thinks of the Anthropocene through entropy, see 
Parikka (2014).
 15. Chakrabarty (2018) points to a fundamental difficulty in Anthropocene time, 
the copresence and tension between a world history and an earth history. An 
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epistemological shift is necessary to move from the human- centered to an 
earth- centered form of knowledge and problem solving.
 16. Jordheim recently pointed out the implicit power of the chronological system 
in the English translation of Koselleck’s essay “On the Need for Theory in the 
Discipline of History.” The phrase “theory of historical times” (geschichtlichen 
Zeiten) becomes “theory of periodizations” (Jordheim 2012: 151– 52). Periods, 
Newtonian duration, was the only theory of historical times imaginable.
 17. Serres writes, “Two distant points suddenly are close, even superimposed. If, 
further, you tear it in certain places, two points that were close can become 
very distant” (Serres with Latour 1995: 60).
 18. Several recent works on change, invention, and innovation argue that change 
often results from repetitive processes, collaboration, serendipity, and/or 
accidents (Ashton 2015; Kennedy 2016).
 19. Sewell (2008) calls this bifurcated temporality “surprising” (520) or “weird” 
(533). It is only strange if one accepts chronological time of progress and 
newness.
 20. Foley (2012) uses the metaphor of the agora, the ancient Greek notion of 
a site of exchange. He identifies three principal agoras: oral, textual, and 
electronic. The pathways project is accessible through its website, http:// 
pathwaysproject .org. The same material is available in a book, Oral Tradition 
and the Internet (Foley 2012). The website is organized through networked 
associations; the book is organized alphabetically. Foley writes, “The common 
misconception that the advent of writing technology cues the immediate clo-
sure of the oAgora [oral exchange] has proven time and again to be nothing 
more than blind tAgora [textual exchange] bias. Writing is used initially for 
record- keeping and similar accounting procedures, most certainly not 
for preserving group and personal identity, remembering history, transmit-
ting remedies for disease, and the myriad other social functions performed 
by oral traditions” (60).
 21. I am thankful to Cornelius Holtorf for bringing this essay to my attention. My 
contact with Cornelius, ironically, was due in large part to the closed, rather 
than open, access to publications (and the affordances of the internet).
 22. The early disdain for John Okada’s powerful account of the dilemmas faced 
by Japanese Americans in the camps in No- No Boy ([1957] 1976) is indicative 
of this early attempt at forgetting.
 23. For a fine example of multiple and layered times that come together a musical 
piece, see “The Nature of Time” by Lorren Stafford and Chris Strouth (2001).
 24. By science, I am thinking of the human sciences.
193n ot e s
CODA
 1. Cornelia Vismann writes, “Those who work with records are familiar with 
the problem: files pile up on desks, accumulate in offices, and fill attics and 
basements. Though registered, their order collapses time and again; though 
collected, quashed, dispatched, sold, shredded, or destroyed in some other 
way, they keep mushrooming” (2008: xi).
 2. There are many works that are troubled by social change and identify prob-
lems as the dysfunction wrought by technology (sometimes for good reason), 
such as Carr (2010), Turkle (2011), and Twenge (2017).
 3. Henri Lefebvre writes that mobility and stability are contradictory but con-
stituent elements of modernity (1995: 190).
 4. An interesting problem in a major subfield of AI, deep learning, is the dif-
ficulty of algorithms making sense of “commonsense reasoning,” while it 
excels in categorization (Marcus 2018). What if the categories are abstractions 
that organize life rather than those that have emerged from life?
 5. Through my work in scholarly communications with the Force11 community, 
I cannot help but wonder whether the obsession with progress and innova-
tion, fueled by digital technology, is akin to Lucy Ricardo and Ethel Mertz 
working on the candy production line in an episode of I Love Lucy: initially 
charmed by the ease of technology but increasingly pressured and ultimately 
frantic as production continues to accelerate.
 6. See, for example, chapter 4 of Ethan Kleinberg’s wonderfully titled book, 
Haunting History. He writes, “If anything, recent advances in the digital 
humanities have led us toward a resurgent neopositivism, chasing empiricist 
dreams toward the grail of history as a hard science” (2017: 118).
 7. I riff this subheading from the title of Chris Lorenz’s fine article on history 
and time that proposes we look for alternatives to “European chronocen-
trism” (2017). It is, of course, the title of a Bob Dylan song. I extend this search 
by considering how pasts are changing in the face of digital media.
 8. For fine monographs on the relation of cybernetics and the humanistic sci-
ences, see Hayles (1999) and Clarke (2009).
 9. Jasanoff goes on to describe these technologies: “Humility instructs us to 
think harder about how to reframe problems so that their ethical dimen-
sions are brought to light, which new facts to seek and when to resist ask-
ing science for clarification. Humility directs us to alleviate known causes of 
people’s vulnerability to harm, to pay attention to the distribution of risks 
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